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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1993, the Santa Cruz County California planning commission and
local trails advocates were poised to unveil a dynamic trails master plan
that would link together parks, beaches, schools, and shopping centers by
. Assistant Professor of Law, Levin College of Law, University of Florida; J.D. 1991, Cornell
University; Ph.D. 1998, Johns Hopkins University. The author wishes to thank the Levin College of
Law for its generous support of the research for this article, as well as her countless friends in the
trail community, especially those hard-working volunteers who have made building a trail a true
labor of love. I also wish to thank Greg Alexander, Chris Slobogin, Berta Esperanza Hernfndez-
Truyol, Sharon Rush, Phyliss Craig-Taylor, Alyson Flournoy and Nissa Laughner for helping me
figure out the Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence. I also want to thank my students for pa-
tiently listening to me work out my thoughts and frustrations with the Court's muddled mess.
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establishing a county-wide series of pedestrian and bicycle trails.' The
plan was a wish list for proponents of alternative transportation and envi-
ronmentalists, but it could not be accomplished by creating trails solely
on publicly owned land. Where necessary, the planning commission
drew paths on the map traversing private land, and the text indicated that
"[plrivate property which underlies a trail corridor... may require a trail
easement dedication as a condition of developmental permits." 2 Within
weeks of learning of the proposed map from his trails advocate mother,
Ken McCrary, whose family owned Big Creek Lumber, had organized a
grassroots opposition movement calling itself "Citizens for Responsible
Land Use" (CRLU). The principal point of contention was a belief by
CRLU members that the trails plan was nothing more than a land grab by
the government, that it further eroded their fundamental right to privacy,
and was nothing less than "extortion" when the government required a
trail easement as a condition for granting a development permit.3 Within
months the donations were pouring in, CRLU had a database of several
thousand addresses, and as many as 200 people were showing up at its
meetings. As the due date for release of the draft plan neared in the win-
ter of 1993, opposition rose to such a high level that the county Board of
Supervisors unanimously passed a resolution: any trail easement exac-
tions by the county must comply with state and federal law and constitu-
tional property rights protections. 4 But a promise to comply with current
law was not enough for trail opponents. After sufficient pressure, at a
Supervisors' meeting on January 25, 1994, the Board unanimously voted
to shelve the plan, disband the Trails Advisory Committee, and wipe the
contested maps off the county records.5
Perhaps most perplexing to the trails advocates was the strength and
hostility of the opposition to what they perceived to be an important step
in improving quality of life in the county, especially in light of the plan's
compliance with state and local laws requiring public access to beaches,
I. See DAN POLLAK, CAL. RESEARCH BUREAU, HAVE THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S 5TH
AMENDMENT TAKINGS DECISIONS CHANGED LAND USE PLANNING IN CALIFORNIA? (2000 (CRB-
00-004)), available at http://www.library.ca.govcrb/00/04/O0-004.pdf.
2. Trails Advisory Committee and County of Santa Cruz Parks, Open Space and Cultural Services
Department, 1994 Public Draft Trails Master Plan for the County of Santa Cruz (unapproved), re-
printed in POLLAK, supra note 1, at 17.
3. The CRLU organized under the banner of "exaction equals extortion," a slogan that echoes
Justice Scalia's reference in Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987), that the gov-
ernment had been engaged in an "out-and-out plan of extortion."
4. Easements for trails had often been exacted by the County Planners, but the practice had not yet
reached the level of scrutiny that occurred after the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision a
few months later in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
5. POLLAK, supra note I, at 43-50.
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open space zoning, development restrictions, alternative transportation
mandates, and the like.6  As cities grow, residents inevitably desire
greater and greater open spaces, parks, and recreational land to offset the
strain on current facilities caused by population growth and the expan-
sion of suburban developments. How, thought the Santa Cruz trail advo-
cates, could anyone object to an amenity as beneficial as an off-road bi-
cycle or pedestrian trail?
Santa Cruz County is by no means the only area that has seen land-
owner opposition to open space and recreational trail requirements; they
are just one in a growing movement of private property owners who use
a constitutional due process or takings rhetoric to claim trail development
violates their property rights.7 Developers and private landowners who
desire minimal restrictions on developing their lands are organizing grass
roots groups to increase political opposition to a variety of land use re-
strictions under the banner of Fifth Amendment rights.8 One property
rights advocacy group in El Dorado County, California, operates under
the slogan, "Fifth... or Fight."9 Other members include business own-
ers who see that survival in a growing economy means jobs, and jobs re-
quire high density or industrial uses, heavy investment in streets and
highways, and, heaven forbid, the possible sacrifice of spotted owls and
6. The California Coastal Act, which created the California Coastal Commission, requires public
access from the nearest road to the shoreline as a condition for the approval of coastal development
projects. Local coastal acts often mandate such exactions. Plus, the California constitution states
that no "individual, partnership, or corporation, claiming or possessing the frontage or tidal lands of
a harbor, bay, inlet, estuary, or other navigable water in this State, shall be permitted to exclude the
right of way to such water whenever it is required for any public purpose, nor to destroy or obstruct
the free navigation of such water." Cal. Coastal Act, Cal. Pub. Resources Code div. 20, §30212
(Deering, 2001); CAL. CONST. al. X, § 4. The Santa Cruz County 1980 general plan included in-
structions for generalized trail corridors on the County General Plan Land Uses and Facilities Maps.
POLLAK, supra note 1, at 46.
7. For example, the Monon Trail in Indianapolis, Indiana, fell victim to a tremendous amount of
opposition by landowners who blocked the trail with debris, posted "no-trespassing" signs, and
loudly decried the project at all possible opportunities. See Dennis Royalty, Public Benefits of the
Monon Trail are Worth the Trials, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Apr. 21, 1998, at N3. On the Pumpkinvine
Trail in northern Indiana, landowners actually placed pumpkins along the trail and then used them
for target practice, leaving the remains of the pumpkins strewed along the corridor. See Martin
DeAgostino, Group Says Trespassers Use Corridor to Get on Private Land, S. BEND TRJB. Dec. 18,
1997, at C2. Along the Missouri KATY trail, opponents set fire to a number of wooden bridges that
were being restored as each new mile was opened. In many cases, however, once the trail in ques-
tion opened, opposing landowners changed their tune and found ways to gain from the trail near
them. See John Cutter, Old Rails Finding New Life as Trails, at City Times; Pinellas Trail: From
Rails to Recreation, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 13, 1989, at 1.
8. See William Michael Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, the Narratives of Takings and Com-
pensation Statutes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1151 (1997); John Echeverria, The Politics of Property
Rights, available at http://www.envpoly.org/papers/politics.htm (last visited May 29, 2001).
9. POLLAK, supra note I, at 60.
HeinOnline  -- 26 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 401 2001
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
snail darters.'0 Takings has become the organizing rhetoric that repre-
sents the most serious challenge to trail planning. As Molly Ivins ex-
plains: "The property rights movement. . is not so much an actual
group of citizens of like mind in this country as it is the deliberate crea-
tion of the big timber, big mining, big oil and big cattle industries. The
industries built this AstroTurf (meaning phony grassroots) movement to
help lobby against repealing outrages like the 1898 mining law, cut-rate
grazing fees, cut-rate oil royalties on public lands, etc.""
While governments routinely use eminent domain to build parks or to
require that developers leave certain percentages of land undeveloped or
dedicated to green uses, government land use regulations in favor of rec-
reational trails seem to have met with unusually stiff opposition from
landowners. Paradoxically, trails fall in the gap between land use regula-
tions for roads and transportation and those for parks and recreational
uses. But while the public has strongly embraced trails as a beneficial
quality of life amenity, politicians have backed away from them. The
property rights movement has identified trails as a particularly important
battleground; yet little scholarship has been devoted solely to the way in
which governmental land use powers have been used to develop recrea-
tional trails or have been hindered in doing so. This article attempts to
locate the legal aspects of recreational trail development within the in-
creasingly powerful property rights movement. 2 The most complex re-
sult of this rising property rights rhetoric is a clear shift in constitutional
takings doctrine to be more sympathetic to landowners' arguments.
Thus, the interplay of takings decisions and trails development will be
the focus of most of this article.
Two aspects of the current rise in property rights organizing and its
opposition to trails are of interest. The first is the rhetorical appeal of the
language of constitutional rights and takings prohibitions. To many
landowners, government limitations on land use have simply become too
excessive; to these landowners, the potential threat of a public trail or an
open space exaction is the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back.' 3
10. POLLAK, supra note I, at 58.
II. Molly Ivins, Republicans are Busy Pre-Fouling Their Own Nest, FT. WORTH STAR
TELEGRAM, Jan. 4, 2001, at 9.
12. Oregon just passed a constitutional amendment, by a fifty-four percent majority, that would
require compensation for any regulation that negatively affects property values. There were thirty-
five statewide ballot measures in the November, 2000, election dealing with land development is-
sues. See Randy Gragg, Measure 7 Detonates Land-Use Planning, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Dec. 3,
2000 at F3; John Roach, Growth Issues Spiral on All Sides in Voting, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRtB. Bus.
NEWS, Nov. 9, 2000, available at 2000 WL 28950598.
13. As one landowner stated: "This country has the habit to nibble away our rights. People in
[26:2
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Far greater restrictions on land use have been accepted with less opposi-
tion, as with zoning, building set-backs, upgraded sewer rules, exactions
for roads and sidewalks, and even certain wetlands restrictions.' 4  By
contrast, a pedestrian trail or an open space requirement is generally not
a heavy burden on a landowner. Moreover, in the case of trails travers-
ing privately-owned land, as was proposed on the Santa Cruz County
maps, the government was willing to pay compensation for the trail
easement. But to many landowners, compensation simply is not enough.
Trails raise the specter of long lines of public trespassers loitering and
littering, breeding crime, and destroying private property while allowing
their dogs to foul the footpaths. The banner has thus become the right to
privacy, the right to exclude, the right to prevent physical intrusion on
one's fiefdom, and ultimately the right to control and limit access to
scarce natural resources.' 5
The second aspect is the remarkable resurgence of local, grass-roots
political opposition that often leaves county commissioners reeling.1
6
Local governments are caught in the crossfire between increasing federal
and state environmental mandates to regulate growth; local interest
groups promoting everything from bicycling, protecting endangered
redwoods, and limiting urban sprawl; to business leaders, real estate in-
terests, and professional sports franchises advocating for their special in-
terests. One side is calling for regulations that promote conservation and
preservation while the other is calling for smaller government and pri-
vate, rather than public, initiatives to achieve quality of life enhance-
general are feeling afraid of government. It's getting so big. It feels like a machine." POLLAK, su-
pra note 1, at 48.
14. These regulations did not pass uncontested, yet the public use and necessity requirements
were easier to show. See. e.g., Lois Shifter, Taking Stock of the Takings Debate, 38 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 153 (1997); Note, Supreme Court Validates Open Space Preservation, Postpones Question
of Inverse Condemnation, 10 ENVTL. L. REP. 10125 (1980); John Vandlik, Waiting for Uncle Sam to
Buy the Farm... Forest or Wetland? A CaIl for New Emphasis on State and Local Land Use Con-
trols in Natural Resource Protection, 8 FORD. ENVTL. U. 691 (1997); Note, Techniques for
Preserving Open Spaces. 75 HARV. L. REV. 1622 (1962).
15. Rural landowners are especially adamant that trails bringing city folks into the country are
ruining the peace and quiet that they sought when they escaped from the city. See Cutter, supra note
7, at I; Traci Carl, Crossing Paths: Some Property Owners Rail at Public Proposals for Using Aban-
doned Tracks, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 9, 1997, at 51.
16. The group "Oregonians In Action," for instance, spent more than $880,000 on the November
2000 election promoting Measure 7, that would constitutionalize compensation whenever a land-use
regulation affects property values. The group also sponsored the Dolan v. City of Tigard litigation to
the U.S. Supreme Court, which ultimately resulted in the City of Tigard paying compensation of
$1.5 million for a bike path and flood plain across the Dolan's 1.67-acre downtown parcel. Dave
Hogan, Land-Use Wins Buoy Oregonians in Action, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Dec. 25, 2000, at Al.
2001)
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ments. 7 In the realm of local politics, governmental land use restrictions
and the exercise of eminent domain have a very different currency than
they do in the courts.'8
I?. City and county planners feel like they are caught "in a crossfire" between environmental
groups and property rights advocates and developers. See Jeff Barnard, Groups Want Land-Use
Laws Kept Up, THE COLUMBIAN, Dec. 20, 2000, at C3. The El Dorado County, California Planning
Commission experienced an eye-opening level of opposition to its draft general plan. Changes be-
tween Draft 2 and Draft 3 of its general plan show the influence of local property rights interests.
The underlined passages in the following were added in draft 3 and the strike-outs were removed.
1) "The development of these visions and strategies serves to provide for the underlying ap-
proach of the General Plan. This approach is the identification of distinct planning concept ar-
eas where growth will be directed and ..... g ..h ..ill be limited as a means of providing for
a more manageable land use pattern .... Specifically, the Plan will direct planned growth to
Community Regions and Rural Centers and imit rovide for planned growth within Rural Re-
gions."
2) Mandatory developer contributions of bicycle and pedestrian paths, transit stops, parking,
and open space for sensitive habitats were changed to "negotiable design features."
3) The "Rural Residential Low Density (RRL)" designation was eliminated, which would have
required minimum parcel sizes of at least 40-160 acres, and replaced with the "Rural Residen-
tial" category that would allow one unit per 10 acres.
4) With regard to the "Natural Resource" category, the plan was changed as follows: "The-puf-
pse. f this land use .ign.tie is to pete:t The Purpose of the Natural Resources (NR) des-
ignation is to identify areas that contain economically viable natural resources and to protect the
economic viability of those resources and those engaged in harvesting/rocessing of those re-
sources from interests that are in opnosition to the managed conservation and economic, benefi-
cial use of those -resources. The important natural resources of the County includ_.ifg forested
areas, and i..t.. w.at r_ sh"e,, d and .i-'zr anr:yo, eritfi:e w'..ildlife hb"itas .- F& .and :ndang:red
speeies- habilt, mineral resources, ..elands, lake. a.d ponds, a4d a... .. !he ........
mcnt efd:ieeapmen! wou'zld eempzmis these a:nturo! reselircz vlues."
5) Mandatory open space requirements were eliminated for the Planned Development Combin-
ing Zone Districts.
6) The revised plan eliminated prohibitions on development on steep slopes: "Disturbance of
slopes forty (40) percent or greater shall be prohibiIe discouraged to minimize the visual im-
pacts of grading and vegetation removal. Stl:h-k Festiz ns r buildi.g en e:loe shall be
designed en. all development IFeUezts przehibiting developmaet en- slopes ferty (40) pezrezite
gfeete .
7) The revised plan eliminated setback requirements for streams, rivers, lakes, and wetlands.
8) In the section on rare, threatened and endangered species, the revised plan eliminated a pol-
icy calling for the preparation of Habitat Conservation Plans to protect sensitive plant and ani-
mal species and their habitats. Also eliminated were policies to map sensitive species habitat
and maintain an inventory of listed rare and endangered species. El Dorado County General
Plan Third Administrative Draft (annotated), October 1993, reprinted in POLLAK, supra note I,
at 61-62.
Although many of these changes were eliminated in the final version, enough remained to support
the Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund's lawsuit on the grounds that the 1996 General Plan's environ-
mental impact report violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), the Planning and
Zoning Law, and the Public Trust Doctrine. POLLAK, supra note I, at 65.
18. See Dick Welsh's Political Actions for a Property Rights Activist Website, at
http://www.halcyon.com/dick/election.html (last modified Apr. 7, 1997). Mr. Welsh explains that
being loud and visible at local elections, and stacking the audience, is effective. Id. He also says
that "local elections are much easier to influence than the nationals. Besides, not much media atten-
HeinOnline  -- 26 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 404 2001
Eminent Domain, Exactions, and Railbanking
The property rights movement is a product of the 1990s, a period that,
not coincidentally, saw significant population growth and suburban
sprawl in uneasy juxtaposition with a commitment to environmental
regulations and "smart growth" land planning policies.' 9 The tension be-
tween the "development as usual" proponents and middle-class yuppie
environmentalists continues to be played out in many venues, from envi-
ronmental regulations, species and habitat protection, historic preserva-
tion, open space and recreational uses, to alternative transportation man-
dates, 20 and smart growth planning.2' These battles overlay a complex
legal structure of eminent domain, regulatory takings, zoning, and police
power jurisprudence that, according to the movement's literature, enables
big government to run roughshod over the small landowner.
22
The property rights movement also has had its victories. Much schol-
arship has focused on the last fifteen years of Supreme Court takings de-
cisions that have, according to some, radically limited the power of gov-
ernments to regulate or limit land uses.23 Between the 1930s and the
tion is focused on the local elections." Id. There are countless newspaper articles noting that local
councils and commissions voted against trail development when large organizations, like the local
farm bureau, oppose them. See. e.g., Carl, supra note 15, at 51.
19. Smart growth represents a movement toward regulated development that encourages urban
infill; mixed-use zoning to combine residential, commercial, and light industrial uses in close prox-
imity to decrease traffic; development that encourages mass and alternative transportation; and
higher-density suburban development to protect open spaces and scarce natural resources. Janice C.
Griffith, The Preservation of Community Green Space: Is Georgia Ready to Combat Sprawl with
Smart Growth? 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 563 (2000). See also Christopher Yates, Reagan Revolu-
tion Redux in Takings Clause Jurisprudence, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 531 (1995); Exec. Order
No. 12,630, 53 Fed. Reg. 8,859 (Mar. 15, 1988); Republican Contract with America (1994) at
http://www.house.gov/house/contract/CONTRACT.html; Treanor, supra note 8; Glen Sugameli,
Takings Bills Threaten Private Property. People. and the Environment, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. LJ. 521
(1997). See also generally Symposium, Sustainable Growth: Evaluating Smart Growth Efforts in
the Southeast, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (2000). See also infra Pt. VII (discussion of the politics of
the Property Rights Movement).
20. Florida passed a constitutional amendment to mandate a high speed train (to begin construc-
tion by 2003) linking its major cities. See Laura Kinsler, High Speed Rail Backer Prepares Funding
Plan, THE TAMPA TRIB., Dec. I, 2000, at 4. Yet, at the same time, Oregon, a leader in the smart
growth movement, just passed a constitutional amendment that threatens to gut its land-use regula-
tions by requiring compensation for every regulation that affects property values. See Gragg, supra
note 12, at F03.
2 1. See John Echeverria, Why the Takings Issue Matters, at
http://www.envpoly.org/papers/why.htm (last visited May 29, 2001).
22. Many of these property rights groups ultimately bankroll important litigation. See. e.g., Ho-
gan, supra note 16, at AI (Oregonians in Actions' support of the Dolan litigation); Ruth Marcus,
Issues Group Funds Seminars for Judges: Classes at Resorts Cover Property Rights, WASH. POST,
Apr. 9, 1998, at AI (Olin Foundation's support of the Preseault litigation).
23. Michael Heller & James Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of Takings, 112 HARV.
L. REv. 997 (1999); Stuart Miller, Triple Ways to Take: The Evolution and Meaning of the Supreme
Court's Three Regulatory Taking Standards, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 243 (1998); J. Peter Myme, Ten Ar-
2001]
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1980s the Supreme Court has been reluctant to interfere with governmen-
tal land-use regulations, either under due process or takings. But after
the watershed decisions of 1987,24 the Court has elevated scrutiny in
cases involving exactions or conditions for the granting of development
permits, and may do so in basic land use regulations as well, which his-
torically received very deferential review by the Court.25 Two principal
Supreme Court cases, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission26 (1987)
and Dolan v. City of Tigard2 7 (1994), have established what appears to be
a distinctly new test with elevated scrutiny for governmental exactions, a
mechanism routinely used by planners to extend and develop trail net-
works. Recreational trails will be at great risk if they are not seen as fal-
28ling squarely within police power boundaries.
The current trend of property rights advocacy has created a schism
over, what I will term in this paper, "quality-of-life commitments" by lo-
cal governments.29 Open space requirements in dense inner cities clearly
meet a police power health, safety, and welfare standard. However, it is
not entirely clear that a pedestrian and bicycle path to the beach, an open
space requirement for suburban developments which are already land in-
tensive, or a buffer zone between the Appalachian Trail and neighboring
land uses meets that clear public purpose test. 30  Nevertheless, much of
the recent "smart growth" movement is centered around normative
evaluations about the quality of urban life, including access to rural ar-
guments for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89 (1995); Eric
Freyfogle, The Owning and Taking of Sensitive Lands, 43 UCLA L. REV. 77 (1995).
24. Four important regulatory takings cases came down that year. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704
(1987); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
25. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San
Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
26. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
27. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
28. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 119 S.Ct. 1624 (1999); Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v.
Superior Court, 968 P.2d 993 (Cal. 1999), cert. denied 526 U.S. 1131 (1999); Parking Ass'n of
Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200 (Ga. 1994), cert. denied 115 S.Ct. 2268 (1995) (Jus-
tice Thomas's dissent in the cert. denial notes that the states are hopelessly divergent in their posi-
tions on the applicability of Nollan and Dolan).
29. Justice Brennan, speaking positively about historic preservation laws, noted that "historic con-
servation is but one aspect of the much larger problem, an environmental one, of enhancing--or per-
haps developing for the first time--the quality of life for people." Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 108 (1978) (citations omitted).
30. See Lawrence Berger, Public Use. Substantive Due Process and Takings - An Integration, 74
NEB. L. REV. 843 (1995); Jan Laitos, The Public Use Paradox and the Takings Clause, 13 J.
ENERGY, NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL, L. 9 (1993); John Humbach, Constitutional Limits on the
Power to Take Private Property: Public Purpose and Public Use, 66 OR. L. REV. 547 (1987).
[26:2
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eas, alternative transportation modes, safe and aesthetically pleasing
parks and forests, historic preservation, cultural and ethnic diversity and
integration, and a replication of small-town American public life.?
The viability of the use of eminent domain, exactions, open space re-
quirements, growth limitations, and historic preservation laws for en-
hancing quality-of-life features in our urban environments has not been
faced head-on by the Supreme Court. Yet quality-of-life decisions are
too important to leave to the fickle marketplace; it is a perfectly legiti-
mate role of the police power to enhance life as well as preserve it. How
that may be done within current takings jurisprudence is rather unclear,
however. The purpose of this article, therefore, is to focus on the legal
foundation of land-use regulations in the specific area of recreational
trails and their buffer-zone greenbelts. Of course, the legal foundation
does not always correspond to political reality. Despite the ultimate le-
gality and justification for quality-of-life features, the property rights
movement often mounts a formidable campaign: threats of costly litiga-
tion, takings challenges, and an appealing property rights rhetoric pre-
vents the state from, as they see it, pandering to a small interest group of
lycra-clad cyclists, crunchy tree huggers, urban snobs, and European
wannabes3
Perhaps the most serious threat to recreational trails comes in the form
of opposition to the popular rails-to-trails program that recycles aban-
doned rail corridors into trails and greenways. 3 Rail-trails are being at-
tacked in the courts on the ground that conversion to a trail is an addi-
tional burden on adjacent land that deserves compensation. In many
cases, landowners are challenging the railroad's ownership of the corri-
dor in the first place, even though a railroad may have been peacefully
running trains along its corridor for more than a century. And the federal
railbanking law that facilitates conversion has been found to work a tak-
ing in one hotly-contested case.34 Because rail-trails comprise the lion's
share of new trail development, this article will thoroughly analyze the
federal railbanking law under the Court's newest regulatory takings doc-
31. See James Charles Smith, Law. Beauty, and Human Stability: A Rose is a Rose is a Rose, 78
CAL. L. REV. 787 (1990); JOHN COSTONIS, ICONS AND ALIENS: LAW, AESTHETICS, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE (1989).
32. I have heard the smart growth movement labeled just one "cultural value" with comments like
"Americans don't want to live like the Japanese or the French." However, many trail advocates use
comparisons to Europe, especially Denmark, for models of bike-friendly urban growth. See Carolyn
Lockhead, An Illusion of Auto Freedom, S.F. CHRON., June 4, 2000, at 2ZI; Despite Congestion.
US. Isn t Prepared to go Full Cycle-Letters, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 27, 2000, at 4G,
33. See infra PL IV (discussion of railbanking).
34. Preseault v. U.S., 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
2001]
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trines.
Part I1 provides a brief account of the legal structure of governmental
land use controls and the current state of takings jurisprudence to form a
basic background for the different ways in which recreational trails have
been developed. Part III gives a brief summary of the Supreme Court's
regulatory takings jurisprudence and the way in which it identifies the
property interests and the mechanisms for restraining governmental ex-
cess. Parts IV through VI examine three of the particular legal avenues
of trail development currently in use: eminent domain, developer exac-
tions, and the federal railbanking program. Part VII looks more closely
at the politics of the property rights movement and the legal tactics used
to derail trail projects. In the end, although all three methods of obtain-
ing the land necessary for trails are legal, the necessity of dealing with
the heightened emotions and political pandering that trail projects engen-
der requires a more subtle approach. Part VIII suggests a number of dif-
ferent ways to enhance the political climate in favor of trails.
II. LAND ACQUISITION FOR DEVELOPING RECREATIONAL TRAILS
Because of the "smart growth" planning movement, rising gas prices, a
greater attention to health and safety, and dismay with oceans of parking
lots and eight-lane roads, ever-growing numbers of Americans are walk-
ing and riding bicycles for recreation and transportation."5 The popular-
ity of alternative transportation has translated into a tremendous impetus
for developing new trails within urban settings, linking urban centers
with rural areas, and in rural parks and wildernesses for more rugged cy-
cling, horseback riding, and hiking opportunities.36 And because much
35. The National Rails-to-Trails Conservancy estimated that people visited their local rail-trails
96 million times in 1996. See Rails to Trails Conservancy Website, at
http://www.railtrails.org/RTCactivepagesHome/Main.asp (current rail-trail statistics printed on
map). This number is five times greater than the number of people who attended every pro NFL
football game combined during the same period. See NFL Attendance on the Decline, ALBANY
TIMES UNION, Mar. II, 1997, at C2. Yet, while the cost of building a trail is often a fraction the cost
of building a stadium, construction of trails is often seen as promoting an elite special interest while
stadiums are viewed as grand public assets. The Transportation Efficiency Act (TEA2 1) recognizes
that bicycling is an important form of transportation and provides that ten percent of federal highway
funds be made available for enhancements of transportation alternatives, such as bike trails. Trans-
portation Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3037(a), 112 Stat. 107, 387.88 (1998) (codified
at 49 U.S.C. § 5309).
36. Canada is building a ten thousand-mile trail network linking the Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic
oceans, with relay runners expected to converge near Ottawa with flasks of water from all three
oceans for the inauguration in 2001. The publicity devoted to the trail is staggering. One commen-
tator called "the construction of a cross-country recreational trail ... a 21st-century exercise in na-
tion building." James Brooke, Trail Burnishes Canada's Self-Image: A 10,000-Mile Network Cross-
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of the urban and suburban growth of the past thirty years did not include
venues for alternative transportation, trail advocates believe we have al-
most a moral imperative to catch up by building trails along as many pre-
existing roads as are practicable.7 Some cities have mandated that all
new streets must be built to accommodate bicycles.38
Once a governing body determines that a bicycle trail linking parks
and schools, or a wilderness trail to a pristine fishing pond should be
built, it can set about acquiring the necessary land or trail easements. If
the landowners are willing to sell or donate either the land or a trail
easement, theIgovernment can simply purchase it. But a single dissent-
ing landowner can break the link in a trail by refusing to sell if the gov-
ernment has no mechanism for appropriating the land. Unlike traditional
parks that are usually block-shaped and can be created from the holdings
of a single landowner, trails require thin parcels across multiple tracts of
land. And although a trail may be only ten feet wide, a 100 foot ease-
ment may be necessary to construct adequate buffer zones of vegetation,
fences, or embankments to protect neighboring uses and achieve the de-
sired effect for trail users. 39 Yet even a relatively narrow trail can easily
require hundreds of small parcels or easements.
In the face of an unwilling seller, the trail builder has three options.
First, it can exercise the power of eminent domain, condemn the neces-
sary land, and pay the landowner the fair market value of the property
rights being taken. This forced appropriation of the land has the benefit
of being quick and relatively inexpensive, but it requires that the builder
ing the 10 Provinces and Three Territories Turns the Nation's Gaze Inward, PORTLAND
OREGONIAN, July 30, 2000, at A20. The Washington, D.C.-based National Rails-to-Trails Conser-
vancy website keeps track of the nation's growing obsession with trails. See Rails to Trails Conser-
vancy Website, supra note 35.
37. In the 1970s and 1980s, because of the tremendous growth in automobile use, and the ineffi-
ciency and sometimes outright danger of walking, many cities stopped building sidewalks in subur-
ban areas, forcing the few lone pedestrians and cyclists onto the shoulders of sometimes very busy
streets. But cyclists ar attempting to "take back" the streets. See Ross Petty, The Impact of the
Sport of Bicycle Riding on Safety Laws, 35 AMER. BUS. U. 185 (1998). Even in a city as small as
Gainesville, Florida, cyclists die at an alarming rate along busy stretches of highway. The response
seems to be a call for more educated and considerate motorists as well as better and safer bicycle
lanes. See Cindy Swirko, Cyclist Death Prompts Worries, GAINESVILLE SUN, Aug. 3, 1999, at Al;
Erich Spivey, 441 Cyclists Killed on Paynes Prairie, GAINESVILLE SUN, Jan. 23, 2001.
38. Tucson, Arizona, for instance, adopted in its Dec. 10, 1999 Comprehensive Plan a section on
urban trails. Tucson transportation policy also requires that new streets being built include a marked
bike-lane shoulder or separate bicycle path. See PAG Regional Transportation Overview, at
http://www.pagnet.org/TPD/tpdoverview.html (last updated 04/19/01).
39. On average, the author estimates that it takes approximately twelve acres of land to construct a
one mile stretch of trail one hundred feet wide. A one-mile length of trail could therefore easily re-
quire land from twenty to thirty separately-owned parcels.
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have the power of eminent domain and the political backbone to use it.
All utility companies and departments of transportation have eminent
domain power, as do most county and municipal governments. But some
states do not allow the use of eminent domain solely for constructing a
trail, though a trail built as part of a new road may be permitted.4 ° While
most governing bodies have general eminent domain powers, many
landowners question whether trail use meets the "public necessity" or
"public use" test required for exercising that power. Moreover, many
parks departments and private non-profit trail groups usually do not have
eminent domain powers. Even where a local parks board might have the
power to condemn private land, sometimes exercising that power can be
political suicide when local elections are often won and lost on single is-
sue campaigns.4 ' Taking private land for a road is one thing; taking it for
a trail can be another.
The second method of obtaining land for trails is to impose the dedica-
tion of a trail easement as a condition in building permits or development
plans.42 These "exactions" commonly require subdivision developers to
provide streets and parks within the subdivision, and perhaps to pay for
widening of access roads and land for expansion or construction of local
schools. 43 While these exactions are relatively common, they are being
scrutinized more closely in recent years under the Supreme Court's Nol-
lan/Dolan line of cases. 44 Moreover, while courts generally find it rea-
sonable to require a developer to set aside up to fifteen percent of its land
for open spaces, parks, schools, and streets, when bicycle trails are
thrown in there often isn't any land left. Trails are often the last to be
added and the first to go when the minimum set-asides have been
40. See East Oaks Develop. Inc. v. Iowa DOT, 603 N.W.2d 566 (Iowa, 1999).
41. See Carl, supra note 15, at 51.
42. James Holloway & Donald Guy, A Limitation on Development Impact Exactions to Limit So-
cial Policy-Making: Interpreting the Takings Clause to Limit Land Use Policy-Making for Social
Welfare Goals of Urban Communities, 9 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1 (2000); Sam Starrit & John
McClanahan, Land Use Planning and Takings: The Viability of conditional Exactions to Conserve
Open Space in the Rocky Mountain West After Dolan v. City of igard, 30 LAND & WATER L. REv.
415(1995).
43. See Hoepker v. City of Madison, 1996 WL 167619 551 (Wis. Ct. App.) (table); Deerfield Es-
tates v. Township of E. Brunswick, 286 A.2d 498 (N.J. 1972); Divan Bldrs. Inc. v. Planning Bd. of
Township of Wayne, 334 A.2d 30 (N.J. 1975); Jenad, Inc. v. Scarsdale, 218 N.E.2d 673 (N.Y.
1966); Commercial Bldrs. of N. Cal. v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
44. See infra Pt. IV (discussion on exactions). Traditionally, takings and due process challenges
called for a minimum standard of scrutiny of the legitimacy of the governmental regulation, but that
scutiny has been elevated in the exactions context to at least some type of middle tier scrutiny. See
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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reached.4s The justification for exacting land for parks is that the addi-
tional population brought into an area by the development will place ad-
ditional strains on pre-existing facilities. Thus, it seems only fair to re-
quire developers to bear their fair share of the new burden for public
facilities. But trails often bring outsiders into newly developed areas,
particularly urban dwellers who want easy access to the countryside.46
Developers may dissent from exactions that appear to benefit residents
from outside the subdivision who want access to the development's new
facilities and resources. What they fail to consider, however, is that their
development affects urban dwellers who cannot reach rural open spaces
except by driving through the new developments that ring most cities.
These exactions can take three different forms. The government can
require the landowner to actually dedicate the land to the public body,
thus removing it from the private tax roles and relieving the owner of li-
ability for maintenance.47 Or the landowner can simply be required to
leave certain lands undeveloped though no ownership transfer occurs. A
third option falls in between, and may entail conveyance of an easement,
though fee title will remain with the landowner. If the land is dedicated,
the landowner no longer may exclude the public from use of the facili-
ties.
45. Trails suffer when landowners complain about exactions. One survey of California city and
county land planners showed that after Nollan and Dolan these agencies stopped their practice of
requesting trail and public access exactions more often than any other exaction. The study also
showed that the agencies listing landowner objections to certain exactions listed objections to open
space, parks, and trails as second only to exactions for modifying or building roads. The study indi-
cates that landowners were very likely to complain (roughly thirty-five percent of agencies reported
objections) about trails, and forty-two percent of counties and sixteen percent of cities modified their
exactions for trails in response to these objections. POLLAK, supra note I, at 19, 20, 24.
46. While some rural landowners may complain about city-dwellers invading rural areas, on a
reciprocity of advantage analysis, urban and rural centers provide cross-benefits to each other's
population. However, one of the problems of suburban sprawl is that it tends to sever the linkages
between the rural and the urban, making residents of each less likely to venture into the other's terri-
tory. Trails can easily be viewed as a sort of compensation to urban landowners who have lost their
access to rural areas because of ever-widening circles of suburban development. Trails help relink
the urban and the rural in ways that recreate some of the peacefulness and safety that was associated
with earlier times. As Frank Michelman explained, "[elfficiency-motivated collective measures will
regularly inflict on countless people disproportionate burdens which cannot practically be erased by
compensation settlements. In the face of this difficulty, it seems we are pleased to believe that we
can arrive at an acceptable level of assurance that over time the burdens associated with collectively
determined improvements will have been distributed 'evenly' enough so that everyone will be a net
gainer." Frank 1. Michelman, Property. Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of 'Just Compensation' Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1225 (1967). See also STEVEN EAGLE,
REGULATORY TAKINGS (1996) §8-2(g)(1).
47. This was attempted by the city in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 380 (1994), with
regard to the bicycle trail.
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Unlike streets and parks, trails pose unique problems. With the devel-
opment of streets, many subdividers choose to retain control over the
streets and then transfer that control to homeowners' associations to limit
governmental interference within their development. In other cases,
those streets are dedicated to the city or county so that local maintenance,
snow removal, and upkeep costs are not assessed solely to the develop-
ment's residents. Some developers that are required to devote a certain
amount of land to parks can opt to privatize the parks and limit access to
residential owners and still satisfy the public open space requirement.48
Trails, however, cannot be closed effectively. They are not very func-
tional if they simply circle around the development. Most trail users
need long stretches of trail to gain access to other areas. So when local
planners demand that developers reserve a portion of land for a trail, it is
usually to link trails to neighboring areas. The landowner most likely
will lose all power to regulate or restrict public access.
With both eminent domain and exactions, the government effectively
appropriates either the land or at least a trail easement. But local master
plans do not provide for compensation in the case of exactions, only ap-
propriations. As a result, exactions fall in the narrow space between out-
right appropriations and government regulations that limit uses of land
under what is termed the general police power.49 In the latter category,
the courts have held that most regulations that have incidental effects on
land values are necessary and constitutional, but that regulations that "go
too far" in imposing onerous burdens on landowners effectively "take"
the land and therefore require compensation. 5° The zoning plan that
completely zones a parcel into disutility will often be held to have
"taken" the land even though the government never attempted to appro-
priate directly the title to the land.5' Under such "regulatory takings," the
government must compensate the landowner if the restrictions are exces-
sive. If not, they are deemed legitimate police power actions that balance
the benefits and burdens of living in a civilized society.52 Deciding
where a trail exaction falls, however, can be a tricky exercise.
48. The City of Tigard allowed Mrs. Dolan to retain private ownership and use of the flood plain
and the land required to remain as open space in Dolan. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 380
(1994). See also Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 394 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1964).
49. The police power is generally viewed as the power of the legislature to pass laws to further the
general health, welfare, safety, and morals of-the citizenry. It is based on sovereignty. The Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution place limits on that power. U.S. CONST. amend.
V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
50. Pa. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922).
51. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992).
52. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
[26:2
HeinOnline  -- 26 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 412 2001
Eminent Domain, Exactions, and Railbanking
The railbanking statute, which allows for the conversion of abandoned
rail corridors to trails, is ostensibly a regulation on the procedures that
railroads must follow under the Surface Transportation Board's aban-
donment jurisdiction. The effect of railbanking, according to some, is to
prevent land from reverting to adjacent landowners. When a corridor is
banked instead of abandoned, adjacent landowners who have a rever-
sionary interest in the corridor land claim their land has been "taken" and
they seek compensation. When the dispute is viewed as a pre-emption of
state-defined property rights, it might appear that the statute has inter-
fered with the right to possession or the right to exclude which are core
property rights. But when viewed as the destruction of a contingent fu-
ture interest, as I argue below, the regulation does not "take" any prop-
erty because the landowner had no property right to begin with. To de-
termine exactly how the statute operates on the relevant property rights,
however, we must delve into the Court's extremely complex regulatory
takings jurisprudence.
Ideally, all local land planners would like to regulate land use in such a
way as to achieve the normative values of a thriving and healthy envi-
ronment without having to pay for every action.5 3 A healthy and desir-
able community benefits everyone, even those landowners whose uses
are restricted.s4 Yet people complain when property taxes climb. Walk-
ing the fine line between when a regulation is deemed a legitimate police
power and when it rises to the level of a regulatory taking is not easy
given the Supreme Court's recent attempts to create new bright line
rules.55 At least one federal regulation, the rails-to-trails program, at-
tempts to "regulate" land use and promote trails by converting aban-
doned rail corridors to multiple-use greenways5 6 However, determining
whether an exaction or a regulation must be compensated requires under-
standing the constitutional framework of the Takings Clause.
53. The author notices that most local governments are in a Catch-22 situation: their budget is
often directly tied to property values, so until public amenities are available to raise local land val-
ues, the funds to create the amenities are not available.
54. Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 (1914) (holding that the law requiring that
coal seams be left along property lines secured an average reciprocity of advantage); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 134 (1978) (holding that the "preservation of land-
marks benefits all New York citizens"); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (find-
ing that the law did not secure an average reciprocity of advantage where all economic value is lost).
55. See generally Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Lucas,
505 U.S. 1003; Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U.S. 374 (1994).
56. The Rails to Trails program uses abandoned railroad corridors for recreational trails while
preserving the corridors intact for possible future reactivation. See infra Pt. V.
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III. REGULATORY TAKINGS: A CONSTITUTIONAL PANDORA'S Box
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that no person
shall be "deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law," "nor shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation." The Fourteenth Amendment makes both provisions ap-
plicable to the states.5 7 Until 1922, the Supreme Court adhered to a
bright-line rule that takings cases were limited to the archetypical situa-
tion of the government physically appropriating land through the exer-
cise of eminent domain while the due process clause pertained to the le-
gitimacy of police power regulations enacted to promote the public
welfare. 8 The bright-line test was easy to apply insofar as the takings
clause would require compensation when land was appropriated for pub-
lic use; the due process clause would require nullification of regulations
that did not meet the requisite public use standards. Hence, land taken
for railroads, highways, courthouses, and even easements for the preser-
vation of civic health and safety, like sewers or utilities, were considered
within the scope of the takings clause. But police power regulations-
like the power to regulate industrial pollution and discharge into rivers,
the power to outlaw certain trade practices like brothels and distilleries,
and the power to pass zoning laws-were not believed to fall within the
takings clause protections because although they deprived property of
value, they did not "take" the property for public use.59 As Justice Bren-
nan explained, "[a] 'taking' may more readily be found when the inter-
ference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by
government, than when interference arises from some public program ad-
justing the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common
good." 6
That bright-line rule began to blur in 1922 with Justice Holmes' opin-
ion in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon.6' In this case a Pennsylvania statute
had been enacted that prohibited mining for coal beneath certain struc-
tures and in residential areas because it caused subsidence and dangerous
cave-ins.62 The coal companies argued that the act took away their rights
57. Chicago, B & Q R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978) (stating that "of course" the Fourteenth Amendment makes the tak-
ings clause applicable to the states).
58. EAGLE, supra note 46, at 2.
59. EDwARD KEYNES, LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND PRIVACY: TOWARD A JURISPRUDENCE OF
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 112-28 (1996).
60. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (citations omitted).
61. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
62. Id.
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to mine for coal in areas where they had purchased both the mineral and
the support estate,63 thus impairing both property and contract rights.
Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, held that the regulation imper-
missibly impaired those rights and reversed the grant of an injunction
preventing the coal company from continuing to mine as planned.
Holmes' opinion has become famous for its oft-quoted passages recog-
nizing the difficult balance between the police power and impermissible
takings: "Government hardly could go on if to some extent values inci-
dent to property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law, ' ' 4 and "[tihe general rule at least is that while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking. 65
In a strong dissent, Justice Brandeis criticized Holmes for staking a
new path that would require compensation in cases in which the owner
retained ownership of the property.66 Contrasting regulations and appro-
priations, Brandeis explained: "Every restriction upon the use of property
imposed in the exercise of the police power deprives the owner of some
right theretofore enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgement by the
state of rights in property without making compensation.... [But t]he
property so restricted remains in the possession of its owner. The state
does not appropriate it or make any use of it. The state merely prevents
the owner from making a use which interferes with paramount rights of
the public. 6 7 Because the coal company retained the coal, Brandeis did
not see how this regulation appropriated its property.
Although this may be perhaps one of the most commented-on deci-
sions in Supreme Court history,68 it is an odd little case. It was decided
during the heyday of Lochner-era substantive economic due process and
appears to proceed more in the line of due process analysis than any prior
takings analysis the Court had used.69 The coal company never asked for
63. Pennsylvania recognizes three estates in land: the surface estate, the support estate and the
mineral estate. In this case the coal company had purchased the latter two. Id.
64. Id. at 413.
65. Id. at 415.
66. Id. at 416 et seq.
67. Id.
68. See generally Robert Brauneis, The Foundation of Our 'Regulatory Takings" Jurisprudence:
The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes 's Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J.
613 (1996); J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 22
ECOLOGY L.Q. 89 (1995); Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a
Muddle, 57 CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984), as well as virtually any article dealing with regulatory takings.
69. See Robert Brauneis, The Foundation of Our 'Regulatory Takings'Jurisprudence: The Myth
and Meaning of Justice Holmes' Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613
(1996); John Bristow, Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel: Is the Court One Step Closer to Unraveling the
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nor received compensation, the remedy for a takings violation. And be-
cause the state was not a party to the suit, compensation could not have
been ordered. It is also notable that Holmes did not refer to the arguably
most relevant precedent, Mugler v. Kansas,70 in which a Kansas law pro-
hibiting alcohol sales and manufacture rendered a brewery, and its
equipment, entirely worthless. The property owner was denied compen-
sation on the grounds that the Court had to uphold a law if it "promoted a
legitimate public end in a rational way.'
Regardless of the scholarly critiques of Mahon, it has acquired a piv-
otal role in regulatory takings doctrine, which holds that governmental
regulation could have such detrimental impact on property that compen-
sation might be required even if title to land is not appropriated outright.
Though the case was neglected for nearly fifty years, when the Court be-
gan looking back to Mahon in the sixties as a source for constitutional
limitations on excessive governmental interference with property
rights,72 the Holmesian "goes too far" language proved difficult to apply.
After struggling for nearly twenty years, the Court admitted in 1978 that
the test involved "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.",73 In Penn Cen-
tral Corp. v. New York City, Justice Brennan listed three factors the
Court considered important in making the ad hoc determination of when
a regulation "goes too far." Those factors are: 1) the economic impact on
the claimant, 2) the extent to which the regulation interferes with reason-
able investment-backed expectations, and 3) the character of the gov-
ernmental action.74 Penn Central involved a New York City historic
preservation law that prohibited Penn Central from building a fifty-five-
story office complex cantilevered above the historic Grand Central Ter-
minal. Although some called the proposed building an "aesthetic joke,"
Penn Central claimed unsuccessfully that its inability to build in the air-
space over its building worked a taking. 5
Takings and Due Process Clauses? 77 N.C. L. REV. 1525 (1999); Daryn McBeth, Public Need and
Private Greed - Environmental Protection and Property Rights, I DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 112 (1996);
Glen Summers, Private Property Without Lochner: Toward a Takings Jurisprudence Uncorrupted
by Substantive Due Process, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 837 (1993).
70. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
71. Id. See also JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNiNG AND CONTROL LAW 423
(1998).
72. See William Michael Treanor, Jam for Justice Holmes: Reassessing the Significance of Ma-
hon, 86 GEO. L.J. 813,864 (1998). See. e.g.. U.S. v. Commodities Trading Co., 326 U.S. 121 (1950)
(first mention of the Mahon case); Armstrong v. U.S., 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (first decision to discuss
the concept in some detail).
73. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
74. Id. at 123.
75. Id. at 118.
[26:2
HeinOnline  -- 26 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 416 2001
Eminent Domain, Exactions, and Railbanking
Two years later, in 1980, the Court articulated a somewhat different
test when considering a California ordinance that limited development of
open space in order to slow urbanization in Agins v. City of Tiburon.76
Instead of looking to the Penn Central balancing factors, the Court ar-
ticulated a new test that suspiciously resembled the traditional due proc-
ess principles that had been spelled out in the early zoning challenges of
the late 1920s. The Court in Agins stated that "[t]he application of a
general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance
does not substantially advance legitimate state interests, or denies an
owner economically viable use of his land. 7  One way to reconcile
these two different tests would be to apply the Agins test when analyzing
facial challenges to a regulation, and the Penn Central balancing test
when engaging in as-applied challenges that claim a particular applica-
tion of a regulation works an undue hardship on a single property
owner. 8 Unfortunately, the Court has not remained true to this distinc-
tion, sometimes applying the Agins test to as-applied challenges.
79
In the first important exactions case, Nollan v. Calif Coastal Commis-
sion,80 the Court applied the "substantially advance" prong of the Agins
test to a conditional exaction case, and elided due process and takings
analyses into one big muddle.8' In this case a landowner was told he
could build a larger house on his beachfront lot but only if he provided a
beach easement allowing the public to walk back and forth between two
public beaches on either side.8 2 The Court struck down the condition be-
cause the state's action-demanding a lateral public easement across the
beach-did not substantially advance the stated goal of the Coastal
Commission Act-protecting the public's view of the beach from the
nearby highway. 83 Nollan thus uses the "substantially advance" lan-
guage from Agins to inquire into the justification of imposing on a single
76. 447 U. S. 255 (1980).
77. Id. at 260. The Agins Court referred to the decisions in Nectow v. City of Cambridge. 277
U.S. 183 (1928) and Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). See also Vil-
lage of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
78. This is not entirely unjustified, as Justice Powell mentioned in Agins that the zoning was valid
on its face. 447 U.S. at 259.
79. E.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
80. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
81. Numerous scholars have written on the muddling of the Court's takings jurisprudence, which
is primarily caused by what appears to be an importation of due process analyses into takings cases.
See generally Bristow, supra note 69, and articles cited therein.
82. Id. at 828.
83. Id. at 837. The Coastal Commission's purported state interest was to protect the public's abil-
ity to see the beach from the street, break down the psychological barrier to use of the beach caused
by extensive private development, and protect the public's view of and access to the beach.
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landowner a restriction that essentially forces her to contribute her land
for public use. The actual language in Nollan is the "essential nexus"
test, i.e. whether there is an essential nexus between the harm caused by
the landowner's use of her land and the solution exacted by the govern-
ment.
84
The essential nexus test was further refined in 1994 in another exaction
case, Dolan v. City of Tigard.8" In Dolan the owner of a hardware store
sought a permit to expand the size of her store and pave a portion of her
parking lot. The city conditioned the permit on her dedication of a por-
tion of her land along Fanno Creek to the city for a flood plain, plus an
additional fifteen-foot wide section for a bicycle and pedestrian trail.
8 6
The two amounted to roughly ten percent of Dolan's property and could
be used to meet the fifteen percent open space requirement mandated in
the Central Business District general plan. 7 The Court found that the
City's exaction met the essential nexus Nollan element because the flood
plain dedication was clearly related to the extra stormwater runoff that
would result from her additional building and paving projects, and the
bicycle dedication was clearly related to the additional traffic that would
be generated by her larger store.88 Yet the Court struck down the condi-
tions on the ground that besides meeting the "essential nexus" require-
ment of Nollan, a government must show a "rough proportionality" be-
tween the problems generated by the landowner's use and the solution
sought through the exaction.89 Thus, because the same goals could be
achieved by simply forbidding Ms. Dolan from developing the land in
the flood plain, the requirement that she dedicate that portion to the City
violated the rough proportionality test. Likewise, although her enlarged
store would likely generate more traffic downtown, the City failed to
show that either a bike trail or a dedication of the bike trail land would in
fact mitigate the traffic problem.
The Nollan/Dolan test of essential nexus and rough proportionality
heightens scrutiny from the traditional rational basis test previously used
under due process tests to challenge the legitimacy of the governmental
action, though it is unclear if the test will remain applicable only in the
84. Id. at 837.
85. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
86. Id. at 379-80.
87. Id. at 380.
88. Id. at 387.
89. "Under this standard, if the local government cannot demonstrate that its exaction is directly
proportional to the specifically created need, the exaction becomes 'a veiled exercise of the power of
eminent domain and a confiscation of private property behind the defense of police regulations.'" Id.
at 389-90 (citations omitted).
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narrow set of exactions, or will be extended to land use regulations in
general. 90 At this point, the lower courts generally are not elevating scru-
tiny in non-exactions cases. 91 But insofar as the Nollan/Dolan test pur-
ports to more closely scrutinize the validity of the government's legisla-
tive goals and means, and derives from Agins and its line of due process
cases, it threatens to import a stricter takings test into facial challenges of
regulations and replace deferential minimum scrutiny under due proc-
ess.
9 2
That prediction is not unwarranted given the current Court's penchant
for elevating scrutiny and moving away from the Penn Central ad hoc
balancing test. At the same time as the Agins test was somehow meta-
morphosing into the stricter essential nexus and rough proportionality
tests, the Court was creating a set of bright-line rules for finding when a
regulation will cause a per se taking. In most as-applied challenges, the
Court under Penn Central looks to the three-factor balancing test to de-
termine whether the regulation asks the property owner to bear a burden
that, in all fairness, should be borne by all.93 In 1982, however, the Court
created an exception for regulations that cause permanent physical inva-
sions of a landowner's property, in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp.94 Here the Court ruled that compensation was due to a
landowner for physical invasion caused by New York's rule requiring
landowners of residential property to permit the installation of cable tele-
vision facilities on their buildings. Although the property taken was
minimal-just the area required for the thin cable wires and the roughly
two cubic feet needed for the cable transformer-and caused no eco-
nomic impact (it even arguably increased the value of the units), the
character of the government's action was deemed to require compensa-
tion because it permitted a permanent physical invasion.95
Although the Loretto rule raises the specter that governmental exac-
tions of park land, open space, or trail dedications could be deemed per
90. The Court indicated that it will not extend the test outside of exactions, but that promise may
be short-lived given the likely make-up of the Court in the next few years. City of Monterey v. Del
Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999) ("[W]e have not extended the rough-
proportionality test of Dolan beyond the special context of exactions-land-use decisions condition-
ing approval of development on the dedication of property to public use.").
91. Santa Monica Beach Ltd. v. Superior Court, 968 P.2d 993 (Cal. 1999), cert. denied 526 U.S.
51131 (1999).
92. See generally Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1962). See also Brauneis, supra note 69;
Bristow, supra note 69; McBeth, supra note 69; Summers, supra note 69 (all on the conflation of
due process and takings).
93. Armstrong v. U.S., 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
94. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
95. Id. at 441.
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se takings because they invite the public to invade privately-owned land,
the Court in Nollan provided an exception for cases in which the land-
owner's use of the property contributes to the problem the exaction seeks
to remedy. 96 For trail purposes, the Nollan exception may help if the ex-
action directly addresses a burden created by the development, as with
subdivision residents putting strains on pre-existing trail facilities. But
where the trail is more a trade-off for increased burdens on other facili-
ties, like streets or sewers, the Nollan exception may not save the exac-
tion.
In creating a second per se exception, in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council,97 the Court combined the economic impact factor from
Penn Central and the "denies an owner economically viable use of his
land" prong from Agins, to hold that when a regulation deprives an
owner of all economically viable use of her land, a per se taking will re-
sult unless the regulation does no more than could be achieved through
background principles of nuisance or was an inherent limitation on title.98
In Lucas, the landowner was denied the power to build residences on two
beachfront lots he had purchased, because a newly adopted setback rule,
adopted to deter beach erosion, placed his entire parcels in the no-
development zone. Justice Scalia articulated a new rule that once an
owner can show complete and total economic loss, a per se taking will be
found unless the state can show that the landowner could have been pre-
vented from so using her land in a nuisance suit by neighbors or the
state.99 Because no one has the right to commit a nuisance, prohibitions
against actions that cause a nuisance do not take from a landowner any
right she had to begin with. Similarly, if one acquires title to land subject
to certain limitations or servitudes, a regulation that outlaws the activity
already prohibited by the servitude takes nothing from the landowner.
Her title was already limited.
From this necessarily brief summary, we can begin to see how trails
might be analyzed under exactions and regulatory takings doctrines. For
instance, a trail exaction would squarely fit within the Nollan/Dolan
cases and must meet the essential nexus and rough proportionality re-
quirement in order to avoid compensation. The federal railbanking law
96. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836 (1987). This exception would not apply in
Loretto, however, where using one's land for residential rental purposes does not exacerbate the
problem of tenants not having adequate access to cable TV facilities. See Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
97. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
98. Id. at 1029.
99. Id.
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that promotes conversion of abandoned rail corridors to recreational
trails is a far more complex legal issue. It's application could either con-
stitute a permanent physical invasion under Loretto, require heightened
scrutiny under Nollan/Dolan, be challenged as a denial of all economi-
cally viable use of that portion of the land under Lucas or Agins, or call
for a simple ad hoc balancing under Penn Central because the character
of the government action is the postponement of the removal of a rail
servitude, not the taking of a trail easement. Recognizing that the law of
regulatory takings is far more complex than presented here, and that nu-
merous additional factors can affect the takings analysis,'0° this frame-
work should allow a sufficiently nuanced calculus within which to view
both trail exactions and the railbanking law. Thus, with the foregoing
basic framework, the different mechanisms for achieving recreational
trail land acquisition under the three broad categories of eminent domain,
exactions, and regulation can be explored.
IV. TRAILS BY EMINENT DOMAIN
Since 1898, the Franciscan Friars of the Atonement, at the Graymoor
monastery in Garrison, New York, have owned their monastery and 400
acres of undeveloped land about ninety minutes north of New York City.
Only recently, however, their ownership has been threatened by, of all
things, the close proximity of the Appalachian Trail.' 0 ' The trail runs
along the Hudson River for more than a mile along a fifty-eight-acre
easement that the National Park Service (NPS) purchased from the friars
in 1984 for $116,500. But the easement is only fifty-feet wide in some
places and the Park Service is attempting to purchase from the friars
about eighteen acres of buffer land. After fifteen years of frustrated ne-
gotiations, the NPS has referred the case to the Justice Department to be-
gin proceedings in eminent domain. While the friars sympathize with the
Park Service's goal of maintaining the land in its natural, preserved state,
and they have no future plans to develop the land themselves, they dis-
agree with the NPS that federal acquisition of the land is the only way to
ensure that no development will ever encroach on the trail. Currently the
NPS is holding off the condemnation proceedings, from pressure by poli-
ticians intervening on behalf of the monastery, but doing so runs afoul of
the National Trails System Act (NTSA) which has placed the Appala-
100. Consider the denominator problem, the distinction between temporary and permanent tak-
ings, and vested and non-vested rights. EAGLE, supra note 46, at §§ 7-6(e), 8-2(h)(5), 6-5.
101. Jim Fitzgerald. An Appalachian Impasse; N.Y. Friary Resists Park Service Effort to Widen
Buffer on Trail. THE WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2000, at A 19.
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chian Trail at the center of a fight to preserve a historic legacy of Ameri-
can individualism.'0 2 The end of the year 2000 was the hoped-for com-
pletion date of all land acquisitions along the 2,500 mile trail, running
from Georgia to Maine.
Whether or not a governmental entity can acquire land for recreational
trails by eminent domain is not as straightforward as it would seem. Of
course, when land or an easement is acquired through formal condemna-
tion processes, the governmental entity pays for it. The question, there-
fore, is whether a particular entity has the authority to condemn land for
such a purpose; i.e. are recreational trails a valid public purpose? While
the answer to that question might seem rather obvious, the law proves
otherwise. Insofar as the relevant legislative body has mandated that rec-
reational trails are an important public welfare goal, the courts seem
comfortable permitting such a taking. 0 3 But absent a clear legislative
mandate, some state courts will not permit local parks boards, state parks
departments, or departments of transportation (DOT) to exercise eminent
domain power over private land solely for a recreational trail under
"6general" eminent domain authority. Condemnation authority specifi-
cally for trails may be needed.
As a part of the National Trails System Act,1 4 the Secretary of the In-
terior has authority to condemn land both for the actual width of a recrea-
tional trail, and for a buffer between developed neighboring uses, for
most of the trails designated under the Act.'05 Since the NTSA's enact-
ment in 1968, twelve national historic (NHT) and eight national scenic
trails (NST) have been designated by Congress, as well as hundreds of
other local and regional trails that have been catalogued, surveyed, and
102. Secretary of the Interior, Stewart Udall, prefaced his national trails legislation proposal with
the following comment: "A nationwide system of trails will open to all the opportunity to develop an
intimacy with the wealth and splendor of America's outdoor world for a few hours at a time, or on
one-day jaunts, overnight treks, or expeditions lasting a week or more. A system of trails carved
through areas both near to, and far from, man and his works will provide many varied and memora-
ble experiences for all who utilize the trails." March 31, 1966 Letter from Udall to Senator Hubert
Humphrey (transmitting the proposed trails legislation), in Thomas Downs, The National Trails Sys-
tem: A Model Partnership Approach to Natural Resources Management, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,091,
10,093 (2000). The Appalachian Trail is perhaps the most enduring American symbol of personal
achievement. Though most of us won't climb Mt. Everest, even seventy-year-old grandmothers
have hiked the Appalachian Trail. See Story of Grandma's Heroic Hike, CLEVELAND PLAIN
DEALER, Oct. 18, 1998, at 4J; Grandmother Hikes Appalachian Trail, PATRIOT LEDGER (Quincy,
Mass), Sept. 23, 1995, at 16. See also Patrick Miller, Bikes Replace Wagons on the Santa Fe Trail,
ALBUQUERQUE J., Aug. 23, 1998, at 7 (seventy-year-old bikes from Santa Fe to Missouri).
103. United States v. 13.10 Acres of Land, 737 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
104. Pub. L. No. 90-543, 82 Stat. 919 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§1241-1262 (1994 &
Supp. 1999)).
105. See Downs, supra note 102.
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recognized by the Department of the Interior as national recreation
trails.' 6 Although the authority of the Secretary to condemn land has
changed over the years by Act of Congress, all the NSTs and NHTs were
open for land acquisition from willing sellers, by condemnation, and by
other agreement under the 1968 Act. 0 7 In the 1978 amendments to the
NTSA, Congress increased the amount of land that could be condemned
to 125 acres per mile of trail rather than the twenty-five originally al-
lowed, and further funded the land acquisitions from $5,000,000 to
$95,000,000 for existing trails,'08 but all new trails designated between
1978 and 1983 would be individually prohibited from using federal funds
for land acquisition. The prohibition attached to the new trails created a
greater role for volunteer agencies and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) which could purchase the land from willing sellers through do-
nated funds.' 9 In 1983, Congress authorized land acquisition and ex-
penditures of federal funds, but only from "willing sellers."" 0  And fed-
eral law now prohibits condemnation with respect to seven trails."
A number of states along the Appalachian Trail have also granted in-
dependent legislative authority to parks departments or land commis-
sioners to use eminent domain within the state to help fill in the trail." 2
However, some limit that power to twenty-five acres/mile for buffer land
106. The first two National Scenic Trails, the Appalachian Trail and the Pacific Crest Trail, have
since been joined by the creation of the Continental Divide NST, the Florida NST, the Ice Age NST,
the Natchez Trace NST, the North Country NST, and the Potomac Heritage NST. The National His-
toric Trails were a new category added in the 1978 amendments and comprise the California NHT,
the Iditarod NHT, the Juan Bautista de Anza NHT, the Lewis and Clark NHT, the Mormon Pioneer
NHT, the Nez Perce NHT, the Oregon NHT, the Overmountain Victory NHT, the Pony Express
NHT, the Santa Fe NHT, the Selma to Montgomery NHT, the Trail of Tears NHT, the El Camino
Real de Tierra Adentro NHT, and the Ala Kahakai NHT. 16 U.S.C. § 1244 (a) (2001).
107. The Trails Act vests primary responsibility in the Secretary of the Interior who, under the
1968 Act, had the power to acquire lands "[wlhere the lands included in a national scenic or national
historic trail right-of-way are outside of the exterior boundaries of federally administered areas," 16
U.S.C. § 1246(e) (1994 & Supp. 1999), by voluntary sales, Id., other agreements, 16 U.S.C. §
1246(0 (1994 & Supp. 1999), or by condemnation, 16 U.S.C. § 1246(g) (1994 & Supp. 1999). But
Congress limited the Secretary to acquiring twenty-five acres of land in any one mile of trail. Id.
108. 16 U.S.C. § 1249(a)(I) (1994 & Supp. 1999).
109. See Downs, supra note 102, at 10,096-98.
110. The Natchez Trace NHT and the Selma to Montgomery NHT are the exceptions. See id. at
5.
III. 16 U.S.C. § 1244(aXi I) (1994 & Supp. 1999) (Potomac Heritage NST); § 1244(a)(13) (1994
& Supp. 1999) (Florida NST); § 1244(aX14) (1994 & Supp. 1999) (Nez Perce NHT); § 1244(aXl5)
(1994 & Supp. 1999) (Santa Fe NHT); § 1244(aX16) (1994 & Supp. 1999) (Trail of Tears NHT); §
1244(aX17) (1994 & Supp. 1999) (Juan Bautista de Anza NHT); & § 1244(aXI8) (1994 & Supp.
1999) (California NHT). But see Pub. L. 106-509, Nov. 13, 2000, 114 Stat. 2361 (all amended).
112. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 23-67 (1999) (limited to two hundred feet in width); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 132A § 12 (2000); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 216-D:2 (2000); 64 PA. CONS. STAT. § 803
(2000).
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or, as in Connecticut, limit the total allowable land obtainable through
eminent domain to 200 feet in width.' 13 No other National Scenic or Na-
tional Historic Trail has received even this limited state support." 
4
While federal eminent domain power is generally available for National
Scenic Trails, the same is not true for National Historic or national rec-
reation trails. 115 Many of the latter are local, intra-state trails and rail-
trail conversions that are governed by state departments of natural re-
sources, parks departments, local trail managers, or departments of trans-
portation, and few of these agencies have specific condemnation power.
A few states have followed the federal lead, and created comprehen-
sive trail maps that show a variety of types of trails, from wilderness hik-
ing and horseback trails to urban bicycle paths and cross-state rail-trails.
Most of these maps are only wish lists, however, depicting the ideal loca-
tion of trail networks, and serve as guides for Departments of Natural
Resources (DNR) and DOTs in their future land acquisition and planning
processes. Where necessary, two trails might be linked on the map by
connecting lines that traverse private property. The line may be on the
map even though the trail is not yet on the ground (and may never be).
But it is precisely this type of governmental foresight that has provoked
the ire of landowners. Many private property owners do not want their
land identified on maps as being the possible site of a future trail linkage
as they believe such a mark will lower their property values. ' 16  When
politicians respond like those in Santa Cruz County, local land planners
113. Id.
114. The Appalachian Trail is one of eight National Scenic Trails, which are extended trails pro-
viding for "maximum outdoor recreational potential and for conservation and enjoyment of the na-
tionally significant scenic, historic, natural, or cultural qualities of the areas through which such
trails may pass." National Historic Trails follow, as closely as possible, "original trails or routes of
travel ofnational historical significance." 16 U.S.C. § 1242 (a) (2) & (3) (2000).
115. The current statute provides that condemnation proceedings against privately-owned land
can be undertaken only in cases where "all reasonable efforts to acquire such lands ... by negotia-
tion have failed, and in such cases... [shall include] only such title as... is reasonably necessary to
provide passage across such lands." 16 U.S.C. § 1242 (aX2) & (a)(3) (1994 & Supp. 1999). Na-
tional Historic Trail land acquisition by the federal government is limited to only those areas indi-
cated by the study report or by the comprehensive plan as high potential route segments or high po-
tential historic sites. rd.
116. In some instances, maps setting out future roads have been held to constitute a taking if land
values are sufficiently reduced, or uses are limited, as a direct result of the demarcation. See
NICHOLS, ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.05[4][a] (3d ed. 2000). In the Santa Cruz County conflict over
the Trails Master Plan the contested maps were to be wiped off the County records and all mention
of a Trails Map was to be deleted from the General Master Plan. POLLAK, supra note I, at 47. Un-
der the amended General Plan, any trail easements obtained by the County were not to be put on any
published trail maps until "a complete trail from beginning to end has been obtained legally from the
respective property owners, and only after adequate funds exist to implement a trail maintenance
plan." Id.
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find their hands tied as they are unable to foresee and plan for land ac-
quisition for additional trail linkages. Such opposition results in greater
reliance on using rail corridors for trails which, as discussed later, gener-
ally provide uninterrupted corridors that readily link up with other trails
and transportation facilities and can be acquired with minimal impact on
privately-owned land. To the extent rail-trails are also under attack,
however, county planners may find themselves blocked at every step of
the way.
As a categorical rule, recreational trails, like parks, meet the public use
requirement of the Fifth Amendment.' 7 Assuming it is not going to be
used for limited access, a trail that is open to the public clearly meets the
public use test.' 8 But the constitutionality of eminent domain does not
guarantee that it will be used. Only six states appear to have some sort of
legislative regime in place to develop state-wide trail systems. They are
Georgia, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, and Tennessee, yet
not all have granted eminent domain power to construct the system."t 9
Other states give powers to establish trails on state lands and in state
parks but do not give authority to extend those trails beyond the borders
of government-owned lands. 0 Moreover, a number of states prohibit
outright the use of eminent domain for any trail purposes.12 ' A few state
117. The Fifth Amendment requires that public property taken under eminent domain be taken
only for "public use." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Although the definition of public use has changed
over the centuries, it generally means "for the public good, the public necessity, or the public util-
ity." ROTUNDA & NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE, § 15.13 (1999).
118. Hoepker v. City of Madison, 1996 WL 167619 551 (Wis. Ct. App.) (table). See also
NICHOLS, supra note 116, at § 14D.01 [5].
119. GA. CODE ANN. § 12-3-113 (2000) (giving the Georgia DNR power to create the Georgia
Scenic Trails System but denying the power of eminent domain); ME. REV. ST. ANN. tit. 12 § 1982
(2000) (granting eminent domain powers for the creation of a Maine Trails System, but requiring
the consent of the governor for all eminent domain acquisitions, and limiting those to twenty-five
acres per mile); MINN. STAT. § 85.015 (2000) (giving the Commissioner of Natural Resources the
power to establish state trails using eminent domain--but the statute was amended in 2000 to a spe-
cific trail-by-trail description of what is permissible in each circumstance and, now, in only a very
few cases is the eminent domain power granted by the state or its agencies); NEB. REV. STAT. § 37-
1006 (2000) (Trail Development Assistance Act, which does not limit eminent domain power of
state or its agencies); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:8-37 (2000) (giving the Parks Department eminent do-
main power for State Trails System); TENN. CODE ANN. § 11-11-112 (2000) (giving eminent domain
power for the Tennessee Trails System, though limiting that power to twenty-five acres per mile).
120. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 390.121 (2000); TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN. § 13.014
(2000).
121. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 5074.3 (2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216-F:1 (2000) (limiting
eminent domain only to abandoned rail corridors); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 231-A:5 (2000) (pro-
hibiting municipalities from using eminent domain to establish trails); WASH. REV. CODE §
79A.05.130 (2000) (prohibiting use of eminent domain for cross-state trail); GA. CODE ANN. § 12-3-
113 (2000) (ironically establishing the Scenic Trails System but prohibiting the use of eminent do-
main).
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legislatures have even removed eminent domain powers in the past dec-
ade or so under pressure from private property owners.
122
My own anecdotal evidence and the trend in many states limiting emi-
nent domain powers for all but the most necessary streets and highways
show that DNRs, DOTs, or local governing agencies are very reluctant to
use eminent domain to establish trails. Some states commonly use con-
demnation when one or two recalcitrant landowners derail a popular trail
project. 23 They are even more likely to do so if those parcels are the re-
maining lots needed to fill in a trail from an abandoned rail corridor that
was acquired from a voluntary sale. But few governmental entities will
condemn every parcel needed to construct a trail, even though it would
not hesitate to do so to construct a highway. On the other hand, many
state DOTs are warming up to the idea of using eminent domain to build
trails alongside roadways so that the land acquisition for both occurs at
the same time. 24  One state even viewed the DOT's power to acquire
land for "ways open to travel by the public" to include bike and pedes-
trian walkways. 125  Yet not all state agencies are as creative in their
thinking about trails.
Despite legislative limitations and recent trends to restrict using emi-
nent domain for trail purposes, state courts appear to construe their own
122. MINN. STAT. § 85.015 (2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 474.58 (2000) (removing in 1984 the
power of DOT and DNR to use eminent domain with regard to rail corridors for conversion to
trails); COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-1 1-104 (which was amended in 1984 and 1990 to limit eminent do-
main powers to dealing with pre-existing trails).
123. There was a lengthy dispute in Crawfordsville, Indiana, over a small rail-trail. One land-
owner along the route contested the railroad's title to the land, taking the case to the Indiana Su-
preme Court. The Court ruled that the landowner held fee simple to the land and the railroad only an
easement. The Court further found that the easement had been abandoned and the trail group had
purchased nothing from the railroad. After the ruling, the county parks board decided to condemn
the parcel at issue. In condenmation proceedings the fair market value of the land was determined to
be $300. See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Lewellen, 682 N.E.2d 779 (Ind. 1997). I suspect that the legal
fees to litigate the issue to the state supreme court level greatly exceeded the value of the land at is-
sue.
124. See FLA. STAT. ch. §§337.27(I), 334.03(7) (1977), as interpreted in West Gate Shopping Ctr.
Inc. v. Div. of Admin., State Dept. of Transp., 363 So.2d 407 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). This is
made even easier through TEA21 enhancement funding that provides that ten percent of all federal
highway dollars be used for enhancements such as trails. By combining the funding sources and
linking trails to roads, local governments can reinforce the idea that trails are simply alternate, but
equally valuable, transportation venues. Transportation Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 105-206, §
3037(a), 112 Stat. 107, 387-88 (1998) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 5309).
125. Id. See also Munson v. City of S. Burlington, 648 A.2d 867 (Vt. 1994) (the highway con-
demnation process is different from the bikeway condemnation process, though combined condem-
nation appears permissible through the highway process). Accord generally Lincoln Branch, Inc. v.
City of Lincoln, 512 N.W.2d 379 (Neb. 1994); State v. Holmquist, 1996 WL 722107 (Minn. C1.
App. 1996).
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statues relatively broadly. Colorado, for instance, does not grant eminent
domain authority in its Recreational Trail System Act, 26 but Colorado
courts have interpreted the Act as simply not giving specific eminent
domain authority for trail acquisition, rather than as prohibiting all use of
eminent domain for trails. 2 7 The distinction is subtle, but the Colorado
courts would allow a local government to use eminent domain for a rec-
reational trail so long as there is independent authorization to do so (per-
haps via DOT highway or municipal park condemnation powers).,2 8
Other states might interpret their general eminent domain statutes to in-
clude trail purposes under a broad reading of "public purpose." Wiscon-
sin readily permits use of eminent domain power for recreational trails
because "the establishment of the trail will benefit the public, [and there-
fore] a public purpose exists."'' 29 Under the Wisconsin Court's interpre-
tation, a "court can conclude that no public purpose exists only if it is
clear and palpable that there can be no public benefit."'130 Since the pub-
lic will use the trail, it meets the public purpose requirement.
The Iowa Supreme Court has held that the Iowa Department of Trans-
portation does not have general eminent domain authority for establish-
ing recreational trails or bikeways, but the Iowa DOT could condemn
private land for a bike trail when a pre-existing trail was interrupted by a
road-widening project.' The road project justified rebuilding the inter-
rupted trail, even if it had to be done through condemning private land.
A Minnesota court also has held that because the Commissioner of
Transportation has the power to develop a statewide bikeway system,
land condemned for a highway could also be used for a bike trail. 32
States like these are proving themselves to be more creative than others
in finding ways to permit appropriation of private land for trails.
33
Another way in which state authorities have used eminent domain for
trails is to exercise it against a railroad, rather than against private land-
owners. By doing so, the state's action usually falls under relatively
126. See C.R.S. § 33-11-104(4), which provides in pertinent part that: "[nlothing in this article
shall permit the acquisition of recreational trails by proceedings in eminent domain by any state
agency or any unit of local government or any agency thereof...".
127. Town of Parker v. Norton, 939 P.2d 535 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997).
128. Id. at 536.
129. Halverson v. Winnebago County, 376 N.W.2d 868 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (unpubl. opinion).
130. Id.
131. E. Oaks Devel. Inc. v. Iowa DOT, 603 N.w.2d 566 (Iowa 1999).
132. State v. Holmquist, 1996 WL 722107 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
133. Additionally, the Federal Highway Administration has provided streamlined procedures for
obtaining enhancement funds to encourage construction of trails. See Transportation Enhancements
Guidance Package (Feb. 25, 1997) from Jane F Garvey, Acting Administrator FHWA to Regional
and Division Administrators, available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/tea21.
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generous rules allowing for additional public use of already dedicated
public land. 34 Most states have rules allowing public utilities easy ac-
cess to street and highway corridors or state-owned lands to lessen the
burden on private landowners.' 3 5  Similarly, utilities may condemn the
right to string poles and wires along rail corridors. State parks may be
required to cede land for roads and highways where the alternative would
be condemnation, at great cost, of private land for road expansion pro-
jects. As one court explained, an "implied right to condemn public prop-
erty under a general grant may be found where the condemnor's use is
not substantially inconsistent with that of the condemnee .... This im-
plied power may not be invoked, however, when the proposed use of the
railroad property would destroy or essentially impair the railroad's exist-
ing use of the property."' 3 6 The key is that both the railroad and the local
trail body are exercising use and access rights over land devoted to a
public purpose.3 7 When a local governing body condemns land along-
side an operating rail line for location of a trail, it does so only on the
guarantee that the trail will not inconvenience or impair rail opera-
tions.'3
Although courts uniformly hold that trails do meet the "public pur-
pose" requirement of the takings clause, trails often are not viewed as po-
litically viable candidates for exercise of eminent domain. Many people
do not deem trails to be sufficiently worthy of taxpayer expenditures to
warrant a grant of eminent domain powers. And states are even less
likely to allow use of eminent domain to provide greenbelt buffers be-
tween trails and developed neighboring land uses then to build the trails
in the first place.
Nevertheless, the Franciscan Friars of the Atonement are unlikely to
win their legal battle against the National Park Service's effort to con-
demn eighteen acres of monastery land as a buffer to the Appalachian
Trail.' 39 Congressional approval under the NTSA, as well as the privi-
134. See, e.g., Long Island R.R. Co. v. Long Island Lighting Co., 479 N.Y.S.2d 355 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1984); Southern Ry. Co. v. State Hwy. Dept. of Ga., 134 S.E.2d 12 (Ga. 1963); Fl. E. Coast Ry.
Co. v. Miami, 372 So. 2d 152 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
135. Long Island R.R., 479 N.Y.S.2d at 165-66.
136. In re Condemnation by Suburban Hennepin Reg'l Park Dist., 561 N.W.2d 195, 196-97
(Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (citations omitted).
137. Although railroads are considered quasi-public entities, their use of the Ind is considered a
public purpose and therefore open to additional public uses by utilities and n w trails. Fogle v.
Richley, 378 N.E.2d 472 (Ohio 1978).
138. In re Condemnation by Suburban Hennepin Reg'l Park Dist., 561 N.W.2d 195, 196-97
(Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (citations omitted).
139. See Park Service, Friars Fight for Ownership of Land, GAINESVILLE SUN, Aug. 8, 2000, at
A3.
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leged place of the Appalachian Trail in the American legal system and
psyche, means the NPS can condemn the monastery land. In the court of
public opinion, however, the issue could have a different outcome. Just
as many states do not think trails are a wise or politic use of taxpayer
funds, the Franciscans' appeals to Senator Charles Schumer and Repre-
sentative Sue Kelly may throw some additional factors into the "public
purpose" analysis.
V. TRAILS BY EXACTIONS
While many might agree with the Franciscans that eminent domain for
recreational trails is not an appropriate use of taxpayer money, the story
may change in discussion on exactions of trail easements from develop-
ers and sub-dividers whose new projects will bring additional users to
burden pre-existing parks, beaches, and recreational areas.' 40 The legal
justification behind exactions is that if it would be permissible to prohibit
a development outright, based on its detrimental impact on public facili-
ties, then approval subject to mitigating conditions, like a dedication of
ten percent of the land to open spaces, is also permissible. 14 1 As Justice
Scalia put it: "If a prohibition [would be] a legitimate exercise of the po-
lice power rather than a taking, it would be strange to conclude that pro-
viding the owner an alternative to that prohibition which accomplishes
the same purpose is not.' 42 Developers have routinely been subject to
stringent land use restrictions limiting the density of their development
and mandating certain percentages of open space both on individual lots
and within the entire development generally to mitigate the urban con-
gestion to which their development contributes. "43 They also routinely
build or fund construction for new streets. But does this rationale extend
to recreational trails?
Most trail exactions before the mid-1990s proceeded under the clear
140. See generally EXACTIONS, IMPACT FEES AND DEDICATIONS: SHAPING LAND-USE
DEVELOPMENT AND FUNDING INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE DOLAN ERA (Robert Freilich & David
Bushek eds., 1995); DAVID MELTZ ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON LAND
USE CONTROL AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 197-261 (1999); David Ackerly, Exactions for
Transportation Corridors After Dolan v. City of Tigard, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 247 (1995).
141. See Starritt & McClanahan, supra note 42, at 437-38; Holloway & Guy, supra note 42, at
53-58. See also Nancy Stroud & Susan Trevarthen, Defensible Exactions After Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 25 STETSON L. REV. 719, 720 (1996).
142. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1987).
143. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261-63 (1980); Holloway & Guy, supra note 42, at
31-32. However, some courts look strictly at the development's effects and want a strict nexus be-
tween the effects and the harm. See Simpson v. City of N. Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297, 345-48 (Neb.
1980); Pioneer Trust and Say. Bank v. Village of Mt. Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (111. 961).
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rationale of Agins v. City of Tiburon,144 in which the Court upheld zoning
ordinances that required a reasonable amount of land be left undeveloped
in order to promote the open space needs of the growing city. In that
case, the State of California had determined that the development of local
open-space plans would discourage the "premature and unnecessary con-
version of open-space land to urban uses.' 145 Because the developer's
use of the land would directly exacerbate the problem of dwindling open
spaces, the zoning ordinance was held to not violate the Takings Clause
and therefore not trigger compensation. Only regulations that do not
"substantially advance legitimate state interests.. . or den[y] an owner
economically viable use of his land," would be deemed unconstitutional
under Agins. 46 Furthermore, the State of California had recognized that
the preservation of open space is necessary "for the assurance of the con-
tinued availability of land for... recreation and for the use of natural re-
sources."' 47 To the extent that trails are a form of open space and, like
parks, serve a recreational function, they would seem logical candidates
for a developer exaction.
Two problems immediately arise, however. First, where a typical zon-
ing ordinance mandates that ten or fifteen percent of land be left open, by
the time exactions are made for streets, utility corridors, a neighborhood
park, and a flood plain, there may be none left over for a trail. Second,
where the developer is not the large residential subdivider, but is instead
the single landowner who seeks a building permit to expand his house,
build a garage, or expand a pre-existing business, an exaction for a trail
may not be sufficiently related to the burden caused by the developer's
use. This lack of fit was precisely the issue in Dolan v. City of Tigard14"
in which the Court found the Oregon city's exaction for a trail consti-
tuted a taking for which compensation was required.
In Dolan the City had conditioned the grant of a permit to expand Ms.
Dolan's downtown hardware store on the dedication of a fifteen-foot
wide strip along a flood plain for a bicycle trail. Although the city made
a finding that the increased traffic caused by the larger store was likely to
generate as much as 435 additional trips per day through the downtown
area, the Court was skeptical that the bicycle trail would in fact reduce
any of those trips. 49 Perhaps Justice Scalia had a hard time envisioning
144. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
145. d at 261.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 262 n. 7, citing CAL. GoV'TCODE ANN. §65561(a) (1979).
148. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
149. Id. at 395.
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any of Ms. Dolan's customers returning home on their bicycles with their
newly purchased 2x4s, sheets of plywood, or kitchen sinks. An obvious
flaw with Scalia's image, however, is that while few of Ms. Dolan's cus-
tomers might in fact use the trail, it would likely be used by customers of
neighboring businesses who found the increased traffic caused by her
bigger store made parking and access to downtown too difficult. Those
customers, who were accustomed to driving downtown, might be de-
terred by the additional traffic and ride their bicycles or walk.'50
Nonetheless, the Court's requirement that exactions meet a strict "es-
sential nexus" and "rough proportionality" test means that bike paths are
likely to lose support from local planners simply because they are hard to
prove. Moreover, because most bike path exactions are for new trails or
trail extensions,' it may be difficult for land planners to show that the
development will increase the burden on public facilities if the trails are
not yet in existence. 52 On the other side of the scale, however, is the ar-
gument that an urban bike trail like the one in Dolan will likely have
some mitigating impact on the traffic caused by a new development, no
matter how small, whereas residential bike paths will probably have little
mitigating function on traffic because suburban users are likely to use
them solely for recreation and not for transportation to work, shopping,
or entertainment centers.'
Some scholars have suggested that Dolan's rough proportionality re-
quirement is likely to result in more permits simply being denied rather
than granted subject to conditions if those conditions are going to be
strictly scrutinized.' 54 Furthermore, in areas in which recreational tour-
ism constitutes a significant percentage of the local economy, the impor-
tance of trails may have more to do with the community image and
availability of transportation alternatives than with any quantifiable re-
duction in automobile trips to the grocery store. To the extent that bicy-
150. Just exactly how direct must the impact of development be on pre-existing services? Where
increased traffic requires widening the road, the impact is direct and clear; where it may displace
other more passive uses, the state may have a harder time meeting its Dolan rough proportionality
requirement.
151. See Rails to Trails Conservancy Website, at
http://www.railtrails.org/RTCactive pages/Home/Main.asp (last visited May 29, 2001).
152. This problem may lead local planners to shy away from bold new efforts to mitigate a devel-
opment's effects, instead resorting to conservative, tried and true methods, like road widening and
new traffic control devices.
153. Obviously, if the trail does not lead to any commercial establishments, it will function more
as a park or open space rather than as an alternative transportation corridor. However, having a local
bike path will certainly reduce the automobile traffic of those cyclists who have to drive to get to a
safe cycling area.
154. Starritt & McClanahan, supra note 42, at 451.
2001)
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cle trails actually bring customers to the area, trail exactions would seem
justifiable even if they do not meet the rough proportionality requirement
of Dolan. And even more importantly, Dolan may inhibit communities
that would like to develop along greater recreational lines more than
those that have already capitalized on the growing demand for greater
recreational facilities and can show the nexus between customers and
trails.
Notably, while the Court is comfortable stating that property rights are
the creatures of state law, and that property rights can differ dramatically
across state lines,'" Dolan makes it very difficult for states to experiment
with their land use plans in order to promote local assets, natural re-
sources, and normative plans for future development.' 5 6 Recent scholar-
ship has confirmed that the Nollan/Dolan cases have had a chilling effect
on state and local planners seeking to implement quality-of-life man-
dates. 7
In the only case that has apparently looked at a trail exaction after Do-
lan, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals determined that no taking had oc-
curred because the developer did not have to dedicate the trail land out-
right.' 58 In that case, Hoepker v. City of Madison Plan Commission,'"
the court refused to treat the bike path reservation for a residential subdi-
vision as a facility "designed for travel," as had been argued in Dolan.160
The court instead viewed the trail as equivalent to any other park, play-
ground, or greenspace that would generally meet the rough proportional-
ity test of Dolan.'6' A strong dissent noted, however, that forcing the
155. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Corp., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984).
156. Matthew Cholewa, Federalism and Land Use After Dolan: Has the Supreme Court Taken
Takings from the States? 28 URB. LAW. 401 (1996). Some states have already seen a chilling effect
in their application of Dolan rough proportionality to exactions that require land dedications as well
as those that do not, arguably stretching Dolan more than is necessary. See generally Clark v. City
of Albany, 904 P.2d 185 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) rev. den. 912 P.2d 375 (Or. 1996); POLLAK, supra note
I.
157. See Cholewa, supra note 156. See also generally Holloway & Guy, supra note 42; Nancy
Stroud & Susan Trevarthen, Defensible Exactions After Nollan v. California Coastal Commission
and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 25 STETSON L. REv. 719 (1996); Parking Ass'n of Georgia, Inc. v. City
of Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200 (Ga. 1994), cert den. 115 S.Ct. 2268 (1995) (Justice Thomas's dissent in
the cert. denial notes that the states are hopelessly divergent in their positions on the applicability of
Nollan and Dolan).
158. The lack of causes would seem to be evidence of the chilling effect of Dolan on trail exac-
tions.
159. 551 N.W.2d 63 (1996) (unpubl. decision).
160. ld. at 8.
161. Some courts do not think parks are legitimate recipients of exactions. City of College Sta-
tion v. Turtle Rock Corp., 666 S.W.2d 318, 320 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984), rev'd on appeal 680 S.W.2d
802 (Tex. 1984).
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subdivision to reserve a broad corridor to extend a pre-existing recrea-
tional trail "makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the [town] to require
Hoepker to dedicate streets, school sites, playgrounds, tot-lets, and other
open spaces required to serve the subdivision."' 6 2 The dissent had a hard
time seeing the trail extension as a facility closely linked to the develop-
ment's residents. The dissent also pointed out that pursuant to a different
Wisconsin statute, areas "reserved" by plat are automatically conveyed to
the local municipality in fee. Hence, the land would in fact be dedicated
and would thus require a Dolan analysis.' 63
Nevertheless, the future of trail exactions is both bright and bleak. The
growing demand for trails as well as other open spaces has induced many
planners to make plans for future acquisitions, as in Hoepker. As a trail
is built into the suburbs, outlying new developments may very well have
to continue the trail as a condition of developing. Yet under Dolan, rec-
reational trail exactions are likely to be scrutinized very carefully and
may not be permitted if the essential nexus and rough proportionality
tests cannot be met. In the end, however, the experiences of local plan-
ners, as those in Santa Cruz County, will decide the fate of recreational
trails in their areas. Even if the exaction is constitutional, many planners
may not exercise that power under fear of landowner protest.
An additional obstacle to trail exactions may arise simply from the ex-
istence of the trail on a planning map; courts have held that the indication
on a map of a portion of land that might potentially be needed for road
widening affects market value of that land and thus might require com-
pensation.'64 Where a map might freeze further development or effec-
tively "bank" land, compensation may be required.' 65 Because a typical
trail corridor is fifty to one hundred feet in width, an entire residential lot
may be sacrificed for each block of trail being exacted.'6 Moreover, the
lack of studies on the market value of land adjacent to trails makes it dif-
ficult to argue that the trail exaction actually benefits the retained land
and therefore does not require compensation.' 67
162. Hoepker v. City of Madison, 551 N.W. 63 (Wis. Ct. App.) (table).
163. Id. at 69.
164. Joint Ventures v. D.O.T., 563 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1990); Md. Nat'l Capital Park v. Chadwick,
405 A.2d 241 (Md. 1979).
165. Hernando City v. Budget Inns, 555 So. 2d 1319, 1320 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Engineered
Hous. Concepts, Inc. v. Wayne County, 447 N.W.2d 777, 778-80 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989); see also
NICHOLS, supra note 116, at § 6.05[4)[a].
166. The exaction could be less extensive where the trail is built in the road right-of-way or
shoulder, however, where only twenty to thirty feet running laterally along the lots would be all that
is required (author's estimation).
167. See The Pennsylvania Study. Rails to Trails Conservancy Website, at
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While the experiences of the Santa Cruz County Board of Supervisors
may have been extreme, they were not unique. In 1980, the Santa Cruz
County general plan called for the designation of general trail corridors
on the Land Uses and Facilities Map to indicate areas for future trail de-
velopment. Between 1980 and 1993 trail exactions were regularly made
in exchange for development permits. The County did not give back any
trail easements exacted from homeowners and developers prior to re-
moval of the trails from the maps, even after the debacle of 1993-94.61
However, after the trail maps were expunged from the general plan, pro-
visions were explicitly made that land acquired for trails would be ac-
quired only from willing sellers. No more exactions would be al-
lowed.' 69
VI. RAILBANKING
One of the most innovative federal programs designed to mitigate the
losses of rail corridors caused by the nation's shrinking rail industry and
to encourage use of abandoned corridors for recreational trails and
greenways is the 1983 amendment to the NTSA that permits a recycling
of rail corridors through what is termed railbanking. Although the Inter-
state Commerce Commission (ICC) has had the authority since 1976 to
impose trail uses on abandoned rail corridors through the Railroad Revi-
talization and Regulatory Reform Act (4-R Act), 70 it was the 1983
amendment to the National Trails System Act that gave the program the
necessary incentive to make it viable for the railroads.17' That incentive
http://www.railtrails.org (last visited Mar. 8, 2001). See also Steve Lemer & William Poole, The
Economic Benefits of Parks and Open Space: How Land Conservation Helps Communities Grow
Smart and Protect the Bottom Line, The Trust for Public Land, at
http://www.tp.org/tier3_cdl.cfm?content-item-id=l 145&folder id=727 (1999); Roger L. Moore &
Kelly Barthlow, The Economic Impacts and Uses of Long-Distance Trail, (Washington, DC: Na-
tional Park Service, 1998) (National Park Service Pamphlet; on file with author); The Conservation
Fund and Colorado State Parks State Trails Program: The Effect of Greenways on Property Values
and Public Safety, The Colorado State Trails Program [(303) 866-3203 ext. 306] (Mar. 1995) (on file
with author); The Impacts of Rail-Trails. A Study of Users and Nearby Property Owners from Three
Trails, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, Rivers, Trails, and
Conservation Assistance Program (Feb. 1992).
168. POLLAK, supra note 1, at 47.
169. Id.
170. Pub. L. No. 94-210,90 Stat. 144 (1976).
171. National Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. 1247(d) (added in 1983) reads: "Interim use of rail-
road rights-of-way. The Secretary of Transportation, the Chairman of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, and the Secretary of the Interior, in administering the Railroad Revitalization and
Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, shall encourage State and local agencies and private interests to
establish appropriate trails using the provisions of such programs. Consistent with the purposes of
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was an explicit provision continuing rail servitudes and easements during
interim trail use, easements that might otherwise terminate under state
law when a railroad discontinued services and removed tracks and ties.
The Act essentially holds the railroad's property rights in abeyance dur-
ing trail use rather than allowing them to terminate or revert back to ad-
jacent landowners, which would cause fractionation and destruction of
the corridor. The justification for holding the railroad's easements in
limbo is the explicit preservation of the rail corridor for possible future
reactivation, which would be prohibitively expensive if corridors had re-
turned to private ownership and required repurchase at today's market
prices. 7 2 Section 1247(d) of the NTSA provides that in the meantime,
interim trail uses can be made of the corridor so long as they are not in-
consistent with the primary purpose of preservation for rail service.173 If
that Act, and in furtherance of the national policy to preserve established railroad rights-of-way for
future reactivation of rail service, to protect rail transportation corridors, and to encourage energy
efficient transportation use, in the case of interim use of any established railroad rights-of-way pur-
suant to donation, transfer, lease, sale, or otherwise in a manner consistent with this chapter, if such
interim use is subject to restoration or reconstruction for railroad purposes, such interim use shall not
be treated, for purposes of any law or rule of law as an abandonment of the use of such rights-of-way
for railroad purposes. If a State, political subdivision, or qualified private organization is prepared to
assume full responsibility for management of such rights-of-way and for any legal liability arising
out of such transfer or use, and for the payment of any and all taxes that may be levied or assessed
against such rights-of-way, then the Board shall impose such terms and conditions as a requirement
of any transfer or conveyance for interim use in a manner consistent with this chapter, and shall not
permit abandonment or discontinuance inconsistent or disruptive of such use."
172. Id. See also Charles Montange, Conserving Rail Corridors, 10 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J.
139 (1991).
173. Some commentators have characterized the operation of the statute as a "pre-emption" of
adjacent landowners' state property rights, but that is not exactly the best way to describe the legal
process involved. Specifically, when a railroad holds a servitude in land owned by another, it has the
right to current exclusive possession and use, while the landowner holds title to the underlying fee
with right to future possession if the rail servitude is ever terminated. The landowner has no power
to control whether or not the servitude will be terminated. In property law parlance we can think of
the railroad as owning a current use and possessory right, but the landowner owns the remaining
sticks in the bundle of rights that make up fee simple absolute. State property laws determine the
conditions on which the railroad's servitude will terminate and the railroad's rights will transfer back
to the fee owner. Generally, only a railroad can own a rail servitude and if a railroad is going to
transfer its easement, it can transfer it only to another railroad or back to the landowner. What the
railbanking statute allows is for the railroad to transfer its current rights in the easement to a third
party for an indefinite period, usually a government or a non-profit trail group (not just anyone),
while retaining a small stick, a repurchase option. See generally Sheila Bryant, The Constitutionality
of Rails-to-Trails Conversions Under the National Trails Systems Act Amendments of 1983: Pre-
seault v. ICC, 26 TULSA L.J. 295, 301-02 (1990). To the extent that state law prohibits a railroad
from transferring its easements to anyone other than another railroad or the fee owner, the railbank-
ing statute changes the rules with regard to the rights transferred to the trail group, but it has no ef-
fect on the future interest the railroad retains in the repurchase option. See id.; Thomas Duda, The
Use of Discontinued Railroad Rights-of-Way as Recreational Hiking and Biking Trails: Does the
National Trails System Act Sanction Takings? 33 ST. Louis U. L.J. 205, 214 (1988); Stephen Miller,
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the railroad reactivates, however, the trail must give way."'
Rail-trails are incredibly popular. On October 19, 1998 the 1000th
trail was opened in Greene, Rhode Island, raising the total number of
rail-trail miles to 10,000 across the United States. 75 The railbanking act
was vital to this success. Unfortunately, it is currently under attack in
numerous federal courts across the country. A team of lawyers out of
Washington, D.C., funded by a variety of property-rights-based organiza-
tions, are filing class action lawsuits against whatever trail, whether pro-
posed or on the ground, for which they can find landowners willing to be
class representatives. 76  These suits have taken a number of different
permutations against the railroads, telecommunication companies, and
the U.S. government alleging everything from slander of title, trespass,
and conversion, to intentional infliction of emotional distress and a tak-
ing. 177 One set of recent attacks are leveled at railbanked trails and spe-
cifically allege that the federal law works a taking of the adjacent land-
owners' state property rights when it prevents the termination of the
railroad's property rights and the shifting of those rights to adjacent
landowners.178  At least eight cases are pending in various stages of liti-
Eminent Domain, Preseault v. ICC: 'Rails to Trails Act-Section 8(D) Railbanking: An Authorized
'Taking' of a Reversionary Interest? 21 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REv. 187, 189-90 (1990); Lawrence
Lim, Walking the Line: Rails-to-Trails Conversions and Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 337, 340 (1992).
174. STB procedures on railbanking provide that a reactivation by a railroad must be undertaken
in a way that minimizes the effect on the trail. However, if the trail cannot be accommodated with
the rail service, the rail ultimately prevails. See 62 Fed. Reg. 53,508 § 1152.29(c)(2), (3), (dX2) &
(3). See also Montange, supra note 172, at 155.
175. See Rails to Trails Conservancy Website, at
http://www.railtrails.org/RTCactive-pages/Home/Main.asp (current rail-trail statistics printed on
map; these statistics show that not all of the rail-trail miles were "banked"). As of Jan. 2001, those
numbers had risen to 1090 railtrails comprising 11,582 miles. Id.
176. See Elizabeth Amon, Working on the RRs: Simple Property Case Sparks 25 Class Actions
Against RRs. Telecoms, NAT'L LJ. Aug. 16, 1999, at Al. The attorneys operate as The Ackerson
Group and they heavily publicize their legal activities on the internet. See The Ackerson Group at
http://www.ackersonlaw.com.
177. This legal team's initial foray was in the case of Firestone v. Penn Cent. in which they filed
a number of state law property claims against the railroad with regard to an abandoned corridor that
Penn Central had sold to a holding company for divestiture back in 1992. Firestone v. Penn Cent.,
No. 29D 03-9210-CP-500 (7th Cir. 1992). Spin-offs from that case have made it to the Seventh Cir-
cuit where Judge Posner held that Indiana's recently-enacted railroad abandonment law was an un-
constitutional taking of the railroad's property. Penn Cent. Corp. v. U.S. R.R. Vest Corp., 955 F.2d
1158 (7th Cir. 1992). Firestone is still back in the trial court in Hamilton, County, Indiana where
meetings finally resulted in a tentative settlement in Oct., 2000. Id.
178. The takings claim has been supported by a number of scholarly commentators who take, at
face value, the claim that postponement of a reverter interest is an interference with a property right
that is deserving of compensation. See generally Duda-, supra note 173; Bryant, supra note 173; Jill
K. Pearson, Balancing Private Property Rights with Public Interests: Compensating Landowners for
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gation across the country challenging railbanked trails filed by this legal
team alone. '9 These cases are proceeding slowly, however, because of
the complex interplay of federal railroad regulation, common carrier du-
ties and liabilities, and state property rights that come into play with any
railroad issue.
Although the railbanking program has been in existence for nearly
twenty years, only one decision has held that the federal statute worked a
taking, and that was after extremely lengthy litigation over Paul and
Patricia Preseault's land near Lake Champlain.'"0 The Preseault dispute
entailed two trips to the Vermont Supreme Court, one trip to the U.S.
Supreme Court, two decisions out of the Court of Claims, and an en banc
reversal of an earlier 2-1 decision by the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. In the first three of the four decisions addressing the takings
claim, no taking was found. But the most recent decision in Preseault
may be heralding a change in legal attitudes toward rail-trails.' Most
courts that have faced these takings challenges have tried to resolve the
dispute on other grounds, wisely not wanting to venture into the quag-
mire of federal regulatory takings doctrine on top of ICC regulation and
150-year-old state railroad charters and statutes. While Preseault may be
the only precedent, it also presented a unique set of facts that are unlikely
to arise in typical railbanking cases. Moreover, if the matter is properly
understood, Preseault will be unlikely to cause further damage to the
popular railbanking program.
To properly understand the railbanking process and place the relevant
property interests in their proper light, one must understand railroad land
acquisition practices. Railroad development was complex in the nine-
the Use of Railroad Corridors for Fiber-Optic Technology, 84 MINN. L. REv. 1769 (2000); Emily
Drumm, Addressing the Flaws of the Rails-to-Trails Act, 8-Spg KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 158 (1999);
Sharon Bell, Osages. Iron Horses and Reversionary Interests: The Impact of United States v. Atter-
berry on Railroad Abandonments, 20 TULSA L.J. 255 (1984). For reasons discussed in this article,
they are misconstruing the property right at issue. See also infra Pt. VI (discussion of the interplay
of state abandonment and railbanking laws).
179. Preseault v. U.S., 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (back down in the Court of Claims for de-
termination of danages); Gloseeyer v. U.S., 45 Fed. CI. 771 (Fed. Cl. 2000) (also in the Court of
Claims for determination of damages) (Moore v. U.S. was joined to Glosemeyer); Swisher v. U.S.,
No. 98-1352-KHV (D. Kan. filed Dec. 22, 1998); Hash v. U.S., No. CV99-3245-MHW (D. Idaho
filed Dec. 17, 1999); Schmitt v. U.S., No. IP-99-C-1852-Y/F (S.D. Ind. filed Mar. 11, 2000); Lowers
v. U.S., No. 1-99-Cv-90039 (W. D. Iowa); Seger v. U.S., N. 4:99-CV-03056 (D. Neb. filed Feb. 15,
1999); Bywaters v. U.S., No. 6:99CV451 (E.D. Tex. filed May 23, 2000).
180. Trs. of Diocese of Vermont v. State, 496 A.2d 151 (Vt. 1985); Preseault v. ICC, 853 F.2d
145 (2d Cir. 1988), affld, 494 U.S. I (1990); State of Vt. v. Preseault, 652 A.2d 1001 (Vt. 1994);
Preseault v. ICC, 24 Cl. Ct. 818, 27 Fed. Cf. 69 (1992) aff'd 63 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1995), vacated
66 F.3d 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1995), rev'd 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
181. Preseault v. U.S., 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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teenth century and unraveling the property rights today is especially
complicated. Knowing the history helps explain why adjacent landown-
ers have no compensable property rights affected by the law. The next
section thus outlines the railroads' history, the state laws affecting their
property rights, the unique questions presented in Preseault, the funda-
mental flaws with Judge Plager's plurality opinion, and then it analyzes
the railbanking law in light of the Court's regulatory takings doctrine.
A. Railroad Land Acquisition Practices
Not surprisingly, the railroads developed differently in different parts
of the country at different times, making any blanket summary impossi-
ble. The first railroads were chartered in the eastern states in the 1830s
and 1840s by special acts of each state's legislature.' 82  They were
funded by private financiers who hoped to make a profit by supplying the
transportation needs of the outlying agricultural areas to the urban cen-
ters of Boston, Philadelphia, and New York. By the 1840s railroads
were expanding into the Midwestern and Southern states and began to
compete with inland canals as the preferred mode of transportation for
moving goods and people into the agricultural heartland. 8 ' While the
federal government heavily subsidized the canals by granting the canal
companies easements over public lands and by granting them large
swaths of land outright which they could then sell to homesteaders to fi-
nance construction, such federal support of railroads did not begin until
1852.' 84 However, between 1852 and 1862 the federal government only
granted access rights to public lands to railroads in Midwestern and
Southern states for their corridors only; no land was given outright for
sale to raise funds. 185 By contrast, the states were often very generous in
donating land and encouraging railroads to open up new areas for home-
steading and development. 186
The early railroads tended to be small, running local routes that were
182. See W.P. GREG & BENJAMIN POND, THE RAILROAD LAWS AND CHARTERS OF THE U.S.,
(1851) (for a list of all railroad charters for mostofthe eastern states, including Me., Conn., R.I., Vt.,
N.H., and Mass.). See also PAUL GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT, 341-386
(1983); LLOYD MERCER, RAILROADS AND LAND GRANT POLICY (1982).
183. GATES, supra note 182, at 354-59.
184. Id.
185. These grants occurred in Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Illinois, Missouri, Arkan-
sas, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida. FRANK WILNER, RAILROAD LAND
GRANTS PAID IN FULL, n.34 (1984).
186. See Danaya C. Wright and Jeffrey M. Hester, Pipes, Wires, and Bicycles: Rails-to-Trails,
Utility Licenses. and the Shifting Scope of Railroad Easements from the Nineteenth to the Twenty-
First Centuries, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351, 365-76 (2000).
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established by land agents knocking on the doors of landowners seeking
to purchase whatever land was needed between outlying towns and
nearby ports or urban centers. Where possible, the railroads would try to
stay on state or federal land because that was generally donated to the
railroad. Also, before receiving a charter, the railroad would have sur-
veyed the territory and likely received promises of local municipal or
county support in the form of donated land for depots and elevators, tax
abatements, or low interest loans through government bonds."8 7 The
state charter would always give the railroad engineers the access rights to
survey the linJ over private land and eminent domain power to condemn
whatever private land was necessary to fill in the parcels not obtained by
voluntary sale. By the Civil War, most of the eastern states had exten-
sive rail services and the Midwestern and Southern states were frantically
building. But the west had yet to be opened up.
In 1862, in the crunch of wartime economics, Congress finally passed
the first federal railroad grant for construction of a transcontinental line
from Omaha, Nebraska to San Francisco, California linking the Missouri
River and the Pacific Ocean. 88 This Act was followed in 1864 by the
Northern Pacific grant linking Lake Superior and Puget Sound,'8 9 and the
Southern Pacific grant linking Springfield, Missouri and San Diego in
1866.'9 These federal grants gave to the railroads limited fee interests in
their corridor lands and alternate sections, sometimes as much as forty
miles wide, on either side of the corridor, for sale to raise construction
funds.' 9 ' By 1871, the federal government had granted to a variety of
187. Id. See generally GATES, supra note 182.
188. This grant was made by legislation chartering the Union Pacific and Central Pacific Rail-
roads and clearly envisioned a transnational transportation and communication corridor. The legisla-
tion was entitled: An Act to Aid in the Construction of a Railroad and Telegraph Line from the Mis-
souri River to the Pacific Ocean, and to Secure to the Government the Use of the Same for Postal,
Military, and Other Purposes (Pacific R.R. Act of July I, 1862, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 489, amended by
ch. 216, 13 Stat. 356 (1864)).
189. Act of July 2, 1864, ch. 217, 13 Stat. 365, amended by resolution, 16 Stat. 378 (1870).
190. Act of July 27, 1866, ch. 278, 14 Stat. 292 (This grant was originally to the Atlantic and Pa-
cific Railroads, but upon going into bankruptcy the A&P forfeited the grant which was converted to
the Southern Pacific which actually finished the road.).
191. What motivated the federal government to be so generous to these private corporations? In
1820 Illinois had a scattered 55,000 people with a property tax base and state income that would not
pay the Governor's salary today. GATES, supra note 182, at 350. States like Indiana and Illinois
simply could not afford the tremendous cost associated with the extensive internal developments
represented by a railroad line. Costs for constructing a mile along the Northern Pacific Route could
be as much as $100,000 per mile. Obviously, a state like Indiana could not afford the investment by
itself. Instead, the federal government reasoned that by conveying the land to the railroad, the value
of its retained land would more than double, from the $1.25/acre they had originally been asking, to
$2.50/acre. As it turned out, productive cropland that had been unmarketable at $1.25/acre for dec-
ades, sold for more than $ 11.00/acre once announcements of the railroad's coming were made. J. L.
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railroads, or to states for conveyance to the railroads, over 130 million
acres for sixty-one railroad companies. 92 After 1875 federal land grants
to the railroads ceased, but charter railroads were still allowed two-
hundred-foot wide easements on all federally-owned lands. 
93
The demands of reconstruction and the booming expansion of the
western states, with the growing importance of the telegraph, caused
many small railroads to be absorbed into larger conglomerate railroads
that could provide lower rates for longer-distance shipping. From 1875
to 1900, tremendous changes in the economy and population led to a
complex series of laws enacted by Congress to regulate rates and ser-
vices and to establish the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in an
effort to make the railroads nationally rather than regionally focused.'
94
Though the 1887 ICC Act was supposed to simplify railroad operations
by locating regulatory power in a single entity, the imposition of federal
control on top of state property rights dramatically complicated the juris-
dictional conflicts and multiplied the layers of analysis necessary for de-
termining the effect of the railbanking statute on state property rights.
Determining whether a property right was taken, however, requires de-
termining what interests the parties had in the mid-nineteenth century,
which depends to a great extent on nineteenth-century conveyancing
practices. It is first year property law that the intent of the parties at the
time of the original transaction governs the interpretation of the property
right that was transferred, and the modem reader must try to determine
the intent of the parties in light of a relative scarcity of case precedents in
the area of railroad deed interpretation and rather arcane terminology. 195
Consequently, if the railroad did not acquire fee simple absolute title to
RINGWALT, DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES 155 ( 888). The
cash value of farms increased in Indiana from an aggregate in 1850 of SI 88,388,173 to an aggregate
in 1860, after the railroads had arrived, of $314,902,776. Id. at 155. In ten years the value of farm-
lands nearly doubled, an increase due almost entirely to the arrival of the railroads. The same was
true of the canal lands. For many lines, therefore, the railroads received their land originally from
the federal or state governments, or from defunct railroads or canal projects. Id.
192. GATES, supra note 182, at 384-85; WILNER, supra note 185, at 27; Thomas Root, Railroad
Land Grants from Canals to Transcontinentals, Monograph series no. 4, Natural Resources Law
Section of American Bar Ass'n, (1987).
193. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 482, codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 934-39 (2000).
194. Interstate Commerce Clause Regulations Act, Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887).
195. I have written extensively on the interpretation of railroad deeds and other granting docu-
ments and will not repeat myself here. See generally Danaya C. Wright, Private Rights and Public
Ways: Property Disputes and Rails-to-Trails in Indiana, 30 IND. L. REV. 723 (1997) [hereinafter
Wright, Private Rights and Public Ways); Danaya C. Wright, Trains, Trails and Property Law: Indi-
ana law and the Rails-to-Trails Controversy, 31 IND. L. REv. 753 (1998); Wright & Hester, supra
note 186.
[26:2
HeinOnline  -- 26 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 440 2001
Eminent Domain, Exactions, and Railbanking
its corridor land, then the subsequent transfer of the land for a trail may
affect reversionary interests in the land that the original grantor re-
tained.
196
The railroads typically acquired their property through one of four
methods: private deed, condemnation, prescription, or state or federal
land grant.' 97 For the sake of simplification, we can collapse the interests
into three rough categories, though in doing so we must realize that state
property rules differ and that two identically-worded deeds might fall
into different categories depending on state rules of deed construction.
The first category that has evolved from state case law is a fee simple ab-
solute for the railroad, leaving no property rights in the original grantor.
The second category involves the grant of a defeasiblefee to the rail-
road in which the original grantor retained either a possibility of reverter
or a right of re-entry that would cause the railroad's property rights to
terminate and shift back to the grantor upon the occurrence of a condi-
tion. The typical condition is failure to use for railroad purposes. Al-
though the railbanking statute does not explicitly address these rever-
sionary rights, it implicitly would prevent the reversion by providing that
railbanking is a continuing railroad purpose.'98
The third category is a grant of a perpetual or limited easement to the
railroad in which the grantor retained ownership of the underlying fee
simple absolute. Both the perpetual and limited easements give to the
railroad an exclusive present right to possession which can be terminated
only by the railroad abandoning its rights. Abandonment, as discussed in
greater detail later, is a complex legal determination that the railroad is
giving up its property rights to those parcels of its corridor held as ease-
ments. In the few cases where the railroad acquired only a license,
196. Although many courts use the term "reversionary" interest to refer to the rights adjacent
landowners might have in a rail corridor, a reversion applies only to the future interest retained by
the grantor who conveyed away a defeasible fee simple interest. When the grantor retained fee title
and only conveyed an easement to the railroad, the proper terminology is the removal of an encum-
brance. See Consol. Rail. Corp. v. Lewellen, 682 N.E.2d 779 (Ind. 1997); Preseault v. U.S., 100
F.3d at 1533 (for discussions on the distinction between terminating easements and reverter inter-
ests). See also Walker v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Lucas County, 1991 WL 110372 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991,
unpubl. opinion); Parrett v. Penn Cent. Corp., 1987 WL 14754 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987, unpubl. opin-
ion); McKinley v. Waterloo R.R. Co., 368 N.W.2d 131 (Iowa 1985).
197. In the process, they could acquire any of six property interests: fee simple absolute, fee sim-
ple determinable (subject to a possibility of reverter in the grantor), fee simple subject to a condition
subsequent (subject to a right of re-entry in the grantor), a perpetual unlimited easement, a limited
easement for railroad purposes, or a license. See Reichard v. Chicago, B&Q. R.R. Co., I N.W.2d
721 (Iowa 1942), outlining the differences between different types ofdefeasible fees in railroad land.
See also Wright & Hester, supra note 186, at 376.
198. The statute provides: "interim use... shall not be treated •.. as an abandonment of the use
ofsuch rights-of-way for railroad purposes." 16 U.S.C.A. § 1247(d) (2000).
2001]
HeinOnline  -- 26 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 441 2001
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [26:2
which is a revocable right to enter and use land, construction of tracks on
the land is generally considered sufficient investment by the railroad to
estop the grantor from revoking the license, thus turning it into what is
generally called an easement by estoppel.' 99 Because an easement is a
right to use land, the railbanking statute's explicit provision that interim
trail use will not be treated as abandonment shows that it is primarily
concerned with easements.
For the most part, only limited easements are affected by the federal
statute, though reversionary rights conditioned narrowly on use for rail-
road purposes enter the umbrella of the railbanking statute's savings
clause.200 Land obtained in fee simple absolute and most land held sub-
ject to a condition subsequent are unaffected by railbanking. Moreover,
land obtained by the railroads from states, municipalities, or the federal
government are not affected by the railbanking law. 0
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of these cases is that different eco-
nomic, geographic, and population patterns in different states, as well as
the different circumstances surrounding the development of the railroads,
has led to significant variations in the legal definitions of the railroads'
property rights and the rules governing abandonment of those rights.0 2
199. Kamenar R.R. Salvage, Inc. v. Ohio Edison Co., 607 N.E.2d 1108 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
200. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1247(d) (2000).
201. See infra Pt. IV (discussion on railbanking and regulatory takings).
202. Until roughly the last decade of the nineteenth century, the railroads and private landowners
used only a handful of terms to refer to land acquired by the railroads for corridor purposes. These
terms were: "a right of way," "a strip of land," "the following real estate," or "a strip over, through
and across." These references to the physical land were the predominant language used in these
deeds. The term "easement" almost never appears in the nineteenth century and the reason is clear.
The common-law easement, as it was defined by the case law of the time, was modeled on the pri-
vate driveway or right of passage. WILLIAM STOEBUCK & DALE WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY
458-63 (3d ed. 2000). It was a non-exclusive right to pass over, but did not include the right to ex-
clude, use gravel, build embankments and drains, the right to fence, or the right to bring an action in
ejectment, because it was an incorporeal hereditament. See State of Wyoming v. Udall, 379 F.2d
635 (10th Cir. 1967). Because the common-law easement simply did not satisfy the railroad's needs,
virtually all nineteenth century deeds refer to the land, or when they use the term "right of way" they
clearly mean it as a synonym for the strip of land. See Joy v. City of St. Louis, 138 U.S. I (1890).
The vast majority ofnineteenth century deeds, and this is consistent with the railroads' and the land-
owners' intentions, would appear to be fee simple or defeasible fee deeds, the latter including a re-
version clause (which is not necessary when easements are being conveyed). Consol. Rail Corp. v.
Lewellen, 682 N.E.2d 779, 782 (Ind. 1997).
Around the turn of the century, however, with the increase in railroad abandonments, courts real-
ized the difficulties caused by finding that the railroads had acquired fee simple title to their land.
Small skinny strips of land would be transferred to others, or might remain in the grantors' heirs,
while adjacent landowners would be unable to reabsorb the parcels into their backyards. Conse-
quently, interpretations of railroad deeds around the turn of the century began to find that the rail-
road had acquired only an easement (often when the deed used the same language as fee simple
deeds interpreted earlier), but they turned to the "right of way" language as being ambiguous and
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Generally, the rules governing the property relationship between the
grantor-landowner and the grantee-railroad are products of state law.
203
But the vagaries of local politics have created variations in state law. For
example, two similarly-situated Midwestern states, Indiana and Ohio,
have had very different attitudes toward the railroads resulting in dra-
matically different legal structures, and the consequence that Ohio has
over 400 miles of rail-trails while Indiana has less than 50 miles.c 4
These differences are the result of different rules on deed interpretation,
as well as different rules that cause termination of the railroad's property
interests in its corridor when they are deemed abandoned.
providing some sort of new property right that was unique to the railroad. See New Mexico v. U.S.
Trust, 172 U.S. 171 (1898). This new right, sometimes called an easement and sometimes called
just a right of way, was more than a common-law easement and is, in fact, quite close to a fee. As
the Court, referring to the term "right of way" in a federal land grant to the railroads, stated:
The phrase 'right of way,' besides, does not necessarily mean the right of passage merely. Ob-
viously, it may mean one thing in a grant to a natural person for private purposes, and another
thing in a grant to a railroad for public purposes.. .(A railroad's] use would be continuous, not
occasional, and which would embrace the entire beneficial occupation and improvement of the
land .... [Flor a mere easement perhaps an action of ejectment would not lie; but wherever a
right of entry exists, and the interest is tangible, so that possession can be delivered, an action of
ejectment will lie.... The interest granted [herein] is real estate of corporeal quality, and the
principles of such apply.
Id. This language was repeated in the interpretation of a private grant in Western Union Telegraph
Co. v. Penn R.R. Co., 195 U.S. 540, 570 (1904). when the telegraph company tried to acquire rights
to string its cables on the railroad corridor. The Court said: "A railroad's right of way has, therefore,
the substantiality of the fee, and it is private property, even to the public, in all else but an interest
and benefit in its uses." Id. An excellent case that details the changing structure of the railroad
easement under traditional legal doctrines is Udall, 379 F.2d 635.
The fact that the legal notion of a railroad easement changed around the turn of the century con-
firms what appears to be an across-the-board reassessment of railroad property rights at this time.
Consistent with this change were changes in eminent domain statutes in some states that precluded
railroads from acquiring corridor land in fee simple after that date. E.g.. Act of Feb. 27, 1905, ch. 48
§ I, 1905 Ind. Acts 59, 59-60 (codified as amended at Ind. Code § 32-11-1-1 (1993)). Also, the lan-
guage in many private deeds that had been interpreted to convey fee simple were slowly being rein-
terpreted to convey an easement now that the easement was legally sufficient to protect the railroad's
property interests. A.E. Kopola, Deed to Railroad Company as Conveying Fee or Easement, 6
A.L.R.3d 973 (1966). And much of this transformation came about as a result of the newly-
recognized importance of mineral rights. Because minerals transferred with fee simple absolute and
fee simple determinable but not with easements, as newly discovered minerals were found on west-
em land, there was a tremendous spate of litigation over the nature of the railroad's title. In general,
the railroads lost, and minerals were held to be retained by the federal government or the private
original grantor. See United States v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 112 (1957).
203. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992); see also Cholewa,
supra note 156, at 406-08.
204. These numbers are constantly changing. In 1996 Indiana had less than fifteen miles of rail
trails. It now has over one hundred miles on the ground or in progress. See Indy Greenways, at
http://www.indygreenways.org; Rails to Trails Conservancy, at http://www.RailTrails.org/OH/; Trail
Link (a part of the Rails to Trails Conservancy), at http://wwwtraillink.com.
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B. Abandonment
One person can acquire the property rights of another through a limited
number of processes. One can purchase another's ownership interest in a
piece of land and obtain a deed. One can also acquire ownership rights
to land when a condition subsequent occurs causing the prior owner's in-
terest to terminate (or "determine"). A property interest can terminate
naturally, as with a life estate, a leasehold, or a term of years. And fi-
nally, one can simply abandon one's property interest by essentially
throwing it away, a process that implies a relinquishment of one's own
property rights in the thing and an intent or understanding that those
rights will vest in whoever comes along and chooses to claim them. 0 5
Because an easement owner does not own the actual fee simple title to
the land, but rather a right to use the land, abandonment of an easement
results in the removal of the servitude so that the fee owner has unen-
cumbered right to use her land without interference by the easement
owner. This can be thought of as the shifting of the railroad's easement
to the fee owner, which merges to create a free, unencumbered title. A
railroad's property rights will terminate, or shift to an adjacent land-
owner, either upon the occurrence of a condition subsequent (as when it
reverts for failure to use for railroad purposes), or upon the abandonment
of an easement. These two events have distinct legal consequences that
must be understood separately.
Moreover, until the railroad's property interest is abandoned, the adja-
cent landowner's interest is not yet vested; it is a contingent future inter-
est that will vest upon the termination of the railroad's interest. What ac-
tions will cause the contingent interest to vest depends on state common-
law or statutory rules of abandonment. Every state's common-law rules
defining abandonment of railroad easements are essentially the same; the
railroad must have intent to abandon and must consummate that intent
through actions either clearly manifesting that intent or actions inconsis-
tent with retaining the property interest. 2°6 Some states have changed
205. BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY 3 (6th ed. 1990) ("'Abandoned property' in a legal sense is that
to which owner has relinquished all right, title, claim and possession, but without vesting it in any
other person, and with intention of not reclaiming it or resuming its ownership, possession or enjoy-
ment in the future. There must be concurrence of act and intent, that is, the act of leaving the prem-
ises or property vacant, so that it may be appropriated by the next comer, and the intention of not
returning. Relinquishment of all title, possession, or claim; a virtual intentional throwing away of
property.") (citations omitted).
206. See Judge Nettesheim's explanation of the "non-use plus" rule. Preseault v. ICC, 24 Cl. CL
818, 832 (1992); 27 Fed. Cl. 69 (1992), affd 63 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1995), vacated 66 F.3d 1190
(Fed. Cir. 1995), rev'd 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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their common-law rules by statute or have narrowly defined what actions
and intent are necessary to find abandonment. Some states have strict
rules that would terminate the railroad's property interest upon relatively
slight indications of non-use, while others will protect the railroad's
property rights even through long periods of inaction, bankruptcy, sale,
and consolidation that might lead to significant restructuring of the
tracks, sidings, and other facilities.07
To further complicate matters, state-law abandonment is often inter-
twined with federal ICC abandonment, which occurs through relin-
quishment of federal ICC jurisdiction.0 8 In 1920, amendments to the In-
terstate Commerce Act gave the ICC jurisdiction over railroad
abandonments.2 9 Abandonment pursuant to the 1920 Act is fundamen-
tally different from abandonment of the state common-law property
rights in the rail easement. 2t0 The former entails a lengthy analysis of in-
ter-state commerce consequences of discontinuation of service, including
a determination that the public convenience and necessity do not require
continued service, 211 while the latter concerns only intent and actions to
abandon the relevant property right. 2  The former concerns railroad ser-
vices and the latter concerns the real estate on which the railroad pro-
vides its services. Federal jurisdiction over abandonment procedures was
actively sought by railroads that felt state laws were too stringent' and
207. Parrett v. Penn Cent. Corp., 1987 WL 14754 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (unpubl. opinion); J. Con-
nelly, What Constitutes Abandonment of a Railroad Right of Way, 95 A.L.R.2d 468 (1964).
208. Interstate Commerce Clause Regulations Act, Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887).
209. Transportation Act of Feb. 28, 1920, ch. 91, §402,41 Stat. 456,477.
210. See Wright, Private Rights and Public Ways, supra note 195, at 730-33. See also Marc Sen-
newald, The Nexus of Federal and State Law in Railroad Abandonments, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1399
(1998).
211. See Transportation Act of Feb. 28, 1920, ch. 91, § 402, 41 Stat. 456, 477-78. This Act says
that "[nlo carrier by railroad subject to this Act shall abandon all or any portion of a line of railroad,
or operation thereof, unless and until there shall first have been obtained from the Commission a
certificate that the present or future public convenience and necessity permit such an abandonment."
See also 49 U.S.C.A. § 10903 (2000).
212. A railroad could easily, therefore, discontinue services but retain the property assets for later
sale, salvage, or reactivation of rail service when doing so is more profitable.
213. Prior to 1920, a railroad that sought to abandon a particular line had to meet relatively strin-
gent state requirements before it was permitted to stop services, sell its assets, and (most likely) go
bankrupt. See Montange, supra note 172, at 160. "[Prior] to 1920, railroad operators desiring to
vacate service on an unprofitable line were faced with numerous obstacles to abandonment, includ-
ing contractual obligations, limitations imposed by state railroad charters, and restrictive laws im-
posed by state legislatures. Railroads were effectively compelled to maintain unprofitable lines as a
result of the myriad difficulties encountered at the state level, forcing many into financial straits and
limiting access to needed capital." Sennewald, supra note 210, at 1402. Many states tried to hold
the railroads hostage to continue providing services because of the subsidies they had received and
the importance of the railroad to the local economy. Id. Since the ICC took over abandonment ju-
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that federal control would impose fair and uniform conditions on all cov-
ered railroads by considering national over parochial needs.21 4 The ICC
was replaced by the Surface Transportation Board (STB) in 1998,2"' so
current abandonments will occur under the auspices of the STB while
past abandonments will have been overseen by the ICC (further com-
pounding the confusion).
Under the federal abandonment law, once a certificate of discontinu-
ance is granted affirming that the public convenience and necessity do
not require continued rail services, the railroad has one year to complete
abandonment proceedings by taking whatever steps it desires to termi-
nate services. It need not sell any real estate, nor does it have to remove
tracks and ties. In most cases the salvage value will encourage such ac-
tions, but they are not required by the STB. If the railroad decides at the
end of a year that it has no future interest in the discontinued line, the
discontinuance certificate will be converted to an abandonment certifi-
cate and the railroad will no longer be liable to the shipping and traveling
public along the abandoned route;216 it cannot be forced to resume active
rail services later. Only when federal jurisdiction is lifted, however, will
the property rights of the railroad be governed solely by state law.21 7 At
that point, a determination of whether the railroad has abandoned its
easement interests can be made, but it is done using the test of intent and
consummation rather than the federal test of public necessity.
To simplify the discussion, assume that under state law a railroad
easement will be deemed abandoned when a railroad holds the requisite
intent (as for instance when the officers determine that the line is unprof-
itable and a determination is made to discontinue services) and when that
intent is consummated through some action (let's say removal of tracks
and ties, selling the stock, and otherwise closing the books on the line).,1 8
If we assume that those two elements rarely occur simultaneously, it
makes sense to assume that most railroads first form an intent and then
later consummate that intent through the required actions.
For purposes of determining when the railroad's property interests
risdiction, most states simply apply the same rules to the railroads on termination of easements that
they use for other easements. See Montange, supra note 172, at 160-64.
214. See Sennewald, supra note 210, at 1402.
215. The Surface Transportation Board has taken over the duties of the Interstate Commerce
Commission with respect to railroad abandonments pursuant to the ICC Termination Act of 1995,
Pub. L. No. 104-88, §§101-02, 109 Stat. 803, 804-52 (1995) (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§10101-11908
(Supp. 1 1995)).
216. 49 U.S.C. § 10903(d) (1996).
217. See Fritsch v. ICC, 59 F.3d 248 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
218. See REST. (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 504; REST. (THIRD) OF SERVITUDES § 7.4.
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terminate, however, the relevant question is whether discontinuation of
services, removal of tracks and ties, receipt of an abandonment certificate
from the STB, or some other act constitutes the necessary elements for
abandonment of a railroad easement under state law. 29 When that oc-
curs, the easement is extinguished and the underlying fee owner regains
the right to undisturbed possession of the easement land. Traditionally,
offering to sell a portion of a corridor was deemed a clear, unequivocal
act indicating intent not to retain any property rights in the easement por-
tions of a corridor.22 0 But removal of tracks and ties while continuing to
pay taxes or maintain the right to control grade crossings has been
deemed, in some states, evidence of intent not to abandon.22'
Those parcels held as defeasible fees, subject to reversion if railroad
uses cease, may or may not pose similar questions under state law. 222 Al-
though the interest is not being abandoned or terminated, as with an
easement, the railroad's defeasible fee may "determine" by the occur-
rence of the condition subsequent that causes the reversionary interests to
become possessory. Some states, however, will terminate the reversion-
ary interest prior to discontinuation of rail services so that the railroad
will be deemed to own the corridor land in fee simple absolute.223 Other
states have treated the reversionary right as an unenforceable restraint on
alienation, thus converting the railroad's property into fee simple abso-
lute.224
As mentioned above, the railbanking statute serves to continue federal
jurisdiction over the corridor and to prevent abandonment under state law
even though the traditional elements of abandonment might be met under
some states' laws when the corridor is converted to a recreational trail.221
219. See Montange, supra note 172, at 160-64.
220. Mammoth Cave Nat'l Park Ass'n. v. State Highway Comm'n, 88 S.W.2d 931 (Ky. 1935);
City Motel Inc., v. State Dept. of Highways, 336 P.2d 375, 337 P.2d 273 (Nev. 1959).
221. Chevy Chase Land Co. v. U.S., 733 A.2d 1055 (Md. 1999); Dept. of Conservaon ex rel.
People v. Fairless, 653 N.E.2d 446 (III. App. Ct. 1995); Thompson v. Md. & Pa. RR Pres. Soc., 612
A.2d 450 (Pa. Super. Ct.. 1992) (non-use, no matter how long, is not abandonment); Burnier v. Dept.
Env. Res., 611 A.2d 1366 (Pa. Commnw. Ct. 1992) (conversion to a trail is not abandonment). See
also Connelly, supra note 207, at § 5.
222. See also infra Pt. Vi, Sec. B (discussing defeasible fees).
223. Bd. of County Cormn'rs of Van Wert County v. Consol. Rail Corp., 469 N.E.2d 1361 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1983); Cent. Ohio Light & Power Co. v. Hixenbaugh, 3 N.E.2d 919 (Ohio Ct. App. 1935);
Paul v. Connorsville & Newcastle Junction R.R. Co., 51 Ind. 527 (Ind. 1875); Denver & Santa Fe
Ry. Co. v. School Dist. No. 22, 23 P. 978 (Colo. 1890); McKinley v. Waterloo R.R.. Inc., 368
N.W.2d 131 (Iowa 1985).
224. See Falls City v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 453 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1971).
225. Burnier v. Dept. Env. Res., 611 A.2d 1366 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992); Schnabel v. County of
DuPage, 428 N.E.2d 671 (111. App. Ct. 1981); Pollnow v. State Dept. of Natural Resources, 276
N.W.2d 738 (Wis. 1979). But see Chevy Chase Land Co. v. U.S., 733 A.2d 1055 (Md. 1999);
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By retaining federal jurisdiction under circumstances that might result in
termination of the railroad's property rights under the old legal regime,
some adjacent landowners claim their property rights have been taken.226
In other words, their argument is that but for the railbanking statute
maintaining federal jurisdiction over the railroad corridor and preventing
termination of the railroad's property rights, they would have benefited
from the acquisition of those rights, either by the .triggering of their re-
versionary interests or by the removal of the rail servitudes. Of course,
the same argument could be made with respect to the 1887 and 1920 fed-
eral statutes.227 This argument is flawed, however, by the fact that the
adjacent landowners do not have a vested right to possession or to ex-
clude the public prior to the operation of the railbanking statute. The
railbanking statute does not take a property right that was owned by the
adjacent landowners; it merely postpones their receiving a benefit to
which they had no legal right and no expectation of receiving. Mere ex-
pectancies based on the continuation of a particular statutory regime,
without reliance, are not property rights protected by the takings
clause.228
Before explaining the details of this analysis, it will help to understand
a relatively typical railroad case and the complex legal issues it raised.
The Preseault case is the only one to date that has found railbanking to
work a taking but, for reasons that shall be made clear, it is simply
wrong. Judge Plager did not understand the legal consequences of fed-
eral ICC jurisdiction over state property rights or the character and scope
of the landowner's property rights in the rail corridor. Moreover, even if
the landowners are deemed to have a compensable property right in the
rail corridors, he applied the wrong takings test to determine whether
compensation was due.
Barney v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 490 N.W.2d 726 (S.D. 1992); Rieger v. Penn Cent. Corp.,
1985 WL 7919 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (unpubl. opinion), for conclusion that conversion to recrea-
tional trail does not constitute abandonment of a railroad easement.
226. Often these adjacent landowners claim to have a reversionary interest in a rail corridor, or
claim to own the fee encumbered by a rail easement, even though they rarely offer proof of their
title. They claim that the law should just give them to the center-line of the corridor whether they
have deeds describing that land or not, simply because they are adjacent landowners. They base this
claim on dicta in many railroad cases that it is against public policy to have isolated strips of aban-
doned land unusable by adjacent landowners. See, e.g., Ross v. Legler, 199 N.E.2d 346 (Ind. 1964).
227. And they were rejected by Judge Plager in Preseault when he argued that it would be absurd
to find that a taking occurred in 1887 or 1920 because so long as the railroad was still operating, the
rights that were allegedly taken were contingent and not possessory. 100 F.3d at 1537-38.
228. See infra Pt. VI, Sec. D (discussing the interplay of state abandonment and railbanking
laws).
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C. The Preseault Saga
The Preseaults' twenty-year legal battle may be setting the most im-
portant legal precedent for the future of recreational trails across the
country and could spell the end of the railbanking program. In 1962 the
State of Vermont purchased the corridor at issue from one railroad com-
pany and leased it to another. In 1975 the second company discontinued
rail service for the portion of the track adjacent to the Preseault's land
and removed all the tracks and ties. In 1981 the Preseaults brought a
quiet title action alleging that the railroad held only an easement, that it
had been abandoned, and that they were now entitled to unencumbered
use of the property.229 The trial court dismissed the action, holding that
the ICC had continuing jurisdiction of the rail line and that under Ver-
mont State law no abandonment had occurred. 30 Without abandonment
of the railroad's property rights, the Preseaults had no claim to the for-
mer rail corridor under state law. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed
in 1985.231
In 1987 the Preseaults sought a certificate of abandonment from the
ICC, but pursuant to an application by the State of Vermont under the
NTSA, the ICC railbanked the corridor and granted a Certificate of In-
terim Trail Use (CITU) to the State for operation of a recreational trail
along the corridor. The Preseaults appealed the ICC order to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit arguing that the railbanking was
not a valid exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause powers and worked
an unconstitutional taking of their property. The Second Circuit rejected
both of these arguments,232 and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed in 1990
as to the commerce clause issue. 33 The Second Circuit, applying ra-
229. The issue of whether the railroad owned fee simple absolute title to the corridor or only an
easement was not resolved until the second Vermont Supreme Court decision, 163 Vt. 38 (Vt. 1994).
230. This is important because it raises the question of whether the recognition of ICC superau-
thority pre-empts or is incorporated into state law. To the extent that Justice Scalia would not find a
taking in instances where there are inherent limitations on title, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992), then pre-existing regulatory limitations, whether state or fed-
eral, exist as a part of state-defined property rights. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164 (1979)( navigational servitude as a limitation on title). Judge Nettesheim addressed this in
her cogent analysis of the interplay of federal railroad law and state-defined property rights. Pre-
seault v. U.S., 27 Fed. Cl. 69, 88-89 (Fed. Cl. 1992) (recognizing that Lucas' inherent limitations on
title can include federal as well as state regulatory limitations).
23 1. Trs. of Diocese of Vt. v. Vermont, 496 A.2d 151 (Vt. 1985).
232. Preseault v. ICC, 853 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1988), aff'd, 494 U.S. 1 (1990).
233. Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. I (1990). The main substance of the Preseault's objections were:
(1) that Congress's idea of a federal 'rail bank' is an 'utter fiction' because the ICC does not retain
jurisdiction over the railway carrier and, therefore, cannot require the carrier to resume service over
the route in the future; (2) that the true purpose of § 1247(d) is merely to prevent reversion of the
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tional basis deference to the commerce clause issue, found that the Trails
Act "serves two purposes: 1) preserving rail corridors for future railroad
use and 2) permitting public recreational use of trails. Both purposes are
legitimate congressional goals under the commerce clause.
234
With regard to the takings claim, the Second Circuit held there was no
taking of the Preseaults' property rights because no state property rights
existed that could have been taken; if there even were any "reversionary
interests," they were mere expectancies that continuing ICC jurisdiction
precluded. In other words, because the ICC could have kept the railroad
from abandoning, thus preventing any state property right from vesting,
the ICC's decision to bank the corridor did not affect any property right
the Preseaults had because their rights were contingent.2 ' As the Court
explained:
Preserving railway corridors for future railway use is a function that con-
gress has recently delegated to the ICC, and it is, as discussed earlier, per-
missible under the commerce clause. For as long as it determines that the
land will serve a 'railroad purpose', the ICC retains jurisdiction over rail-
road rights-of-way; it does not matter whether that purpose is immediate or
in the future. To distinguish between future railroad use and immediate
railroad use would serve no purpose but to stifle Congress's creative effort
to exercise foresight by preserving existing corridors for the future railroad
needs of our country.
The Second Circuit had found the Preseaults had no property right be-
cause denial of the abandonment could have achieved the same laudable
goal of rail corridor preservation without triggering any property right, so
approval subject to railbanking could not interfere with a right they had
either. On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Brennan stated, with
regard to the Commerce Clause claim, that even if the only purpose of
the legislation had been promotion of recreational trails, that alone would
satisfy the legitimate state purpose requirement of the rational basis
test.23 7 Yet he reversed and remanded on the takings claim because a
Tucker Act procedure was available to determine whether or not a prop-
rights-of-way [of] property owners after abandonment by the railway carrier; and (3) that Congress's
attempt to establish a rail bank is mere subterfuge for an attempt to take the rights-of-way for an-
other public purpose-recreational trail use-without just compensation. Presenult, 853 F.2d at
149. Decisions to reactivate are voluntary and have occurred. In fact, at least one railbanked corri-
dor has been reactivated. See Glosemeyer v. U.S., 45 Fed. CI. 771, 774 (Fed. CI. 2000).
234. Preseault, 853 F.2d at 150.
235. This is the same argument used in the exactions context that says that if a denial of a permit
would be permissible, then approval subject to a condition must also be permissible. See Nollan v.
Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1987).
236. Preseaul, 853 F.2d at 151.
237. Preseault, 494 U.S. at 18.
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23 239
erty right had been taken. 38  The takings challenge was premature.
The Supreme Court did not find that a taking had occurred; it simply
held that a taking claim should be brought through the Tucker Act in the
Court of Federal Claims, and not through an action challenging the
power of Congress to pass the railbanking law. 40
In the meantime, the State of Vermont sued the Preseaults for trespass
and sought an injunction because they had excavated and removed large
amounts of soil from the railroad corridor. The Chittenden Superior
Court, in 1993, granted a permanent injunction and held that the Pre-
seaults' prope ty interests in the corridor would not vest until the rail-
banking ended and the ICC issued an unconditional certificate of aban-
donment; until then, the State owned the railroad's exclusive possessory
interest in the corridor and was entitled to an action in ejectment to ex-
clude even the fee owner if he had sold to another the right to present
possession.14' The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under
Vermont state law, the railroad's interest in its corridor was exclusive,
that because Congress's intent in preserving the corridor would be frus-
trated if the state construed the railroad's interest to be anything less than
it was when it was operating rail services, the interest would remain ex-
clusive throughout the railbanked period.242 Because the Preseaults' ac-
tivities impinged on the original railroad easement, they were to be en-
joined despite the fact that they did not impinge on the current trail
use.
243
After prompting by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Preseaults filed suit
under the Tucker Act in the Court of Federal Claims in 1990 alleging
that the Railbanking Act "took" their property by preventing the unbur-
dening of their servient estates that would have occurred had the railroad
simply abandoned its interest rather than railbanked it. In the first deci-
sion out of the Claims Court, Judge Nettesheim held that, if the entire
dispute were solely a matter of state law, the original railroad had only
acquired easements across the relevant parcels of land,2" and that those
238. The Tucker Act provides a mechanism for seeking compensation when a private citizen
claims a debt against the U.S. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(I) (2001). The Little Tucker Act creates
concurrent jurisdiction in district courts for claims not exceeding S10,000. See 28 U.S.C. §
1346(a)(2) (2001).
239. Preseault, 494 U.S. at 17.
240. Id.
241. State of Vermont v. Preseault, 163 Vt. 39, 41 (1994).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. United States v. Preseault, 24 Cl. Ct. 818, 830 (1992). Though I disagree with the analysis
of these deeds, that is an issue best left for another article.
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easements would have been abandoned under Vermont state law through
its abandonment rule of "non-use plus. ' 24 5 That rule states that a railroad
easement is abandoned upon non-use for a sufficient period of time plus
"other factors [that] give rise to an inference that the right-of-way is be-
ing used for a purpose inconsistent with its being a railroad, or when
there is clear and objective indication that there is no present intent on
the part of the railroad to use its right-of-way., 246 This is essentially the
common-law test requiring intent to abandon and consummation. The
Claims Court held that if it were only looking to Vermont state law, the
railroad had acquired only an easement and the easement would have
been extinguished some time not later than 1975 when the tracks and ties
were removed.247
A second opinion by Judge Nettesheim, however, attempted to ascer-
tain the legal consequences of superimposing federal railroad law on the
Preseaults' state property rights.248 She found that because of ongoing
federal ICC jurisdiction over this corridor, the Preseaults had no "histori-
cally rooted expectation" in the removal of the rail servitude at the time
they acquired the property, and therefore had no property right that could
be taken. The suit was dismissed.249 Judge Nettesheim wrote a lengthy
analysis of federal jurisdiction over railroad services, discontinuation of
those services, and abandonment. In the end, she agreed with the Second
Circuit that the Preseaults had no cognizable property claim under state
law because Vermont would not find abandonment and the triggering of
state property rights without ICC termination, that the property was
heavily regulated and therefore came with state law limitations on title,250
and that because the taking, if any, was temporary, the Preseaults could
show no interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations
245. Id. at 832.
246. Id. The non-use plus test for easement abandonment in Vermont is similar to all other states
that, under their common law, provide for some combination of intent and actions evidencing that
intent. A few states, however, have codified a new rule that removes the intent element when non-
use occurs for a sufficiently long period of time and is accompanied by removal of tracks and ties.
See IOWA CODE § 327G.76 (1999), IND. CODE. ANN. § 32-5-12-6 (2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-44.1
(2000).
247. Preseault, 24 Cl. Ct. at 832.
248. By this she included the original 1887 ICC Act, the 1920 amendments, the 1976 4R Act that
established the practice of trail use, and the 1983 NTSA that specifically stated that rail use ease-
ments would not be terminated by banking. Preseault v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 69 (1994).
249. Id. at 87.
250. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1992) (where Justice Scalia announced
that no takings claim would arise when a landowner's property was already burdened by inherent
limitations on title).
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under the Penn Central balancing test.25
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Judge
Nettesheim's decision was affirmed, though on different grounds. 252 The
majority in that case felt that Penn Central balancing was not the appro-
priate test under takings doctrine, but that under Lucas, no property right
was taken because rights are determined as of the purchase date. Be-
cause the Preseaults purchased most of their land after 1983, they had no
expectation the corridor would not be railbanked. This opinion was sub-
sequently withdrawn, however, when the court, sua sponte, decided to
rehear the case en banc.25 3
The rehearing resulted in a lengthy opinion by Judge Plager, joined by
only three judges, a concurring opinion by Judge Rader joined by one
judge, and a blistering dissent by Judge Clavenger, joined by two other
judges.5 4 This means that there is no majority for the reasoning, though
there is for the outcome. Plager held that because the railroad easement
would have been deemed abandoned under Vermont State law in 1975,
the Preseaults' property rights had vested at that time, and with the ICC's
railbanking order, the property rights were pre-empted, and therefore
taken. For a number of reasons this is patently illogical, not the least be-
ing that the railroad's property rights could be deemed extinguished
eleven years before the ICC permited discontinuance and removed itself
from jurisdiction over rail operations. 255 How could the property right be
extinguished if the ICC could have ordered resumption of rail service at
any time? Such an event would have required the railroad to repurchase
its easement.5 6
The concurrence argued a slightly different version of state law: that
the State of Vermont, the current owner of the railroad's moribund
rights, could not shift the use from railroads to trails and still claim that
the present use was consistent with the purpose for which the original
easement was granted. Thus the shift caused the easement to be aban-
doned when the State railbanked and built the trail in 1985 even though
the declared purpose of railbanking is to preserve the corridor for future
rail service.2 5 7 Since neither opinion focused on the role played by the
251. Preseault, 27 Fed. Cl. at 84.
252. Preseault v. U.S., 66 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1995), vacated by 66 F.3d 1168 (1995).
253. Id. See also Ruth Marcus, Issues Group Funds Seminars for Judges: Classes at Resorts
Cover Property Rights, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 1998, at A l.
254. Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
255. See also Sennewald, supra note 210, at 1418-2 1.
256. Id.
257. Some states have held that shifting the use of an easement from the permitted use to a differ-
ent use is permissible, while others have held that doing so forces the first easement to be aban-
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federal transportation laws, there is no majority on how federal law, in-
cluding the NTSA, affects state property rights.
Finally, the dissent quite cogently argued there had been no abandon-
ment under Vermont state law, either through non-use and removal of
tracks and ties, or through the shift in use from rails to trails. 58 Judge
Clavenger noted that Vermont, along with numerous other jurisdictions,
would not find that shifting a publicly-used easement from rail service to
trail use constituted abandonment. Viewing the rail corridor as a "public
way," the dissent would find that under Vermont law no right was taken
because no property right existed to exclude the public in the first
place.259
In many ways, this conflict shows the difficulty of determining the ef-
fect of the railbanking statute on state property rights and whether that
effect rises to the level of a taking requiring just compensation. To break
down the issue, the first question is whether or not the claimant has a
property right that has been interfered with by the Act. Ironically, in
Preseault, the Vermont Supreme Court held there was no property right
when it refused to quiet title to the corridor in the claimants. Yet subse-
quent federal decisions, purporting to defer to Vermont State law, found
that there would be state property rights in the absence of federal regula-
tory oversight,26° yet there was disagreement as to whether the federal
limitations would be deemed incorporated into and a part of state prop-
erty law, or would be deemed ancillary to it or superimposed on top of
it.261 Hence, it is difficult to say exactly how property rights are crea-
tures of state law when federal regulations affect and limit those rights.262
doned. See Wright & Hester, supra note 186, at 441-47.
258. Preseauli, 100 F.3d. at 1560 (Clavenger, J., dissenting). See also Wright & Hester, supra
note 186, at 447-53.
259. Of course, Clavenger's interpretation of state law, Preseault, 100 F.3d. at 1560 (Clavenger,
J., dissenting), is no more authoritative than Plager's interpretation, Id. at 1525. Yet, when the Ver-
mont Supreme Court states that the easement has not been abandoned, one would think that their
interpretation of state law would be the final word. State v. Preseault, 163 Vt. 39 at 41 (1994).
260. United States v. Preseault, 24 Cl. Ct. 818, 836 (1992) ("plaintiffs accordingly retained, as
successors to the original grantors, reversionary rights in these easements"); Preseault, 100 F.3d at
1550 ("the Preseaults have interests under state property law that have traditionally been recognized
and protected from governmental expropriation").
261. Nettesheim's opinion holds the former. Preseault v. U.S., 27 Fed. Cl. 69, 88 (1994) ("[in
Lucas] the Court did not restrict its approach to limitations on tide imposed by state law"). Plager's
opinion holds the latter. Preseault, 100 F.3d at 1539 ("Nothing in Lucas suggests that the back-
ground principles of a state's property law include the sweep of a century of federal regulatory legis-
lation.").
262. The question here is whether state property rights are defined solely by reference to state law
or can include federal restrictions, like railroad jurisdiction or federal navigational servitudes. Jus-
tice Scalia implies that property rights cannot be limited by federal law under Kaiser-Aetna v. United
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D. The Interplay of State Abandonment and Railbanking Laws: The
Problem of Vesting
The Second Circuit, the Court of Claims, and the variety of judges on
the Federal Circuit all came up with different answers and different rea-
sons for their takings analysis because they all missed the main point: the
effect of the statute is not to take a property right away, but to fail to con-
fer a benefit by preventing the vesting of a contingent future interest. If
we view the issue in terms of vesting of the future interest, then the
whole dispute takes on a vivid clarity that brings it within the scope of
traditional rules terminating contingent future interests. In many re-
spects, these takings cases are the result of a late twentieth-century aver-
sion to those old arcane rules governing estates and future interests.263
For clarification, there is a four-stage analysis we must follow to analyze
the legal issue presented by railbanking.
The first stage is determining whether or not the claimant has a prop-
erty right in the rail corridor in the first place. In most cases brought be-
fore the courts, the existence of the property right is relatively straight-
forward; Mr. Lucas has a right to build houses on his lots and Ms. Dolan
has a right to continue owning her land and expand her hardware store.
The landowner presumably has the present right and the government now
seeks to restrict it. However, with railbanking, the existence of a prop-
erty right in a soon-to-be-abandoned rail corridor is not about a present
right to possession or a present right to exclude. Rather, it is about the
conditions under which a contingent right will vest.2 " Analyzing vesting
States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). But the Vermont Supreme Court explicitly found that the Preseaults'
state property rights were defined in part by federal railroad ICC jurisdiction. State v. Preseault, 163
at 4 1. See also Preseault, 100 F.3d at 1556 (Clavenger, J., dissenting).
263. Ross v. Legler, 245 Ind. 655 (1964).
264. We must also determine whether the current adjacent landowner owns the reversionary inter-
est or the fee underlying the railroad easement. Most landowners have deeds describing the land
only up to the edge of the rail corridor and it is a matter of state common law or statute as to whether
the adjacent landowner will be deemed to own to the centerline or the heirs of the original grantor
will own the narrow strip under the rail servitude. Most grantees of land adjacent to railroad corri-
dors did not receive a deed indicating the corridor land because in most instances their grantors did
not believe they had title to convey. See Wright, Private Rights and Public Ways, supra note 195, at
378-79. See also City of Manhattan Beach v. Los Angeles Super. Ct., 914 P.2d 160 (Cal.), cert. de-
nied, 117 S.Ct. 511 (1996) (the court looked to several subsequent documents executed by the gran-
tor as evidence that the grantor conveyed fee simple absolute to the railroad). This is done on an
assumption that the original grantor intended to convey all of his or her interest to successors in in-
terest, including reversionary rights or the land encumbered by the rail servitude. Other states hold
that unless the grantor explicitly deeded the corridor land to a successor, he must have retained title
and it therefore passes to his heirs. See McDonalds Corp. v. Dwyer, 432 S.E.2d 165 (N.C. CL App.
1993) (holding that statute giving title of the fee to adjacent landowners was an unconstitutional tak-
ing of the property rights of the grantor's heirs). Ohio law provides that reversionary interests are
2001]
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requires knowing if the railroad owns only an easement or a defeasible
fee and the conditions or actions that will terminate the railroad's rights
and transfer them to the adjacent landowner. 6 5
Identifying the conditions for termination is the second stage of the
analysis and requires a close look at state laws on abandonment. 266 Until
abandonment, the possibility of reverter, right of re-entry, or future pos-
sessory right in the rail corridor land is a mere expectancy, or contingent
future interest in the right to possession.261 Upon abandonment, the right
vests in interest, though it may not vest in possession until the grantor
exercises her right of re-entry, or until she complies with state laws on
personal and do not pass to successors in interest. See Walker v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Lucas County,
598 N.E. 2d 101, 106 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) ("One does not acquire a reversionary interest solely by
virtue of being an owner of property which abuts property held by a railroad in fee.").
265. Although the plaintiffs in most of the class action cases challenging the railbanking law are
adjacent landowners, some courts have held that adjacent landowners do not have standing to sue if
they do not have a deed describing the actual corridor land. See, e.g., Walker, 1991 WL 110372
(Ohio Ct. App. 1991). In many instances, there is a serious question as to whether the original gran-
tor's heirs should be deemed to hold the reversionary interests or the adjacent landowners should.
With both defeasible fees and easements, it was common for a grantor who, after selling the railroad
its land, then sold his retained land to a successor in interest. Because many states had rules on the
non-transferability of future interests, the retained possibility of reverter would not transfer to the
new owner. It would be retained by the grantor to pass to his heirs. Later, states developed rules,
both statutory and common-law, that would find a presumption that a grantor conveyed all interest in
the land that a grantor had, or that in the absence of a known deed, interests in a rail corridor would
be deemed transferred to the adjacent landowner. These rules potentially "take" the property rights
from the grantor's heirs and transfer them to the adjacent landowner, even one whose deed does not
actually describe the corridor land. See McDonalds Corp. v. Dwyer, 432 S.E.2d 165 (N.C. Ct. App.
1993). Additionally, many grantors would not include rail corridor land in subsequent conveyances
because of uncertainty about the interest the grantor retained. Thus, when giving a warranty deed,
few landowners would risk describing the actual corridor land in a subsequent conveyance. More-
over, because the legal definitions of these property rights differed in the nineteenth century, particu-
larly the easement, the grantor's intent when making subsequent conveyances was likely to NOT
include the corridor land. The claims of adjacent landowners to have a property right in a rail corri-
dor, therefore, should be scrupulously examined before allowing the upset to possessory rights that
goes along with most forfeiture actions.
266. In some instances the railroad may own a defeasible fee and the landowner a reversionary
right that is triggered if the railroad use ceases. But some states, under a public policy against rever-
sionary future interests, will interpret defeasible fee deeds to convey to the railroads only easements,
even though such interests were clearly not the intentions of the parties at the time. See Paine v.
Consumers' Forwarding & Storage Co., 71 F. 626 (6th Cir. 1895); Daugherty v. Helena & N.W. Ry.,
252 S.W.2d 546 (Ark. 1952); Askew v. Spence, 79 S.E.2d 531 (Ga. 1954).
267. States differ on the rules regarding abandonment that will cause the landowner's interests in
the rail corridor to become possessory. Some states construe the term "for railroad purposes" nar-
rowly to permit only railroad operations; others broadly to include conversion in light of modem
technological advancements, including electric railways, automobile highways, canals, plank roads,
or even recreational trails. See generally Faus v. City of Los Angeles, 431 P.2d 849 (Cal. 1967);
Bemards v. Link, 248 P.2d 341 (Or. 1952); Strycker v. Richardson, 77 Pa. Super. 252 (1921); Kan.
Elec. Power Co. v. Walker, 51 P.2d 1002 (Kan. 1935); Lawson v. State of Washington, 730 P.2d
1308 (Wash. 1986).
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recording or notice.
Assuming the adjacent landowner does have a reversionary or fee in-
terest in the railroad corridor land, and the railroad's contemplated ac-
tions would constitute abandonment under state law, the third stage re-
quires determining the effect of the railbanking law on the landowner's
property interest in future possession; that is, what the effect of preemp-
tion or prevention of the vesting is on the landowner's property right.
Thus, does the adjacent landowner have a legal complaint if the law es-
tablishes a procedure to prevent the condition from occurring that, with-
out the procedure, would have resulted in the termination of the rail-
road's rights and vesting of the landowner's rights? This is a further
clarification of the question of whether or not the prevention or postpon-
ing of the future interest by the statute is in fact an infringement, depriva-
tion, or a taking of a property right.
The fourth stage is premised on an affirmative answer to the prior
questions. If the interest that the adjacent landowner purports to have in
a not-yet-abandoned rail corridor is a sufficiently robust property right,
whether vested or contingent, what takings test should we apply to de-
cide if compensation is due in any given situation? In essence, the ques-
tion raised by railbanking is whether a change in a statutory regime, that
prevents a right from vesting when it otherwise would have vested under
the old statutory regime, is compensable under the just compensation
clause. The appropriate way to view the effect of the railbanking statute
is to analyze it within traditional doctrines of vested rights. Thus, if the
railroad has already abandoned, the adjacent landowner's right to posses-
sion is vested and interference with that right might require compensa-
tion. But if the statutory regime is merely changed to prevent the vesting
of the landowner's interest, prior to its vesting, the prolongation of the
expectancy is merely the failure to confer a benefit and not a deprivation
of a property right.
Readers who are familiar with the doctrine of vested rights will imme-
diately note that I am using the notion of vesting in both senses: of vested
and contingent future interests, and vested rights doctrine from zoning
and land use law that arises from reliance on a particular statutory re-
gime. By combining these we can see how the railbanking law's inter-
ference with a mere expectancy is not compensable.
In the first sense of the term, vesting is a legal determination that a
person has a legally fixed right of present or future enjoyment or posses-
sion.268 With regard to estates in land, a future interest can be vested or
268. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1401 (3d ed. 1969) ("vest").
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contingent, and if it is vested it can be vested in interest or vested in pos-
session. 269 An estate that is vested in interest only means that the future
interest holder has a legally fixed right to future possession, as with a
remainderman who is unconditionally entitled to property upon the death
of a life tenant. An estate that is vested in possession is one in which the
holder is entitled to immediate possession, as when the life tenant dies
and the remainderman moves into possession immediately. Until a fu-
ture interest is vested, it is a mere expectancy and can be destroyed by
any number of contingencies or legal rules.
A right to ownership of land if a railroad stops using it for railroad
purposes is a contingent executory interest or possibility of reverter; it
may never vest. With this example, if the railroad stops using the land
for railroad purposes, the future interest vests in interest. If the rever-
sionary interest is a possibility of reverter then it also vests in possession
immediately upon cessation of railroad use because the land automati-
cally reverts upon occurrence of the condition. Yet if the reversionary
interest is merely a right of re-entry (which is preferred in most states),270
the adjacent landowner's interest will not vest in possession until the
right of re-entry is exercised, which must be exercised within a reason-
able period of time. Thus, cessation of rail use would cause the future
interest to vest in interest, but the future interest owner must also exer-
cise the right to re-enter before the right vests in possession.
The most common contingent future interests created in these railroad
cases is when a railroad will have acquired some form of conditional fee
from its nineteenth-century grantor that will terminate upon cessation of
271
railroad services. Conditional or defeasible fees require clear language
269. The distinction between vesting in interest and vesting in possession is important. When a
remainder follows a life estate we know that the remainder is vested in interest at the creation of the
remainder, but is not vested in possession until the termination of the prior life estate. Vesting in
interest and vesting in possession can occur at different times only in situations in which a condition
subsequent terminates the prior interest but an additional condition precedent must occur before the
future interest becomes possessory. See REST. (SECOND) DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.4 comm. b.
For instance, a grant "to X for life, then to Y if she has married Z," can result in a bifurcation where
Y's interest is vested in interest (when she marries Z and the condition precedent to her estate oc-
curs) but it has not vested in possession (because X has not died). Vesting refers to the removal of
conditions precedent.
270. California has a statute that converts all possibilities of reverter into rights of re-entry. See
CAL. CIVIL CODE § 885.020. See also RICHARD R. B. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY,
§20.03[2), 20-26 (1968) (on the tendency to convert possibilities of reverter into rights of re-entry);
Forsgren v. Sollie, 659 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1983).
271. Defeasible fees are distinguishable from life estates and terms of years because the condition
that will terminate the estate is indefinite rather than definite. With definite conditions, the future
interest corresponding to a life estate or term of years is a remainder rather than a possibility of re-
version or executory interest. Remainders are often vested and therefore would not be extinguish-
[26:2
HeinOnline  -- 26 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 458 2001
2001] Eminent Domain, Exactions, and Railbanking
of reversion in the event of the occurrence of the condition; for example,
"if the land is not used for railroad purposes it reverts back to me.,
272
Some states hold that operation for a reasonable period of time satisfies
the condition and it is terminated, resulting in fee simple absolute in the
railroad.2" Other reverter clauses, however, create a reversion if the line
is not built within a given period of time or if the railroad fails to main-
tain fences, grade crossings, or the like. These reverter interests expire
naturally. The reversion originally inured to the original grantor, not a
third party.? 4 If it were given to a third party, that interest, called an
executory interest, would be terminated by the rule against perpetui-
ties.
275
Many states have modified their rules against perpetuities and on non-
transferability of future interests, however, in conjunction with the pas-
sage of marketable title acts or stale uses and reversions acts. 7 6 As most
able under most state rules against perpetuities or marketable title acts. See infra Pt. VI, sec. B (dis-
cussion on defeasible fees).
272. See McKinley v. Waterloo R.R. Co., 368 N.W.2d 131 (Iowa 1985) (for a thorough discus-
sion of the different types of conditional fees that are usually created in railroad deeds). See also
Walker v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Lucas County, 598 N.E. 2d 101, 105 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (for the
rule that "purpose" language alone, without identifying what happens upon occurrence of the condi-
tion, is not sufficient to create a defeasible fee).
273. Paul v. Connorsville & Newcastle Junction R.R. Co., 51 Ind. 527, 532-33 (Ind. 1875); Cent.
Ohio Power & Light Co. v. Hixenbaugh, 3 N.E.2d 919,921 (Ohio App. 1935).
274. The rule in most states in the nineteenth century was that possibilities of reverter and rights
of re-entry (the future interests corresponding to defeasible fees with the reversion in the grantor)
were non-transferable to successors in interest; that is, when the original grantor subsequently sold
his land the reverter rights remained behind and did not transfer to the subsequent grantee. The rea-
son for this was obvious. If a grantor could not create a fee simple determinable in X with a rever-
sionary interest in Y because the future interest would be extinguished under the rule against perpe-
tuities, the grantor should not be permitted to get around the rule by conveying the possibility of
reversion to Y in a later conveyance. Since the rule against perpetuities does not apply to reversion-
ary interests in the grantor, most states would not allow the grantor to get around the rule by convey-
ing that interest to a third party; instead, it would pass to the grantor's heirs. For states that retain
this rule, the adjacent landowners have no right to the land underlying the rail corridor because the
reversionary interest is owned only by the grantor's heirs, Walker, 598 N.E. 2d at 106.
275. A reverter clause that gave the future interest to a third party, like the grantor's wife or
nephew for instance, would be an executory interest that would be cut off by the rule against perpe-
tuities at the time the estate was created. The rule against perpetuities terminates contingent future
interests held by third parties, not the original grantor, if those interests are not certain to vest within
a certain period. The typical condition of continued rail services would be a likely candidate for ter-
mination, though obviously not if the condition were that the railroad be built within a specified pe-
riod of time, presumably 21 years. REST. (SECOND) OF DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.4 comm. b
(executory interests being terminated by the rule against perpetuities).
276. Walter E. Bamett, Marketable Title Acts-Panacea or Pandemonium? 53 CORNELL L. REV.
45 (1967). See also Wayne F. Foster, Validity of Statute Canceling Destroying. Nullifying. or Limit-
ing Enforcement of Possibilities of Reverter or Rights of Re-Entry for Condition Broken, 87
A.L.R.3d 1011 (2000); Jay Zitter, Construction and Effect of Marketable Record Title'Statutes, 31
A.L.R.4th It (2001).
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commentators agree, there is no particularly logical reason for terminat-
ing executory interests in third parties under the rule against perpetuities
while keeping alive contingent reversionary interests in the grantor.
Both can lead to indeterminacy of estates and forfeiture of the present es-
tate by events occurring far in the future when the purpose behind the
condition has in many cases disappeared. Thus, many states have
adopted some sort of marketable title act that will terminate all rever-
sionary interests, regardless of who holds them, if they are not regularly
recorded.277 Title examiners only have to search for encumbrances on
the title back a certain number of years. If there are no recorded future
interests or encumbrances, then the grantor can convey full marketable
title without fear of liability for long lost future interests causing forfei-
ture. In effect, these acts are statutes of limitation that prescribe a period
within which a right of reverter or re-entry may be enforced. The impe-
tus behind these laws is to get rid of stale claims, precisely the kind of
reversionary interests that nineteenth-century grantors retained when
they conveyed land to the railroads.
So long as these statutes provide a reasonable period for recording
one's interests in land and thereby preserving it, they have been found to
be constitutional.278 It has been said that they "reflect the appraisal of the
state legislature of the actual economic significance of outstanding inter-
ests weighed against the inconvenience or expense caused by their con-
tinued existence for unlimited periods of time without regard to altered
circumstances. '2 79 Moreover, interests like easements will be kept alive
without recording so long as the owner of the easement retains posses-
sion or is visibly using the servient estate.280 Thus, railroad easements
will not be terminated under these statutes. The statutes are specifically
designed to cut off non-possessory interests in land, whether vested or
277. E.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 880.020 (2001); CONN. GEN. STAt. § 47-33b (1999); 735 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/13-118 (2000); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-1-2-12; MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 184, § 26 (2000); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 76-290 (2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-10 (2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.47
(2000); WYo. STAT. § 34-1-112 (2000).
278. City of Miami v. St. Joe Paper Co., 364 So.2d 439 (Fla. 1978); Wichernan v. Messner, 83
N.W.2d 800 (Minn. 1957); Presbytery of Southeast Iowa v. Harris, 226 N.W.2d 232 (Iowa 1975);
Walton v. Red Bluff, 3 Cal. Rptr.2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Town of Brookline v. Carey, 245
N.E.2d 446 (Mass. 1969); Cline v. Johnson County Bd. of Educ., 548 S.W.2d 507 (Ky. 1977); Lane
v. Travelers Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 299 N.W.553 (Iowa 1941); Bennett v. yVhitehouse, 690 F.
Supp. 955 (W.D. Okla. 1988). But see Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Miles, 207 N.E.2d
181 (N.Y. 1965) (finding constitutional contract clause violations from the termination of reverter
rights before they had become enforceable). See also Aigler, A Supplement to Constitutionality of
Marketable Title Acts-1 951-1957, 56 MicH. L. REV. 225 (1957).
279. Wichelman, 83 N.W.2d at 808.
280. Id. at 814.
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contingent, "growing out of ancient records which fetter the marketabil-
ity of title," ' not currently used possessory rights. While not all states
have adopted these marketable title acts, the numbers are steadily in-
creasing. As with other statutes of limitations, constitutional prohibitions
against retrospective legislation do not apply to marketable title acts so
long as adequate notice is provided for. 2  The U.S. Supreme Court has
upheld similar legislation cutting off claims that were not recorded
within a reasonable time limit.
28 3
For those slIates that have not adopted some form of marketable title
act terminatink stale reversions, many state courts have affected the same
result through interpretation of the original deeds. Where the railroad
has operated for fifty or more years, some states have found that the con-
ditions are satisfied and the possibilities of reverter are thereby extin-
guished. 4 Yet even if a state has not enacted rules to terminate contin-
gent reversionary interests, because they are contingent and not vested,
their termination through the railbanking act should not raise constitu-
tional implications.8 If destruction of contingent remainders and execu-
tory interests does not raise takings issues, the perpetuation of those in-
terests certainly cannot rise to the level of a taking.
The process of vesting with regard to easements is basically the same
as it is for defeasible fees, except the interest that might shift is not an
ownership interest in fee simple (as with a conditional fee) but merely a
right to exclusive possession. When a railroad holds an easement, or a
rail servitude, in a parcel of land, an adjacent landowner who owns the
fee, owns it subject to the exclusive rail servitude and she is therefore not
entitled to possession of the actual land. We can say that she has a con-
tingent future right to possession if the servitude is eventually extin-
281. Id. at 816.
282. Id.
283. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985)
284. See Paul v. Connorsville & Newcastle Junction R.R. Co., 51 Ind. 527 (1875); Denver &
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. School Dist. No. 22, 23 P. 978 (Colo. 1890); McKinley v. Waterloo R.R., Inc.,
368 N.W.2d 131 (Iowa 1985); Cent. Ohio Light & Power Co. v. Hixenbaugh, 3 N.E.2d 919 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1935).
285. Because marketable title acts are a constitutional destruction of contingent future interests, as
is the rule against perpetuities, their destruction or postponement through the railbanking act should
likewise not run afoul of the constitution. See Presbytery of Southeast Iowa v. Harris, 226 N.W.2d
232 (Iowa 1975). See also City of Miami v. St. Joe Paper Co., 364 So.2d 439 (Fla. 1978); Wichel-
man v. Messner, 83 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. 1957); Walton v. Red Bluff, 3 Cal. Rptr.2d 275 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992); Town of Brookline v. Carey, 245 N.E.2d 446 (Mass. 1969); Cline v. Johnson County
Bd. of Educ., 548 S.W.2d 507 (Ky. 1977); Lane v. Travelers Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 299
N.W.553 (Iowa 1941); Bennett v. Whitehouse, 690 F. Supp. 955 (W.D. Okla. 1988) (all cases refer-
ring to constitutionality of marketable title acts).
2001]
HeinOnline  -- 26 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 461 2001
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [26:2
guished. But she also owns the encumbered fee. Hence, unlike the adja-
cent landowner who owns only a contingent possibility of reverter in the
case of a defeasible fee in the railroad, in the case of a railroad easement,
the landowner owns the entire fee minus the present right to possession.
She owns the right of future possession.
Of relevance to railroad easements is whether they are limited in scope
to a particular use-depot, side lot, or corridor-or are perpetual general
easements for public transportation purposes. 286 Insofar as perpetual
easements can be transferred to other public entities for utility, highway,
or trail uses, the change does not threaten to terminate the easement.
28 7
With a limited easement for railroad purposes, some states have held that
a shift in use from railroad to other public uses can constitute abandon-
ment of the easement; other states have found that the shift does not.
288
However, this analysis has yet to incorporate the effects of federal STB
jurisdiction and railbanking.
Before 1983, the only method by which a railroad could abandon was
to form the intent to abandon, apply to the ICC for a discontinuation cer-
tificate, consummate that abandonment by removing tracks and ties and
other assets, notify the ICC that it had consummated, and then sell the
real estate.28 9 Until consummation occurred, however, no state property
rights of adjacent landowners vested because under state and federal law
the elements of abandonment had not been met.2 ° Thus, if a railroad de-
286. Breach of the scope or terms of the easement, as with any servitude, results only in a claim
for damages and not forfeiture of the easement. The scope of the easement is defined by physical
boundaries - width, depth, length, and height - but also in terms of permissible uses - running trains
and not planting petunias on the land. Uses that exceed the physical boundaries are remedied by
trespass actions. Uses that exceed the use restrictions are remedied by damages actions, as when a
railroad adds an additional use by installing a telegraph line in the easement. Some states, finding
the railroad easement to be the most burdensome use possible, will permit additional lesser uses
without requiring compensation to the landowner from the railroad or new user. See e.g., Mitchell
v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 51 N.E.2d 271 (111. 1943); Mellon v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 750 F. Supp. 226
(W.D. Tex. 1990).
287. Wash. Wildlife Preservation, Inc. v. Minnesota, 329 N.W.2d 543 (Minn. 1983); Faus v. City
of Los Angeles, 431 P.2d 849 (Cal. 1967); Fogle v. Richley, 378 N.E.2d 472 (Ohio 1978). See also
Wright & Hester, supra note 186, at 441-47.
288. Washington Wildlife, 329 N.W.2d 543; Lawson v. State of Washington, 730 P.2d 1308
(Wash. 1986).
289. 49 U.S.C. § 10903 (2001).
290. One could view the process in these terms. The state establishes two elements for abandon-
ment, intent and consummation. Before the railroad can consummate, however, it must receive per-
mission to do so. The federal overlay does not change the state rule; it simply regulates the behavior
that constitutes the second element. Denial of permission to consummate could not work a taking of
anyone's property rights because the actions that make up consummation are squarely within the
federal government's commerce clause power. If denial of permission to consummate does not af-
fect the adjacent landowner's property rights, then approval subject to certain conditions certainly
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cided not to consummate, the landowner was out of luck. The landowner
was also out of luck if the ICC refused to allow the abandonment. The
landowner was also out of luck, for that matter, if the railroad never
formed the requisite intent and never pursued abandonment proceedings
at all. The landowner's interest, in all three scenarios, is exactly the
same: a contingent interest in the possible removal of the rail servitude
that is a mere expectancy until the elements of abandonment are met un-
der state law. 9'
The railbanking statute did an interesting thing. It gave the railroad a
second choice. It could abandon its line as described above, or it could
discontinue services, sell the corridor, but retain a right of re-entry or an
option to repurchase. This process effectively disproves the intent ele-
ment under state abandonment laws. Rather than somehow step in and
prevent the landowner's rights from vesting after the railroad has formed
the requisite intent and consummated its abandonment, the railbanking
act enables the railroad to sell the real estate without meeting the ele-
ments of abandonment, not by changing the rules, but by providing that
intent cannot be inferred from sale of the corridor and discontinuation
alone.
The statute also provides a clear, unequivocal procedure for manifest-
ing an intent not to abandon. Because the railbanking act is permissive
on the part of the railroad, the act of railbanking must be deemed evi-
dence of intent not to abandon because it gives the railroad a way to re-
tain a future interest. If the corridor were abandoned, that interest would
be destroyed.292 Retention of a future interest, therefore, is clear evi-
dence of intent not to destroy the property right on which the future in-
terest depends.293  For if the easement were deemed abandoned, the fu-
cannot. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 851 (1987).
291. The closest analogy here is to zoning regulations in which a zoning change, from residential
to agricultural for instance, does not work a taking if the landowner can continue to farm the land as
she has been doing for generations. All that is taken is her expectancy. See Agins v. City of Tibu-
ron, 447 U.S. 257 (1980); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); John J. Delaney & Emily J.
Vaias, Recognizing Vested Development Rights as Protected Property in Fi?h Amendment Due Pro-
cess and Takings Claims, 49 WASH. U. J. URR. & CONTEMP. L. 27 (1996).
292. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. ICC, 850 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (finding that railbanking and
conversion to a trail are voluntary on the part of the railroad and not mandatory on the part of the
ICC).
293. One could argue that the ailbanking act changes the state-law rules on abandonment insofar
as it rebuts a finding of intent which often occurs solely from the extrinsic evidence of those con-
summating actions like discontinuance of services, non-use, and removal of tracks and ties. Because
such actions are often interpreted as evidence of intent, such actions alone can give rise to a pre-
sumption of intent to abandon under state law. But every state provides that clear evidence of intent
not to abandon will rebut the presumption. So the railbanking statute does not change the state law
elements; it merely provides a procedure which, if followed, shows lack of intent sufficient to rebut
2001)
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ture right of re-entry would also be destroyed.
The second notion of vested rights has developed in the law of zoning.
Under that doctrine, a landowner who has invested a sufficient amount of
time and money in reliance on the ability to develop land, will be al-
lowed to continue despite a change in zoning laws or land-use restric-
tions. The doctrine of vested rights has evolved along two axes: a type
of zoning estoppel which focuses on the government's action in limiting
a landowner's development rights and the notion of pure vested rights
which focuses on the character of the private property interest. As a gen-
eral rule, a developer who obtains a building permit or invests suffi-
ciently in the pre-existing zoning scheme will be able to proceed accord-
ing to the permit even if the land he is developing is downzoned soon
after receiving the permit. There are, of course, nuances and refinements
dealing with whether filing for a building permit should trigger the vest-
ing of the development right, or approval of the permit, or simply a high
probability of issuance of a permit.294 Nonetheless, the overriding con-
cern in the field of vested rights is whether the property owner has acted
in good-faith reliance on an act or omission of government by making a
substantial change in position or incurring expenses to such an extent
that fundamental fairness requires a continuance of such a right.
We can view the railbanking law within this context to decide if an ad-
jacent landowner has acted in good-faith reliance on the statutory regime
that would have yielded the removal of the rail servitude. If the land-
owner had no reasonable expectations that the railroad would abandon its
corridor, or made no investment dependent on the future removal of the
servitude, then no vested rights are likely to exist.295 Perhaps the most
the presumption established by state law. And since it hasn't changed the laws, it hasn't interfered
with even the expectancy of adjacent landowners, much less any vested rights they might have. If it
does change the state property law, it does so indirectly, through superior authority under interstate
commerce. Because the federal government can regulate interstate commerce, it can regulate rail
services, and thus have in indirect effect on state property rights, just as the federal navigational ser-
vitude can affect state property rights. But changes in federal law regarding rail services have not
been found to work a taking because the effect on the state property rights are only indirect. See
Rieger v. Penn Cent. Corp., 1985 WL 7919 at 03 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) ("We do not find that the
language in the deeds evinced any intention on the part of the appellee to unequivocally abandon its
right-of way, especially in light of the language reserving the right to renew railroad operations.").
294. Delaney & Vaias, supra note 291, at 32.
295. Few in the nineteenth century could have predicted the decline in the railroads that resulted
from the increase in automobile traffic and the subsidization of highway construction (author's con-
clusion). Likewise, no one today can predict whether or not railroad services will again become
economic or desirable. Laws must be able to adapt to changing circumstances without raising con-
stitutional concerns at every step. The bright-line between vested rights and mere expectancies has
proved a workable distinction for constitutional due process protections.
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important underlying rationale for vested rights doctrine is that govern-
ment must be able to change land-use rules without having to pay for
every restriction that comes about. As one court explained: "A party has
no vested right in the continuation of existing statutory law.
'296
A landowner who has invested in a particular statutory or zoning re-
gime has acquired an equitable interest in the continuation of that regime.
But a landowner, who has not invested in reliance on a particular set of
rules, is not entitled to compensation when those rules change to limit
her ability to develop her land. Note, the limitation is not to current uses
of the land, but rather to her ability to engage in new, more burdensome
uses. Similarly, the railbanking statute changes the regulatory regime
governing railroad abandonments but it does not take away any current
use or right the adjacent landowner has. It merely changes the rules un-
der which future rights might be exercised.
Since an adjacent landowner has no present right to possession or use
prior to the railroad's abandonment, the railbanking statute does not in-
terfere with any presently-exercisable property right. Since the land-
owner does not have the right to possession, she cannot turn her expec-
tancies into vested rights to possession solely on the basis of a particular
statutory scheme. Because it is the operation of state abandonment rules
that will cause a landowner's rights to vest, changing the rules before
they have in fact vested merely continues her current property rights un-
changed. As a result, there can be no Fifth Amendment violation be-
cause her expectancies are based entirely on an ever-changing set of
property laws. Until her rights vest, either through operation of the law
or through good-faith reliance and investment, her expectancies can be
destroyed without running afoul of the Takings Clause.
A number of other property rules recognize that expectancies do not
rise to the level of a property right that is protected by the Fifth Amend-
ment. For instance, expectancies cannot form the res of a trust.297 Like-
wise, expectancies that arise from a will are not rights that will be recog-
296. Omega Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Marquardt, 799 P.2d 235, 244 (1990). See also Phillips Petroleum,
16 llI.App.2d at 565, 149 N.E.2d 344 (". . . there is no vested right in the continuance of a law or
ordinance, and that where the law or ordinance has been changed pending an appeal the case must be
disposed of by the reviewing court upon the law as it then exists"). There is also no vested right in a
prior zoning scheme without reliance. See Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528 (Wis. 1996);
First of Amer. Trust Co. v. Armstead, 664 N.E.2d 36 (111. 1996).
297. REST. (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 86; BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, vol. 1, § 112 (1977).
REST. (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 85 notes that a contingent future interest can be the rest of a trust, but
not expectancy. This is consistent with the idea that a right of re-entry or possibility of reverter,
though contingent, is a stronger property right than the expectancy that an easement will be aban-
doned.
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nized until the will becomes effective and irrevocable through the death
of the testator; i.e. until they are vested.298 And so long as the present es-
tate holder has the power to prevent the termination of the present estate
and the vesting of the future interest, we cannot say that the holder of the
expectancy has lost a property right when the present estate holder
chooses to retain it.299  In other words, by creating this new process
called railbanking, the STB simply offers the railroad a way to do those
actions that would otherwise look like consummation (removal of tracks
and ties and sale of the real estate) without causing the termination of the
servitude because it disproves, prima facie, the intent element.3°° The
railroad may choose not to consummate, or it may choose an unequivocal
method of showing lack of intent.3"" In neither event does the servient
298. A will, by its nature, is ambulatory and revocable during the testator's lifetime. In re Estate
of Brown, 507 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974).
299. If it seems that intent and consummation of state property easements seem to blur into one
another, consider this example. Under current law, when I place a bag of garbage on my front side-
walk with the intent that it will be collected by the garbage service, I have effectively abandoned it
and relinquished all property rights to it. See AM. JUR. 2DAbandoned, Lost and Unclaimed Property
§ 1 (2000). 1 have the requisite intent and I have taken steps, each of which is an unequivocal indi-
cation that I am abandoning my property rights in the contents (I have placed them in a garbage bag
routinely used for exactly this purpose and put it on the curb the morning of my curbside collection).
Now imagine that I have some items that I am tired of looking at, but I do not want to lose my prop-
erty rights in them. I can stack them in my garage, or rent a storage facility, and pay to retain posses-
sion of them. But what if the government decided that preserving these items actually has an impor-
tant national purpose? The government understands that I do not want the clutter in my house-but
taking them to the landfill is wasteful. Instead, the government is going to create a program whereby
I can put the items in a specially marked bag, then set them on my curb, and they will be labeled for
future reference, collected and retained for me by someone who, in the meantime, might be able to
put the items to good use. Whenever I want them back, I simply notify the proper authority. Under
such a scheme, no one would imagine that my placing the items in the specially marked bag, even
though it might also be a plastic bag, and placing them on the street where I placed my garbage ear-
lier, indicated that I intended to abandon my property rights in them. Quite the contrary. My com-
pliance with the procedures of the program would prove that I intended to keep an interest in them,
that I intended to treat them differently than garbage, and that I actually took steps to make it clear
that I had no desire to treat the items like garbage. In fact, in the absence of the program, I might
never have placed the items out on the street in the first place.
300. In essence, the railbanking law does not change the state statutory definition of abandon-
ment, so there really is no context in which vested rights doctrine could arise. See 16 U.S.C. §
1247(d) (2000). On one reading, the law merely provides a way for the railroad to comply with
long-standing abandonment rules by creating a way to disprove the intent element - retaining a fu-
ture interest. On a slightly different reading, the railbanking statute marginally changes the rules on
abandonment by removing certain actions from the purview of abandonment so they are not inter-
preted to result in the termination of the railroad's property rights - sale of the land for a trail use. In
either event, the public policy behind preservation of the corridor for future rail use, which is clearly
within the scope of an easement for railroad purposes, supports these minor modifications to state
laws on abandonment as within the purview of the legislature. Legislatures must be able to adjust
the benefits and burdens of life in our complex inter-dependent world.
301. Certain actions can be deemed unequivocal indications of intent to abandon, as selling off
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landowner lose a property right because her interest will not vest until
both intent and consummation have occurred.
The fallacy in the Preseaults' argument is that they assume that the
railroad would have abandoned its property rights in the absence of the
program to recycle them." 2 The railbanking program is in essence a
form of recycling.0 3 The crucial element of the program, however, is
that the railroad's property rights are split when the corridor is rail-
banked. The new grantee or trail group acquires the current ownership
and right to possession, but the railroad retains a future interest allowing
it to repurchase the corridor if necessary. It is this interest, retained by
the railroad, that disproves the intent necessary to find abandonment of a
rail corridor. For how can I have an intent to abandon my entire property
rights if I have attempted to retain a property right? And why would I
bother retaining a right to repurchase if my other actions essentially de-
stroyed all the property rights on which that repurchase right de-
pended?3 °
The railbanking statute does not interpose a third, federal arm to snatch
away the landowner's property rights after, or immediately before, final
abandonment occurs under state law. Instead, it offers a mechanism
through which, if the railroad chooses, it may undertake the actions of
parcels throughout a corridor, or not protesting a landowner who claims legal title to a portion by
adverse possession. Similarly, certain actions can be deemed unequivocal indications of intent not to
abandon, like maintenance of the land and drains, putting up no trespassing signs asserting owner-
ship, or prosecuting trespassers. The difficulty lies when the actions are not unequivocal - as when
tracks and ties are removed, but not ballast and bridges, and taxes are paid, but there's no assertion
of ownership against adjacent users. Notably, the railbanking process provides railroads with a
mechanism for legally registering their intent not to abandon, which should take precedence over
ambiguous actions, though perhaps not over unequivocal actions of abandonment. Because
railbanking and obtaining a NITU or CITU requires that the railroad retain a right to repurchase, and
retaining a repurchase option alone has been deemed evidence of intent not to abandon, so too
should railbanking. See Rieger v. Penn Central, 1985 WL 7919 (unpubl. opinion) (Ohio Ct. App.
1985).
302. "The perpetuation of an easement pursuant to federal law, therefore, does not destroy or
'take' a future interest without just compensation. Instead, the owner of the servient estate continues
to hold the land in fee simple subject to an easement for railroad purposes." Sennewald, supra note
210, at 1411.
303. In fact, Lawrence Hanson referred to the railbanking program as "recycling." Lawrence
Hanson, The Recycling of Railroad Rights-of- Way, 76 MICH. BUS. LJ. 430 (1997).
304. There can be significant financial advantages to railbanking for the railroads besides the op-
portunity to repurchase an intact corridor sometime in the future. Some states and counties have
ordinances that require a railroad to return the corridor land to its natural state before it can abandon.
See Sennewald, supra note 210. These rules are harbingers to the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century when the states imposed onerous duties on railroad to discourage abandonments. In most
cases, returning the land to its natural state would most likely cost well over ten times the salvage
value of the tracks, ties, and land if there is ballast or embankments that must be removed.
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abandonment without those actions being interpreted to satisfy the intent
element. Creation of the railbanking procedure does not remove or
change the criteria under which abandonment authorization is granted.
The landowner's lottery ticket retains the same odds. Railbanking a cor-
ridor, however, simply means the railroad changed its mind about its de-
sire to abandon because it was given the option of retaining a right of re-
purchase. Allowing the railroad to keep a stick in its bundle of property
rights may prevent the entire bundle from shifting to the landowner be-
cause it signals that the railroad did not want to simply abandon its entire
bundle of rights. Retention of that stick disproves the intent element.
E. Finding the Right Takings Test
Assuming, as did Judge Plager, that the landowner's rights in an aban-
doned railroad corridor are more than expectancies and are recognizable
property rights protected by the Fifth Amendment, it is unclear what tak-
ings rule should apply. Plager simply asserted that the Preseaults had
lost their right to exclude because people were suddenly bicycling
through their backyard without their permission. Without explicitly stat-
ing that Loretto would be the proper analysis, Plager asserted that the
305railbanking act caused a physical invasion of the Preseaults' property.
Notably however, in Loretto the landowner possessed the current right to
exclude cable companies before the regulation was passed which de-
stroyed this right. In this case, the Preseaults did not have the right to
exclude anyone because their predecessors in interest had sold the right
to exclusive possession to the railroad.
Although it may seem that the effect of the railbanking act is to inter-
fere with the landowners' right to exclude the public, the fundamental
difference between Preseault and Loretto is that in the latter the land-
owner had a right to exclude before the statute destroyed it.3a 6 In the
railbanking situation, the landowner did not have a right to exclude until
the rail easement was abandoned, a event forestalled by railbanking. Jus-
tice Scalia's opinion in Lucas provides for precisely the kind of situation
that occurs when an active railroad banks its corridor. "Where 'perma-
nent physical occupation' of the land is concerned, we have refused to
allow the government to decree it anew (without compensation), no mat-
ter how weighty the asserted 'public interests' involved, [citing Loretto]
though we assuredly would permit the government to assert a permanent
easement that was a pre-existing limitation upon the landowner's ti-
305. Preseault v. U.S., 100 F.3d 1525, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
306. See id.; Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
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tie."3 7 Furthermore, to the extent that federal law "interfered" with state
property rights in 1887, 1920, 1976, or 1983, it did so to protect the
vested possessory rights of railroads against the nonvested, contingent
rights of adjacent landowners who sought to terminate the railroads'
rights prematurely. If the imposition of federal jurisdiction in 1887 did
not work a taking, it is illogical to claim that continuation of that jurisdic-
tion through railbanking works a taking. Because the right to exclude is
not a right most adjacent landowners have, the per se rule of Loretto is
inapposite.
Judge Plager also strongly disagrees with the notion that the federal
railroad laws could somehow be incorporated into the inherent limita-
tions on title exception that Lucas created for "background principles of
the State's law of property."308 Plager asserts that the "background prin-
ciples referred to by the Court in Lucas were state-defined nuisance
rules."3°9 But they also include inherent limitations on title, as for exam-
ple state-defined riparian rights. To the extent that the state laws on rail-
road abandonment require intent and consummation, a railroad that
banks its corridor is precisely not abandoning because banking shows
lack of intent under state law.310 The railbanking statute could not "take"
any rights defined by state law because the railbanked railroad acted in
compliance with state abandonment laws in an effort to preserve their
own rights. By failing to abandon its corridor, the railroad's rights re-
main intact and the landowner acquires nothing.
Judge Clavenger, on the other hand, noted that under the 1982 Ver-
mont "mini-railbanking act," the Preseaults' expectancy rights had al-
ready been terminated.3" Thus, if the federal railbanking law is not a
part of those "background principles of state property law," surely state
statutes are. The Preseaults, at least, who purchased most of their prop-
erty under a state regulatory regime that permitted the railroad to bank or
abandon, never acquired the right to prevent the railroad from choosing
an option it was permitted to choose under state law.
Because of the interplay of the railbanking law and state abandonment
rules, the Second Circuit and Judge Nettesheim were both correct that the
307. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
308. Id.
309. Preseault, 100 F.3d at 1538.
310. We could say that, in railbanking, the railroad acted pursuant to state laws on abandonment
and, by doing so, did not have the intent to abandon. Or, after 1887, 1920, or 1983, we could argue
that the federal railroad jurisdiction is an inherent limitation on title, which apparently has been ac-
cepted by the Vermont Supreme Court. See Trs. of Diocese v. State of Vermont, 496 A.2d 151 (Vt.
1985).
311. Preseault, 100 F.3d at 1567-68.
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Preseaults did not suffer a taking because they had no property right in
the corridor to begin with. But they were mistaken in seeing the issue as
a question of whether Vermont State law recognizes shifts in use for pub-
lic easements, or whether the easement would have been deemed aban-
doned in the absence of the federal railroad laws. The correct analysis is
whether the railroad's actions could be interpreted to result in abandon-
ment under existing state law when it intentionally railbanked its inter-
ests. There is simply no abandonment because the railroad did not have
the requisite intent, and the lack of intent is unequivocally shown by the
retention of a future interest in the servitude. To the extent the railbank-
ing law makes it possible for the railroad to bifurcate its interests and sell
the present interest while retaining a future interest, the effect on the
landowner is irrelevant because the landowner had no vested rights in the
pre-existing statutory scheme controlling abandonment. There was no
reasonable investment-backed expectation or detrimental reliance on the
pre-1983 law defining railroad abandonment. Hence, under Lucas there
can be no taking because railroad jurisdiction is an inherent limitation on
the landowner's title and because a pre-existing rail servitude exists.
Compensation is not required when a landowner is prevented from re-
ceiving a gratuitous benefit.
Finally, if Loretto does not apply because the right to prevent the
physical invasion did not exist before the regulation,31 2 and Lucas does
not apply as a per se taking because a pre-existing limitation on title de-
feats the landowners' expectation, then another potential test is Penn
Central's protection for interferences with reasonable investment-backed
expectations. The courts have developed a set of rules distinguishing be-
tween mere expectancies and vested rights under Penn Central's "inter-
ference with reasonable investment-backed expectations" prong." 3 In
that case, Justice Brennan did not find a taking when a New York City
landmarks law prevented future development of Grand Central Station,
but permitted the continued use to which the land had been put for over a
century. As he noted:
this Court has accordingly recognized, in a wide variety of contexts, that
government may execute laws or programs that adversely affect recognized
economic values.. .. [Tihis Court has dismissed 'taking' challenges on the
ground that, while the challenged government action caused economic
harm, it did not interfere with interests that were sufficiently bound up with1
312. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 2042 (1980), also supports the view that
unless the landowner had a historically rooted expectation in the right to exclude, limitations on that
right in the name of other fundamental rights do not rise to the level of a takings.
313. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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the reasonable expectations of the claimant to constitute 'property' for Fifth
Amendment purposes.
314
A wide body of scholarship and case law has evolved out of Brennan's
assertion that economic expectancies do not rise to the level of "prop-
erty" absent reasonable investment-backed expectations."'
For most landowners adjacent to rail corridors, as in Preseault, pur-
chasing property after all relevant regulations have been enacted should
undermine any claim they have to reasonable investment-backed expec-
tations. In most instances, a landowner who purchases heavily regulated
property cannct complain when those regulations are not lifted. If any-
one had a property right, it was the landowner at the time the regulations
were enacted.3 16 As Judge Nettesheim explained in Preseault: "Plaintiffs
hardly can argue that their reasonable investment-backed expectations
were disturbed when the ICC acted to suspend their reversionary inter-
ests in a manner authorized by federal and state law in effect when they
acquired their property."317
Reasonable minds certainly have differed on which, if any, regulatory
takings test ought to apply to the interference with the vesting of the
landowners' property rights by the railbanking law. Understanding the
way easements operate and the traditional rights acquired by the railroads
pursuant to state law enables us to see that most of the landowners alleg-
ing a taking are hard-pressed to define a property right that has been
taken. The right to have a servitude removed is not a historically-
protected property right like the right to exclude, but is a contingent fu-
ture interest that more closely resembles an expectancy than even a re-
versionary right. For that reason, the railbanking statute does not work a
taking since the railroad's voluntary actions to railbank do not affect a
vested right.
The opportunity to railbank a railroad corridor and use it for interim
trail use is a brilliant way to solve a variety of difficult legal problems.
But opposition to the program has come from the railroads, who for dec-
ades only wanted to remove themselves from liability for their corridors;
314. Id. at 125.
315. STEVEN EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS, § 6-5(a)-(O; Delaney & Vajas, supra note 291;
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984).
316. Most states had a rule on the non-transferability ofchoses in action that would prevent a sub-
sequent landowner from recovering from a trespasser railroad damages that accrued to the predeces-
sor in title. Since the successor took the land on notice that the rail servitude existed, she can hardly
complain that the railroad did not pay for the right from her predecessor. McKinley v. Waterloo
R.R. Co., 368 N.W.2d 131 (1985); Indiana, B. & W. Ry. Co. v. Allen, 100 Ind. 409 (1884); Fed.
Land Bank of Louisville v. Luckenbill, 13 N.E.2d 531 (Ind. 1938).
317. 27 Fed. Cl. at 95.
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adjacent landowners, who would rather acquire the corridor land than see
it used for continued public purposes; politicians, who have paid more
attention to land developers and heavily-regulated industries than their
urban health-conscious constituents; real estate developers, who do not
wish to contribute any land toward parks, schools, open spaces or trails;
and lawyers, who see trails opposition as a way to build a niche practice
that could exploit the rhetoric of the property rights movement. Though
the railbanking program was an attempt to sidestep many of the state law
property problems associated with abandonment of rail easements, chal-
lenges under the Takings Clause threaten to derail these trails. Because
the program attempts to create a federal solution to local property situa-
tions, it is more vulnerable to attack than governmental exactions and ex-
ercises of eminent domain. Yet, only by ignoring legal rules on contin-
gent future interests and vested rights, and by neglecting the history of
the railroads can opponents to railbanking argue that the program is un-
constitutional. Moreover, interim trail use on railbanked corridors can
also make possible grand-scale trail systems that could not be created
through exactions and eminent domain. Thus, rail-trails are the only vi-
able way to create a truly effective national infrastructure for alternative
transportation.3t8
VII.THE POLITICS OF THE PROPERTY RIGHTS MOVEMENT
Behind much of the rhetoric against recreational trails by developers
and by landowners adjacent to rail-trails is a feeling that government has
gotten too big.319 They feel government has gone too far in interfering
with traditional use rights in the name of some unusual notion of the pub-
lic good that merely panders to radical environmentalists and elitist urban
values.3 20 That intervention also is believed to contravene the clear lan-
guage of the Fifth Amendment. Yet if one talks to the average home-
owner, she is in favor of strict restrictions on development, on industrial
318. The goal of the National Rails-to-Trails Conservancy is to have a system of inter-connected
trails with thousands of spur trails leading to cross-state core trails such that every person in the con-
tinental U.S. would live within a mile of a trail that could take her anywhere in the country. Using
railroad corridors, this goal could become a reality. See Rails to Trails Conservancy Website, avail-
able at http://www.railtrails.org/.
319. See Gragg, supra note 12, at F03; Roach, supra note 12.
320. There is, of course, an underlying racist element in the isolationism of most trails opponents.
Trails, like subways or highways, allow access by the underprivileged to mostly-white middle-class
suburbs. See. e.g., Martin Kasindorf, LA Spinning Its Wheels over Transit Plan: Progress Held Up
by Political, Racial Divisions, USA TODAY, July 3, 1997, at 14A. For links between the property
rights movement and the militia movement, see Tharp & Holstein, Report Links Anti-Enviros to Mi-
litia Movement, U.S. NEWS& WORLD REP., Apr. 21, 1997.
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pollution, and on wetlands and species destruction. 21 So where exactly
is the impetus behind the so-called property rights movement?
The property rights movement, which until recent years consisted of a
fringe coalition of die-hard western cowboys, Midwestern family farm-
ers, and urban libertarians, has now become a multi-billion dollar politi-
cal movement. The faces are of small-time homeowners, struggling
farmers, and senior citizens worried about property crimes. 22 Yet the
money behind the faces comes from the National Mining Association,
the Chemical Manufacturers Association, the National Association of
Manufacturers, the American Petroleum Institute, the American Inde-
pendent Refiners Association, the American Forest and Paper Associa-
tion, and the International Council of Shopping Centers, in league with
think tanks like the Cato Institute, the Defenders of Property Rights, and
the Competitive Enterprise Institute.3 23  Molly Ivins calls it "astro-turf
organizing": big businesses funding public relations groups to market
their opposition as green or as coming from the grass roots level. 24
These groups are bankrolling litigation, buying legislation, and funding
judicial junkets with a very simple message: any decline in one's prop-
erty values constitutes a taking for public use and must be compen-
sated.3 25 Even where there has been no diminution in market value but a
use right is restricted, as with many historic preservation projects, land-
owners want a piece of the taxpayer's pie.
The explosion in takings and property rights legislation at both the
321. Sugameli, supra note 19, at 523.
322. Even the law reviews are not immune from the heart-wrenching stories of private individu-
als, as reflected in the stories of the "blind and crippled music teacher," James Hernandez, or the
World War Ii hero, Paul Kollsman, or the "wheel-chair-bound" Bernadine Suitum that Michael Ber-
ger and Gideon Kanner roll out in The Need for Takings Law Reform: A View from the Trenches-A
Response to Taking Stock of the Takings Debate, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 837, 839-40 (1998).
Even Republican Vice Presidential Candidate Jack Kemp spoke of an unnamed Oregon farmer who
allegedly was deprived of the right to use his road or to mend his fences, yet efforts to locate the
source of the story were unsuccessful. Sugameli, supra note 19, at 527. See also Treanor, supra
note 8.
323. For instance, the Center for the Defense of Free Enterprise website reveals an interesting
assortment of claims, including the one that "thousands of homes and thousands of acres of private
land have been confiscated by the federal government and added to National Parks and National
Forests, causing the federal domain to increase and the private sector to shrink." Condemnation Tak-
ings, Center for the Defense of Free Enterprise, at http://www.cdfe.org/issues.html (last visited Mar.
6, 2001). See also the American Land Rights Association website which lists the sponsors of its
yearly congressional vote index; of the 1998 co-sponsors, 228 were corporate sponsors and only
thirty-four were individuals (less than eight percent). American Land Rights Ass'n, at
http://www.landrights.org/_private/105%201st/1051cospon.html. (last visited Mar. 6, 2001).
324. Ivins, supra note II, at 9.
325. See Ruth Marcus, Issues Groups Fund Seminars for Judges: Classes at Resorts Cover Prop-
erty Rights, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 1998, at Al.
2001)
HeinOnline  -- 26 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 473 2001
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
federal and state levels is quite astounding. At the federal level the be-
ginning of the movement was Ronald Reagan's Executive Order 12630
in 1988 that required all federal regulations and agency actions be ana-
lyzed for takings consequences. 326 That was swiftly followed in 1990 by
a house bill that would apply Executive Order 12630 to future regula-
tions, and bills followed every year thereafter that broadened the applica-
tion to all federal agencies. In 1994 a compensation bill was introduced
for American Heritage Areas, a program that gives federal money to des-
ignated areas. The biggest boost to the property rights movement was
the 1994 Republican Contract with America that included a property
rights provision. In response to that, the Private Property Protection Act
of 1995 (HR 925) was introduced. HR 925 demanded compensation if
the value of any affected portion of land was diminished by ten percent
or more. On the House floor this was changed to twenty percent but the
House rejected an amendment that would look at all of the property, not
just the affected portion, despite the Supreme Court's long-standing in-
sistence that takings analysis cannot focus just on the affected portion.327
HR 925 never made it out of the House. But that didn't stop Senator Bob
Dole from introducing the Omnibus Property Rights Act of 1995 (SB
605) that would have required payment for any regulatory action that re-
duced by one third or more the speculative value of any affected portion
of a real, personal, or intangible piece of property.3 28 That bill died as
well, the result of Senate opposition. Coincidentally, landowners do not
seem willing to compensate the government every time a regulation re-
sults in an increase in market value of their land, though they are quick to
demand compensation when regulations decrease their market value.329
Not surprisingly, most senators and representatives do not look fa-
vorably on converting the federal treasury into a cash cow for every per-
son affected by a regulation, and all these bills were rejected either in
326. This history of property rights legislation is most thoroughly detailed in Sugameli's Takings
Bills article. See Sugameli, supra note 19.
327. The Court has rejected the segmentation argument in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, and reaffirmed that position in Concrete Pipe and Products of Cal. Inc. v. Constr.
Laborers Trust For So. Cal., 508 U.S. 60 (1993). See also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De-
Benedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987), and Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979), for further refusal to
accept segmentation arguments.
328. This leaves the question: would the government would have to compensate a landowner who
buys land with the intent, or dream, or expectation, or even fantasy, of developing it for a vast profit,
regardless of the reasonableness of those expectations?
329. If landownership is essentially a lottery, some parcels will appreciate and some will depreci-
ate; some as a result of governmental action and some as a result of other forces. Why should the
taxpayer have to insure themselves for all detrimental effects caused by regulations but not receive
the benefits in higher taxation, or a surcharge, whenever values increase?
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committee or in full-body votes. None made it to the other house on an
affirmative vote. However, legislation at the state level has been far
more successful. Every state has had at least one takings bill introduced,
and currently twelve states have enacted assessment legislation requiring
that state agencies undertake a thorough takings assessment to determine
the impact on every potential property owner.330 As expected, the legis-
lation effectively chills broad agency activities. Five other states have
adopted compensation-type legislation that either provides for compensa-
tion when regulations diminish property rights in ways that don't rise to
the level of a constitutional taking or that requires greater than one hun-
dred percent compensation for takings under eminent domain or reduc-
tions in market value over and above a certain percentage.33' Notably,
until 2000, the only two states that put the issue to public referenda, Ari-
zona and Washington, discovered that the public was skeptical of the true
protections to property rights these laws would provide.332 In 2000, Ore-
gon voters adopted the first property rights referendum in the country,
which is truly ironic given Oregon's position as one of the leaders in
well-managed and smart growth.333
As a general rule, the individual private landowner favors broad regu-
latory powers because she does not want to be subjected to large-scale
environmental nuisances caused by cement plants, chemical refineries,
mines, logging, farm effluent, and other industrial uses. Despite the im-
age of the private landowner told she cannot protect her home from for-
est fires because the kangaroo rat lives nearby, these takings bills are de-
signed to protect corporate landowners. It is very revealing that seventy-
eight percent of all privately held land in the U.S. is owned by only
2.65% of private landowners. In contrast, the nearly sixty million own-
ers of residential property own only three percent of all private land.334
These takings bills are designed to protect the large landowner with the
resources and sophistication to influence legislatures and bankroll litiga-
330. Sugameli,supra note 19,at 552 n.126.
331. FLA. STAT. ANN. §70.001 (West Supp. 1996); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 49-33-1 to -19 (Supp.
1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3601-3602, 3608-3612, 3621-3624 (West Supp. 1996); TEX. GOv.
CODE ANN. §§ 2007.001-.006, .021-.026, .041-.045 (West Supp. 1996); and WASH. LEGIS. SERV.
261 (repealed by referendum, Nov. 7, 1995).
332. See Dennis Wagner, 'War' in Wings as Voters Reject Property Rights Issue, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC/PHOENIX GAZETTE, Nov. 9, 1994, at A 13 (for discussion of Ariz. Prop. 300); Eric Pryne
& David Postman, Referendum 48. Defeat Has Louder Echoes-A Property Rights Stall Now in Con-
gress Too? SEATTLE TIMEs, Nov. 9, 1995, at A I (for discussion of Wash. Ref. 48).
333. See Jeff Barnard, Oregon's Land Use Laws Threatened, ASSOC. PRESS, Jan. 27, 2001, avail-
able at 2001 WL 9870687.
334. Private Property Rights and Environmental Laws: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Env 't and Pub. Works, 104th Cong. 104-299, 205 (1996). See Sugameli, supra note 19, at n.215.
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tion at the expense of the vast majority of small and residential landown-
ers whose land will pay the cost of deregulation and whose pockets will
fund the buyout.3"
From the political side, these property rights groups are pulling out all
the stops. The website of Dick Welsh, founder of the National Associa-
tion of Reversionary Property Owners (NARPO) gives details on how to
get environmentally friendly politicians out of office and property rights
advocates in. s36 It suggests ways to disrupt town and county commission
meetings by "stacking" the audience with one's family members, includ-
ing children, just to take up the seats that would otherwise be occupied
by members voicing opposing views. It recommends being loud and vo-
cal to attract the news media and reminds us that "local elections are
much easier to influence than the nationals. Besides, not much media at-
tention is focused on the local elections" and therefore more influence
can be imposed with less oversight. A trip to the NARPO website can
lead one on a seemingly endless journey to property rights sites loaded
with information about how to influence local politics. Interestingly, the
site for the American Land Rights Association (ALRA) lists the financial
sponsors of its yearly congressional vote index that tallies the federal leg-
islators and their voting records on property rights issues. The list of
sponsors is a predictable medley of forestry, logging, mining, farming,
cattle ranching, free enterprise, and development interests. On the 1998
co-sponsors list, there are 228 corporate sponsors to thirty-four individ-
ual sponsors, nearly seven to one, further supporting the claim that this is
a movement primarily funded by corporate development interests who
use the woeful stories of individuals to appeal to politicians while seek-
ing to halt land-use controls that would restrict their development and
exploitation rights. 3"
Despite the property rights movement, can land use restrictions that
promote quality-of-life values survive? There is certainly no reason to
believe that all legal avenues are soon to be foreclosed. In fact, despite
the tremendous amount of money invested in litigation, lobbying of leg-
islatures, and propaganda stirring up landowners, the successes have
been few and far between. From a legal perspective, recreational trails
would appear safe. While numerous state legislatures have taken pains
to deny eminent domain for trail acquisition in the past few years, times
335. David Russ, How the "Property Rights " Movement Threatens Property Values in Florida, 9
J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 395 (1994).
336. See http://www.halcyon.comldick/.
337. See American Land Rights Ass'n., supra note 323. If the monetary value of investments
were calculated, the differential would be much greater than seven-to-one.
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eventually change. For just as the NTSA prohibited use of eminent do-
main between 1978 and 1983, it looks like the Appalachian Trail may
soon be completed, though not by the hoped-for deadline of the end of
2000.338 Perhaps the best way is a concerted public relations movement
to redefine the issue as a promotion of property values and protection of
property rights rather than the deprivation or the taking of property.
3 39
For limitations on my neighbor's rights to develop her land is a protec-
tion of my right to be free of unwanted and burdensome development
and to retain market value of my land.
VIII.A FEW SUGGESTIONS
One way to promote the development of recreational trails is for the
states to explicitly permit the use of eminent domain power for the acqui-
sition of trail land, and to encourage the development of state-wide trails
systems. It is unfortunate that a beneficial public good like trails cannot
be achieved solely through the beneficence of willing sellers and donors.
A single landowner can frustrate and stymie a trail since a small portion
of interconnected parcels are necessary to make the trail work. Thus, for
the same reason railroads and highway authorities needed the power of
eminent domain, so too do parks departments and trail developers.
While state law can limit the property right taken to a trail easement, it
may be more beneficial to the landowner if the state simply takes the un-
derlying fee as well. In that case, recreational user statutes would not be
needed to absolve landowners of potential liability for injuries to trail us-
ers.34 A statutory regime that allowed for appropriation of a fee simple
determinable would protect the landowners' rights to get the land back if
it ever was abandoned. Similarly, generous tax incentives can encourage
landowners to donate or sell trail easements, thus minimizing the need
for condemnation proceedings.
A second way to promote the development of trails would be to extend
the eminent domain powers of the NTSA to National Historic and na-
tional recreation trails as well as National Scenic Trails. While the Fran-
ciscan Friars of Graymoor may disapprove of the Park Service's appro-
priation of their land for a buffer zone, doing so does not generally take
338. See Fitzgerald, supra note 101, at Al 9.
339. See Louise Halper, Tropes of Anxiety and Desire: Metaphor and Metonymy in the Law of
Takings, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 31 (1996).
340. See Robin Miller, Effect of Statute Limiting Landowner's Liability for Personal Injury to
Recreational User, 47 A.L.R.4th 262 (2001); John C. Becker, Landowner or Occupier Liability for
Personal Injuries and Recreational Use Statutes: How Effective is the Protection? 24 IND. L. REv.
1587 (1991).
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pre-existing uses of landowners; it simply takes the possibility of future
development. As with the Graymoor Monastery, the eighteen acres be-
ing appropriated is currently undeveloped land which the Friars had no
intention of developing in the near future. Hence, appropriation projects
could work closely with landowners to grant them continuing agricul-
tural and low impact uses for as long as they continue to own their land.
And upon sale, those rights would cease. Ranchers abutting the National
Forests can hardly complain if they are permitted to continue making ag-
ricultural use of their land, even if they may be denied the right to exploit
it in ways that are contrary to the values protected by open space, park,
and trail regulations.
Currently, the federal government makes ten percent of all federal
highway funds available solely for the use of enhancements. 341 These
enhancements can include everything from a bicycle trail to an underpass
mural. Oddly, some states have refused to take advantage of the program
because the state transportation agencies consider the comparatively
small enhancement projects to be more trouble than they are worth.342
When a state department of transportation has a budget of a $100 million
for a road project, it finds that a $100 thousand trail project is not worth
the engineering, regulatory, and public-relations efforts it requires. This
is especially true if the DOT engineers expect trail developers to go
through all the same engineering, environmental, and structural processes
that go into building a highway. The State of Indiana DOT, for instance,
required that all proposed trails meet the same structural specifications as
highways, thus requiring nearly a foot of cement foundation under the
asphalt of what is, in most instances, nothing but a glorified sidewalk.
Removing bureaucratic obstacles and providing an expedited bidding
process for small projects like trails can greatly increase the likelihood
that small contractors will be willing to bid on those projects.
The Federal Highway Administration has provided guidelines to state
DOTs to help them streamline the trail development process. 343 Yet bu-
reaucratic inertia has often prevented those guidelines from having any
effect. To the extent a new commissioner can create incentives, trails
projects can flourish. It is not a coincidence that in the past thirty years
most state DOTs have been renamed from their earlier nomenclature as
341. Transportation Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3037(a), 112 Stat. 107, 387-88
(1998) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 5309).
342. See. e.g., John Katzenberger, Hoosier Rail Trails Log Surrounding States, GANNETr NEWS
SERV., Aug. 27, 1997; "'Rails-to-Trails" Hits Snag-Hikers, Bikers Want Old Train Land; So Do
Farmers, EVANSVILLE COURIER, May II, 1997, at A5.
343. See FHWA guidelines, supra note 133, available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/tea21.
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"highway departments." Transportation in the twenty-first century will
necessarily include an expanded role for railroads as well as increased
avenues for public transportation and alternative transportation like cy-
cling and walking. As DOTs embrace their new functions, they will find
ways to promote trails and still maintain our superhighways.
The use of railroad corridors is an unparalleled example of combining
efficiency with good sense. Because most railroad corridors already con-
tain numerous utility lines, sewer lines, and even flood plain controls,
they are often not suitable for fractionation and reversion to landowners
anyway. They were generally acquired with extensive public donations
and consequently retain a semblance of public ownership. To the extent
that utility companies will open their easements to recreational trail use,
cities and landowners can trade future utility access rights in rail corri-
dors. Moreover, shared utility use can often make a trail costless to the
taxpayer because royalties can cover maintenance and security costs. A
single fiber-optic cable in a trail shoulder can raise enough annual reve-
nues to maintain the trail. To the extent that railroads, utilities, and mu-
nicipalities can work together, we can probably reach the Rails-to-Trails
Conservancy's goal of having a dedicated trail within a mile of every-
one's front door.
And finally, these railbanking challenges need to be stopped. While
the legal team filing these class action suits simply prints another com-
plaint off the word processor and files it in a different federal district
court each time it loses in another court, 344 a decisive ruling that the rail-
banking act does not work a taking would halt these cases in their tracks.
Doing so is a recognition of the railroad's future property interests as
well as the public's, who have at least as much claim to the property
rights of abandoned railroad corridors as landowners who purchased the
land only recently with no reasonable expectation that the railroad would
abandon.
IX. CONCLUSION
While the importance of recreational trails in the grand scheme of en-
vironmental regulation and land-use controls may not seem as pressing
as other projects vying for limited tax dollars, the truth is that trails are
the new venues for public recreation. Neighborhood parks have lost
much of their earlier appeal because they are localized and confined, thus
not allowing for changes in scenery, the flexibility to combine recreation
344. See Armon, supra note 176.
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with shopping or commuting, or the capacity to meet changing modes of
recreation and exercise. Trails can serve the needs of a wide diversity of
users, from after-dinner strollers to long-distance marathon runners, cy-
clists, and inline skaters. Unlike parks that require special facilities like
baseball diamonds, basketball courts, and playgrounds, a linear trail can
meet the needs of hundreds of users simply by being long and conven-
iently located. With increased use of automobiles, cyclists and pedestri-
ans cannot safely share most urban streets. For the outdoors adventure-
seeker, wilderness trails provide some of the last remaining experiences
of a rugged and long-lost American past. Trails link us to our future as
well as our past. By preserving railroad corridors for future rail use, we
provide a way of linking people that gets them out of their cars and into
the public world.
Trails are a legal paradox, however, because to the extent courts view
them as recreational facilities rather than transportation corridors, they
can be defeated in Dolan-type situations. Yet to the extent they are
viewed as transportation and not recreation, they are open to Hoepker
criticisms that roads already cover transportation needs and mandated
park space covers the recreational needs, and that trails are simply qual-
ity-of-life amenities that developers should not have to provide. At this
point, while trails have been determined to meet the public use require-
ment for the exercise of eminent domain on the grounds that they are like
parks and open spaces, that narrow analogue may prevent the use of ex-
actions in business and single-residence development, as occurred in Do-
lan and Nollan. Moreover, if legal challenges to rail corridor conver-
sions remain successful, the benefits of trails and future rail
transportation needs will be sacrificed.
While I certainly agree with Justice Holmes that "a strong public de-
sire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving
the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the
change,345 state legislatures, under pressure from the property rights
movement, have foreclosed even the possibility of paying to improve the
public condition by denying the power of eminent domain in trails land
acquisition. Yet because of their unique linear character, trails cannot
feasibly be built if they can only be purchased from willing sellers, ex-
cept in the case of rail corridor conversions where the willing seller is
deemed to own the entire corridor. As Preseault reminds us, however,
ownership of rail corridors is a highly contentious proposition.
It is ironic that when the railroads came through in the nineteenth cen-
345. Pa. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
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tury, they were hailed as the harbingers of the future. They opened up
land for homesteading, they provided markets for agricultural products,
and they dramatically reduced travel time across this vast country. Peo-
ple were in such a hurry for the railroads that they courted new compa-
nies, heavily subsidized them, and promised unbounded rewards in land
and business. Yet as the promises of railroad riches failed to materialize,
Americans were mesmerized by a new technological innovation, the
automobile. Yet after nearly a century of vast public expenditures on
roads and highways, the automobile has now become one of our biggest
environmentalland cultural threats. Trails, however, offer a way to link
the investment and history of past generations, with the demands for in-
dividual freedom and convenience of the present generation, and with the
promises and commitments we owe to future generations. Converting a
rail corridor to a trail for interim use while preserving it for future trans-
portation needs is, as Judge Pratt put it, a "remarkably efficient and sen-
sible way" to further both goals.
346
346. Preseault v. ICC, 853 F.2d 145, 150 (2d Cir. 1988), aff'd. 494 U.S. I (1990).
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